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TREATY-BASED RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 
OF INDIVIDUALS 
Carlos Manuel Vazquez* 
Treaties are frequently described as contracts between nations. 1 
As instruments of international law, they establish obligations with 
which international law requires the parties to comply. In the United 
States, treaties also have the status oflaw in the domestic legal system. 
The Supremacy Clause declares treaties to be the "supreme Law of the 
Land" and instructs the courts to give them effect. 2 The status of trea-
ties as law in two distinct legal orders has given rise to unusual concep-
tual problems. In recent years, it has produced confusion among the 
courts regarding the enforceability of treaties in the courts by individu-
als. As Chief justice Marshall long ago observed, "[t]he province of the 
court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals .... "3 Accord-
ingly, it is frequently said that treaties are enforceable by individuals in 
our courts only when they confer rights on individuals.4 Yet it is widely 
held that treaties, as international instruments, establish legal obliga-
tions and correlative legal rights only of the nations that are parties to 
them, not of individuals.5 
The conjunction of these two propositions has led some courts to 
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. Yale; J.D. 
Columbia. I am grateful to Anita Allen, David Cole, Steven Goldberg, Michael 
Gottesman, Vicki jackson, jane Stromseth, Mark Tushnet, and the other participants in 
Georgetown's Faculty Research Workshop for their comments on an earlier draft of this 
Article. I also gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Joseph C. Bryce, 
Stephen]. Campo, jose Carlos Fraga, and Timothy Hruby. I have previously addressed 
some of the issues discussed in this Article in briefs amicus curiae filed in Haitian Refugee 
Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987) and Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 949 
F.2d 1109 (11th Cir. 1991). 
1. See Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2. 
Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). 
2. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
3. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). 
4. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109, 1110 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(treaty must "directly accord[] enforceable rights to persons"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 
1295 (1992); Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 937 
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (treaty must "confer rights on private individuals"); United States v. 
Bent-Santana, 774 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir. 1985) (treaty must confer "privately 
enforceable rights"); Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1985) (treaty must 
confer "rights enforceable by private litigants in American courts"); cf. Head Money 
Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884) (treaty enforceable by individuals when "its 
provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizens or subject may be 
determined"). 
5. See, e.g., United States v. Zabeneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988); United 
States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 37-38 (1st Cir. 1981); United States ex rei. Lujan v. 
Gengler, 510 F.2d 62,67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975); United States v. 
Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909, 916 (D.D.C. 1988); cases cited infra note 6. 
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dismiss individuals' treaty-based claims or defenses out of hand.6 
Other courts have accepted the general validity of the premises but 
have permitted individuals in particular circumstances to vindicate the 
rights of the states-parties. The recent Ninth Circuit decisions in United 
States v. Verdugo-Urqu{dez 7 and United States v. Alvarez-Machain 8 illustrate 
the latter approach. The defendants, Mexican nationals accused of 
murdering DEA agent Enrique Camarena, claimed that they had been 
abducted from Mexico and brought to the United States by persons 
acting at the behest of the United States govemment.9 They argued 
that their abduction violated the United States' obligations under its 
extradition treaty with Mexico and that, accordingly, they must be repa-
triated.10 The Ninth Circuit in Verdugo agreed that the extradition 
treaty prohibited the United States from abducting persons from Mexi-
can territory.ll It then turned to what it considered the more difficult 
issue: whether the defendants had standing to raise the treaty prohibi-
tion. The court held that, because Mexico had protested the abduction, 
the defendants had derivative standing to enforce Mexico's rights 
under the treaty.12 Mexico's protest distinguished these cases from 
prior decisions that had denied defendants standing to raise similar 
treaty provisions.I3 
The holdings in Verdugo and Alvarez, and in the cases that the Ninth 
Circuit distinguished, were based, either explicitly or implicitly, on the 
two premises mentioned above: that individuals do not have rights 
under treaties as a matter of international law and that individuals may 
enforce treaties domestically on their own behalf only when they have 
rights under the treaties as a matter of international law. If both prem-
ises were true, and if the Ninth Circuit's derivative standing holding 
were rejected, 14 treaties would never be enforceable by individuals in 
our courts. But, if so, and if the province of the courts is solely to de-
6. See, e.g., Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 111 S. Ct. 209 (1990); Zabeneh, 837 F.2d at 1261; Cordero, 668 F.2d at 38; 
Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976); 
United States v. Martinez, 755 F. Supp. 1031, 1034-35 (N.D. Ga. 1991); United States v. 
Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1533-35 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Yuni5, 681 F. Supp. at 916. 
7. 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3344 (U.S. 
Oct. 21, 1991) (No. 91-670). 
8. 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 857 (1991). 
9. See Alvarez, 946 F.2d at 1467; Verdugo, 939 F.2d at 1343. 
10. See Alvarez, 946 F.2d at 1467; Verdugo, 939 F.2d at 1359. 
11. See Verdugo, 939 F.2d at 1352. 
12. The Court said that "an individual who is not a party to an agreement between 
the United States and a foreign nation [may] assert the rights of that nation in our 
courts." 939 F.2d at 1356. 
13. See id. at 1346-47. The court in Alvarez followed the Verdugo decision. 
14. The U.S. Justice Department argues that the Ninth Circuit's standing holding 
should be reversed. Petition for the United States for Certiorari at 19-21, Verdugo (No. 
91-670); Brief for United States at 35-37, Alvarez (No. 91-712) [hereinafter Brieffor the 
United States in Alvarez]; Reply Brief for United States at 15-17, Alvarez (No. 91-712). 
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cide the rights of individuals, how would the Supremacy Clause's man-
date that courts give effect to treaties as law of the land be fulfilled? 
The answer offered here is that, by declaring treaties to be laws, the 
Framers meant to make treaties enforceable by individuals in our 
courts. That the Framers considered it the province of the courts to say 
what the law is and to decide the rights of individuals shows that, by 
declaring treaties to be laws and instructing courts to give them effect, 
the Framers intended to alter (or make irrelevant) for domestic pur-
poses those qualities of treaties as instruments of international law that 
have recently been advanced to deny individuals standing to enforce 
them. 
Part I of this Article examines what is meant by the statement that 
individuals do not have rights under treaties as a matter of international 
law. I conclude that this statement means only that individuals lack the 
power to set in motion the machinery of international law for enforcing 
treaty obligations. I call this the classic conception of the position of 
the individual in international law, which reflects the strict sanctionist 
sense of the term "right." That treaties have long been enforced in our 
domestic courts, however, must mean either that the classic model does 
not accurately describe international law or that the ability of individu-
als to enforce treaties domestically does not turn on whether the treaty 
confers rights on individuals, in the strict sanctionist sense, as a matter 
of international law. I conclude that the enforceability of treaties do-
mestically is not explained by any claimed inaccuracy of the classic 
model. Treaties have been enforced by individuals in our courts 
throughout our history, even during the heyday of the classic model. If 
it is a condition of a treaty's enforceability by individuals in our courts 
that the treaty confer rights on individuals, the term right in this con-
text cannot be understood in its strict sanctionist sense. 
This, moreover, is exactly what the Framers intended. In Part II of 
this Article, I show that the Framers understood that treaties, as inter-
national instruments, were operative on states as bodies politic, not on 
individuals, and were dependent for their enforcement on either mili-
tary force or the good faith of the parties. It was precisely these quali-
ties of treaties that distinguished them, in the Framers' eyes, from laws. 
In the view of the Framers, laws were, by their nature, operative on 
individuals and enforceable in the ordinary courts. 
The inability of the general government under the Articles of Con-
federation to secure compliance with the nation's treaties, the acts of 
Congress, or the Articles themselves was among the principal animat-
ing causes of the Framers' decision to draft a new Constitution. The 
Framers attributed the inefficacy of the Articles to the qualities the Arti-
cles and acts of Congress shared with treaties: all three were operative 
on states as political bodies, rather than on individuals, and were de-
pendent for their enforcement on the good faith of the parties or on 
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military force. They were not laws; because they lacked a legal sanc-
tion, they were only morally binding. 
The Framers corrected this problem with respect to treaties in the 
same way they corrected it with respect to the acts of Congress and the 
foundational document itself: they gave all three the status of "law." 
This, in the Framers' view, made all three operative directly on individ-
uals and enforceable in the ordinary courts. Today, it is well recog-
nized that the institution of judicial review of legislative acts springs 
from the Supremacy Clause's designation of the Constitution as law. 1t 
is on the basis of the Constitution's status as law that we reject the con-
clusion that the Constitution is but a political document allocating pow-
ers among branches of government and not establishing judicially 
enforceable correlative rights of individuals. It is time to recognize that 
the Supremacy Clause had the very same effect with respect to treaties. 
That the Supremacy Clause makes treaties enforceable in the 
courts by individuals does not, of course, mean that any individual may 
enforce any treaty at any time. ln Part Ill of this Article, I propose a 
framework for determining which treaties may be enforced by individu-
als, which individuals may enforce them, and what remedies they may 
obtain. Consistent with the Supremacy Clause's equivalent treatment 
of the Constitution, treaties, and the acts of Congress, I propose that 
we address these problems with respect to treaties much as we address 
them with respect to the other categories of laws. First, as with consti-
tutional and statutory provisions, treaties should be enforceable in the 
courts only if they impose enforceable legal obligations. They should 
not be enforced by the courts if they are hortatory, if they do not estab-
lish the obligation the litigant seeks to enforce, or if they raise political 
rather than legal questions. Second, the obligations established by 
treaties should be enforceable only by individuals who have correlative 
primary rights. Ordinarily, a primary right is the obverse of primary 
duty and the holder of the primary right is easily identifiable. In ambig-
uous cases, I propose that standing principles be employed to deter-
mine when an individual has a primary right under a treaty, as they are 
with respect to constitutional and statutory provisions that impose obli-
gations on the state. If the party relying on the treaty is seeking affirm-
ative relief, rather than merely relying on the treaty as a defense, the 
party must establish in addition that he has a "right of action." There 
are a number of possible sources, other than the treaty itself, for the 
right of action of a plaintiff relying on a treaty. In the last section, I 
examine some of these bases and discuss how to determine, when there 
is no other basis for the plaintiff's action, whether a treaty itself confers 
a private right of action. Finally, I discuss how courts should decide 
what remedies to afford individuals for treaty violations. For this last 
purpose, I propose that, consistent with the Framers' intent to mini-
mize violations of international law by the United States, the 
Supremacy Clause be read to entitle individuals in our courts to such 
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remedies for treaty violations as would prevent or cure a violation by 
the United States of its international law obligations to the state of the 
individual's nationality. 
Many of the issues discussed in Part 111 of this Article are ad-
dressed by the courts today, incidentally and un-self-consciously, in the 
course of determining whether a treaty is self-executing. The courts, 
however, appear to regard the question whether or not the treaty is 
self-executing as distinct from, although perhaps related to, each of the 
foregoing issues. In Part III, I unpack the doctrine of self-executing 
treaties and show that it in fact masks a variety of distinct reasons why a 
treaty may be unenforceable in the courts by individuals without fur-
ther legislation. Failure to recognize the variety of the issues addressed 
under the self-execution rubric has produced what has been called the 
"most confounding [doctrine] in treaty law." 15 I urge that these issues 
be addressed by the courts separately and self-consciously, not through 
the ambiguous and little-understood doctrine of self-executing treaties. 
I. TREATY RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS UNDER INTERNATIONAL AND 
DoMESTic LAw 
Some lower courts and the U.S. Justice Department have recently 
advanced the position that a treaty may be invoked by individuals in our 
domestic courts only when the treaty confers rights on individuals as a 
matter of internationallaw. 16 But in the international legal order, as 
classically conceived, individuals do not have rights and duties: only 
sovereign states are thought to be subjects of international law and ac-
cordingly only states are thought to have rights and duties thereunder. 
If it were true that individuals can enforce treaties in our domestic 
courts only when they have rights under them as a matter of interna-
tionallaw, and if it were true that individuals do not have rights under 
treaties as a matter of international law, then individuals would never 
be able to enforce treaties in domestic courts. 
But treaties have long been successfully enforced by individuals in 
our courts. For this reason, one of these two premises would appear to 
be false: either it is not true that treaties may be invoked by individuals 
in our courts only if they confer rights on individuals as a matter of 
international law, or the classic model does not accurately describe all 
rules of international law. 
Although the classic model may not accurately describe all rules of 
international law either today or at the time the Constitution was 
adopted, the enforceability of treaties by individuals in our domestic 
courts cannot be explained by the claimed inaccuracies of the classic 
model. Individuals have successfully enforced treaties in our domestic 
15. United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 
(1979). 
16. See supra notes 4-14. 
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courts even though they would not have been considered to have had 
rights under the treaty as a matter of international law. Those who 
maintain that a treaty may be invoked by individuals in domestic courts 
only if it confers "rights" on individuals use the term "rights" to mean 
something quite different from what it means to those who maintain 
that individuals do not have "rights" under international law. 
In this Part, I examine what exactly is meant by the statement that 
individuals do not have "rights" under international law. I conclude 
that those who make that statement are using the term "right" in the 
strict sanctionist sense that ties the existence of a right to the legal 
power of the right-holder to invoke the machinery of the legal system to 
enforce compliance or remedy violations. So understood, the state-
ment that individuals do not have rights under a treaty as a matter of 
international law was true in 1789 and remains largely true today. But 
that disability has never defeated an individual's ability to enforce a 
treaty in our domestic courts. 
A. Individuals As Holders of Rights Under International Law 
The statement that individuals do not have rights under interna-
tional law is at bottom a statement that individuals do not have secon-
dary rights under international law-they lack the power to set in 
motion the machinery of international law for sanctioning violations of 
the obligations international law imposes. The classic model does not 
deny, however, that individuals may be holders of primary rights under 
international law: they may be the direct and intended beneficiaries of 
obligations imposed on states by international law. An Austinian posi-
tivist would deny that a primary right is a legal right if a secondary right 
is not annexed to it. Others would disagree. Whatever the merits of 
the ontological debate, the term "right" is susceptible to both significa-
tions. Recognizing the two senses of the term "right" permits us to 
reconcile the two premises with which this Article began: while the 
statement that individuals do not have rights under international law 
employs the term in its strict sanctionist sense, the statement that indi-
viduals may enforce treaties domestically only if the treaty confers 
rights on them as a matter of international law accurately describes the 
legal landscape only if the term is understood in the sense of a primary 
right. 
As described by Vattel, the law of nations is the law that governs 
the society of sovereign states, just as municipal laws are the laws that 
govern societies of persons. Nations or states, according to Vattel, "are 
bodies politic, societies of men united together for the purpose of pro-
moting their mutual safety and advantage by the joint efforts of their 
combined strength."17 States, in tum, are "moral persons who live to-
17. Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of Nature, 
Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, at lv Uoseph Chitty ed., 
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gether in a natural society, subject to the law ofnations."18 Thus, what 
persons are to municipal law, states are to international law. Just as 
persons are the subjects of the municipal law of a state, and thus only 
persons have rights and duties under municipal law, states are the sub-
jects of the law of nations and only states enjoy rights and duties 
thereunder.19 
The classic model does not deny that international law imposes ob-
ligations on states to behave in given ways towards individuals. But the 
duties so imposed are not thought to give rise to correlative rights in 
the individuals affected; the duties are considered to be owed to the 
states of which the individuals are citizens or subjects, and the correla-
tive rights are rights of such states, not of the individuals. Again, there 
is a parallel in municipal law. Municipal law recognizes the existence of 
objects, such as land, trees, and chairs, and it may require persons to 
treat them in certain ways, but such duties are duties towards other 
persons-either individually or collectively-and the correlative rights 
are rights of those other persons; they have not been thought to be the 
rights of the objects.20 In other words, only persons are the subjects of 
1863). This work first appeared in 1758, see id. at iii, and was well known to, and often 
cited with approval by, the Framers of our Constitution. Thomas Jefferson is reported to 
have said that "none is more [enlightened and disinterested a judge of the law of nature 
and the usage of nations] than Vattel." Charles G. Fenwick, The Authority ofVattel, 7 
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 395, 410 (1913). Alexander Hamilton described Vattel as "perhaps 
the most accurate and approved of the writers on the Law of Nations." Daniel George 
Lang, Foreign Policy in the Early Republic 11 (1985). 
18. Vattel, supra note 17, at 2. 
19. Pufendorf, Grotius, and Burlamaqui, among others, all shared this conception 
of international law as the law that governed the society of states, each considered as a 
moral or juristic person. See Edwin D. Dickinson, Changing Concepts and the Doctrine 
oflncorporation, 26 Am.]. lnt'l L. 239, 240-47 (1932). The content of much of the law 
of nations according to Vattel and Grotius, and of all of it according to Pufendorf and 
Burlamaqui, was derived from the law of nature. See id. Unlike persons in a civil 
society, states had not surrendered any portion of their liberty or independence to any 
public authority. Thus, they composed a society of moral persons in a state of nature, 
like persons who, "before the establishment of civil societies, lived together in a state of 
nature." Vattel, supra note 17, at lv. The notion that the law of nations is derived from 
principles of natural law was thus not considered by these writers to be inconsistent with 
the notion that only states are the subjects of international law. 
By the nineteenth century, the content of international law was understood to be 
derived primarily, if not entirely, from other sources, such as custom or convention. 
During this period, the conception of international law as the law governing the society 
of nations, each considered to be a moral person, persisted and indeed gained strength, 
and it continues to be the predominant view. 
20. See Michael Akehurst, A Modem Introduction to International Law 70 (6th ed. 
1987) ("In the nineteenth century ... international law regarded individuals in much the 
same way as municipal law regards animals."). Just as international law has evolved to 
the point where entities other than sovereign states may have rights thereunder, it has 
been argued that municipal law too should recognize rights of things other than 
persons. See Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?: Toward Legal 
Rights for Natural Objects (I 972). Nevertheless, it has been generally accepted 
throughout our history that only persons (and associations of persons, such as 
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rights and duties under municipal law; land, trees, and chairs may, how-
ever, be the objects of such rights and duties. Similarly, individuals 
have been described as the "objects" rather than the "subjects" of in-
ternationallaw.21 
But if international law imposes obligations on states to behave in 
certain ways towards individuals, in what respect do individuals lack 
"rights" under international law? Under the classic model, if state A is 
obligated to behave in a given way towards the nationals of state B, the 
obligation is thought to be owed to the aggregate of the individuals 
making up state B. If state A violates an obligation, it becomes respon-
sible not to the national, but to state Bas a society. If it does not repair 
the injury, only state B is permitted by international law to set in mo-
tion the machinery of international law for sanctioning violations of the 
relevant international law norm. State B, however, has the discretion 
not to pursue an international claim; it may subordinate the interests of 
the individual to those of the larger society.22 For the injured individ-
ual, the primary practical consequence is that he lacks the power to en-
force obligations or remedy violations; the effectiveness of the rule of 
law is dependent on the willingness of the state to seek a sanction for 
. the violation of the rule. 
The statement that individuals do not have rights under interna-
tional law is thus best understood as a statement that individuals do not 
under international law have what might be called secondary or reme-
dial rights, as distinguished from primary rights. The distinction be-
tween primary and secondary rights derives from that between primary 
and secondary rules of law. Primary rules in municipal legal systems 
are those under which "human beings are required to do or abstain 
from certain actions, whether they wish to or not. " 23 Secondary rules 
are "in a sense parasitic upon" primary rules.24 They include rules that 
specify the consequences of violations of the primary rules.25 A secon-
dary or remedial right is thus a right to obtain a remedy or sanction 
corporations, municipalities, and states) have rights and duties under municipal law. 
See id. at 53-54. 
21. See Carl A. N6rgaard, The Position of the Individual in International Law 35 
(1962); Rosalyn Higgins, Conceptual Thinking About the Individual in International 
Law, 24 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. I I, 13 (1978); George Manner, The Object Theory of the 
Individual in International Law, 46 Am. J. Int'l L. 428, 428 (1952). For other 
discussions of this aspect of the classic model, see Charles G. Fenwick, International Law 
32,86-87 (2d ed. 1934); 1 L. Oppenheim, International Law 2, 17-19,456-63 (3d ed. 
1920). 
22. See, e.g., C.F. Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law 59-60 
(1990); Edwin M. Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 29-32 (1915). 
23. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 78-79 (1961). 
24. Id. at 79. 
25. See id. at 95. Hart defined secondary rules broadly to include not only those 
relating to remedial rights, but also rules regarding how primary rules may be 
recognized, promulgated, and modified. It may be that only states have secondary rights 
(or powers) under international law for purposes of these other types of secondary rules. 
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upon the violation of a primary right; a primary right is one that does 
not arise from a prior breach of a legal duty.2 6 
The view that individuals lack rights under international law re-
flects the sanctionist view of law, under which the existence of a right 
turns on the power of the right-holder to set in motion on his own 
behalf the machinery of the legal system for enforcing obligations and 
sanctioning departures from them. 27 This understanding of the con-
cept of a legal right has a venerable lineage in Anglo-American law. 
Evidence of a sanctionist understanding oflaw can be found among the 
writings of the Framers of our Constitution.28 The sanctionist position 
was also a tenet of the positivists of the Nineteenth Century school of 
analytical jurisprudence. John Austin considered the "nearest to a true 
definition" of the term "right" to be "the capacity or power of exacting 
from another or others acts or forebearances."29 Similarly, Professor 
Corbin, following Hohfeld, defined a right as "the legal relation of A to 
B when society commands action or forbearance by B and will at the 
instance of A in some manner penalize disobedience."30 Professor Stone 
For present purposes, however, it is sufficient to consider the status of individuals as 
holders of secondary rights in the more limited sense of remedial rights. 
26. See Arthur L. Corbin, Rights and Duties, 33 Yale LJ. 501, 515-16 (1924); see 
also Arthur L. Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 Yale LJ. 163, 171 (1919) 
[hereinafter Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology] (defining a secondary right as "[a] 
right resulting from some operative fact that was a violation of some precedent right," 
and a primary right as "[a] right resulting from some operative fact that was not itself a 
violation of some precedent right"). Similarly, Professor Monaghan defines primary 
rules as those "that govern persons independently of litigation." Henry Paul 
Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983 and the APA, 91 Colum. L. 
Rev. 233, 249 (1991). Following Hart and Sacks, see Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. 
Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 153 
(tent. ed. 1958), he denominates a "remedial right" what Corbin calls a "secondary 
right." Austin uses the terms "sanctioning" rights and "secondary" rights 
synonymously to signify rights that "are consequences of delicts," which he defines, in 
tum, as "[a]cts, forebearances, and omissions, which are violations of[primary] rights or 
duties."· john Austin, Lectures on jurisprudence: The Philosophy of Positive Law 
44-45 (4th ed. 1873). He divides "sanctioning (secondary)" rights into two categories: 
"sanctioning (or preventive)" and "remedial (or reparative)." Id. at 45. 
In this Article, I shall use the term "secondary rights" to refer to both remedial and 
sanctioning rights. The term will refer to the right to enforce primary rights in advance 
of a violation and the right to obtain remedies after a violation. The term "secondary 
right" is more familiar in the international law literature than the terms "remedial" or 
"sanctioning" right. See, e.g., Louis Henkin et al., International Law 520 (2d ed. 1987). 
Also, for the sake of simplicity, the term "enforcement," as used herein, refers not only 
to preventing or terminating a violation of a law, but also to obtaining a remedy for the 
violation of the law. 
27. Uoyd calls this the "extreme sanctionist view of law" and disagrees with it. 
Dennis Lloyd, The Idea of Law 313 (1964). Katz espouses the view and acknowledges 
the label. AI Katz, The jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the Law 
of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 36 (1968). 
28. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text. 
29. Austin, supra note 26, at 410. 
30. Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, supra note 26, at 167 (emphasis 
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likewise maintains that a thing31 can be considered a holder of legal 
rights only if three criteria are satisfied: "[F]irst, that the thing can in-
stitute legal actions at its behest; second, that in determining the granting 
of legal relief, the court must take injury to it into account; and, third, 
that relief must run to the benefit of it."32 
This sanctionist understanding of the terms "law" and "right" is 
also reflected in Supreme Court decisions throughout our history. 
Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Marbury v. Madison:33 "The government 
of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of 
laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appel-
lation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal 
right."34 Justice Holmes ridiculed the concept of an unenforceable 
right in The Western Maid:35 "Legal obligations that exist but cannot be 
enforced are ghosts that are seen in the law but that are elusive to the 
grasp."36 Justice Stevens observed that, unless we recognize individual 
remedies for violations of the Bill of Rights, "the Bill of Rights should 
be renamed."37 These writers and jurists would deny that individuals 
have a legal right under international law, even if international law re-
quires the state to treat them in a particular way, if international law 
does not recognize their power to employ the system's machinery for 
enforcing the rule and sanctioning departures from it. 
Other scholars argue that individuals may be said to have a right 
even if the legal system does not recognize their power to initiate legal 
actions or otherwise obtain relief at their own behest.38 The Perma-
nent Court oflnternationalJustice has stated that "it is scarcely neces-
sary to point out that the capacity to possess civil rights does not 
necessarily imply the capacity to-exercise those rights ones·el£."39 Hart 
and Sacks have little trouble recognizing the existence of a primary 
added). Corbin stated that his definitions were "in large part based upon" Hohfeld's. 
ld. at 163. 
31. Stone argues that society should recognize inanimate objects as holders oflegal 
rights. He acknowledges, though, that under existing law such objects were not holders 
oflegal rights, as he defined the term. See Stone, supra note 20, at 53-54. 
32. ld. at 11. 
33. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
34. ld. at 163. 
35. 257 u.s. 419 (1922). 
36. ld. at 433. 
37. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 978 (1984) (Stevens,]., dissenting); see 
also First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 660 (1924) ("To demonstrate the 
binding quality of a statute but deny the power of enforcement involves a fallacy made 
apparent by the mere statement of the proposition, for such power is essentially 
inherent in the very conception of law."). 
38. See, e.g., Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights 27-29 
(1973); Louis Henkin, International Human Rights as "Rights," 1 Cardozo L. Rev. 425, 
446 (1979). 
39. Appeal from ajudgment of the Hungaro-Czechoslovak Mixed Arbitral Tribunal 
(Peter Pazmany Univ. v. Czech.), 1933 P.C.IJ. (ser. AlB) No. 61, at 231 (Dec. 15). 
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right even if it is unaccompanied by a remedial right.40 They contrast a 
"primary right" with a "remedial right of action," which they describe 
as a "very different legal animal."41 They criticize Hohfeld and Corbin 
for "encourag[ing] ... confusion [between a primary claim to a per-
formance and a remedial capacity to invoke a sanction for non-perform-
ance] by seeming to suggest that the right and the right of action 
necessarily went together so that if there was no right of action there 
was no primary right in a genuine sense to begin with, and vice 
versa."42 
For purposes of the present inquiry, we need not join the debate 
about whether the object of a primary duty may be said to have a legal 
right if the legal system does not give him a secondary or remedial 
right. We may even agree with the sanctionists that a rule not accompa-
nied by a sanction creates moral rather than legal rights.43 For present 
purposes, it suffices merely to recognize that the term "right" -a term 
that is "incorrigibly multifarious in actual usage"44-admits of both sig-
nifications. This permits us to square the two premises introduced 
above as follows: The classic model maintains only that individuals do 
not have rights under international law in the sanctionist sense, that is, 
individuals lack secondary rights under international law.45 But the 
40. 
Such a right, in strictness, is a valid claim to the personal benefit of the 
performance of a legal duty, not deriving from any default (through breach of 
duty or defective exercise of power) occurring in any precedent legal position. 
Usually the right, if there is one in any particular private person, is the mere 
obverse of the duty. 
The breach of a primary private duty may or may not give rise, by 
operation of law, to a remedial private duty. 
Hart & Sacks, supra note 26, at 153. 
41. Id. at 152. 
42. Id. 
43. See infra note 61-65 and accompanying text. 
44. Hart & Sacks, supra note 26, at 151; accord 4 Roscoe Pound, jurisprudence 56 
(1959) ("There is no more ambiguous word in legal and juristic literature than the word 
right."); Monaghan, supra note 26, at 249; cf. David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-
of-Law Problem, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 173, 175-76 (1933) ("[O]ne may now wonder how 
any juristic construct such as 'right' could have been accepted as fundamental in the 
explanation of any important aspect of judicial activity."). 
45. Indeed, the statement that individuals do not have rights under international 
law would be true only if the term "right" were understood in an extreme sanctionist 
sense. International law includes not only rules requiring the state to behave in certain 
ways towards individuals, but also rules requiring the state to afford the individual 
certain remedies domestically if that obligation is violated. Thus, a treaty might obligate 
parties not only to behave in a given way towards individuals, but also to afford 
individuals a domestic judicial remedy in certain circumstances. See infra note 319 and 
accompanying text. This has satisfied some scholars who hold the sanctionist view of 
law that individuals do have rights under international law. See Hans Kelsen, Principles 
of International Law 140 (1952). A defender of the classic view, however, would 
maintain that individuals lack rights under international law even in such circumstances 
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statement that individuals may enforce a treaty in our domestic courts 
only if it gives them rights as a matter of international law is true only if 
the term "right" is understood in the sense of a primary right simplic-
iter-that is, a primary claim to performance of a duty not necessarily 
accompanied by the power to enforce the primary right, or obtain a 
remedy for its violation, through the system's legal machinery. 
If the classic model accurately described all rules of international 
law throughout our history, it would be simple to demonstrate that the 
domestic enforceability of treaties has never in our history turned on 
whether the treaty conferred rights on individuals in the sanctionist 
sense as a matter of international law. Treaties under the classic model 
never confer rights on individuals as a matter of international law. If 
individuals' ability to enforce treaties domestically turned on whether 
they possessed such rights, individuals would never be able to enforce 
treaties in our courts. The many cases in which individuals have suc-
cessfully enforced treaties in our courts throughout our history show 
that the enforceability of a treaty domestically does not tum on whether 
the treaty confers rights on individuals under international law. 
because, in the absence of domestic incorporation of the international law rule requiring 
the remedy, the individual does not in fact possess a remedy obtainable in the domestic 
courts. If domestic law does incorporate the international rule, the individual's right is 
afforded by domestic law, not international law. See infra note 321 and accompanying 
text. Should the state fail to afford a remedy, it would violate international law, but in 
that event only other states, not the individual, would have a remedy under international 
law. Kelsen does not dispute this last point, see Kelsen, supra, at 140, but he maintains 
that, when a domestic court affords an individual a remedy that international law 
obligates the state to afford, it is functioning as an agent of the international order for 
this purpose; the individual has a "right" under international law, in Kelsen's view, 
because he possesses both a primary right and a right to obtain a remedy from an 
"international" tribunal (the domestic court functioning as an international court) for 
violation of the primary right. 
Kelsen's position reflects a monist understanding of the relationship between 
international and municipal law, under which municipal legal systems are viewed as 
parts of the international legal order, properly addressing only those subjects that 
international law delegates to them. The extreme sanctionist position, on the other 
hand, reflects the dualist understanding that international law and domestic law are 
distinct legal orders and that the rnles of international law do not have any necessary 
status as law in the domestic legal order, and are not applied by the law-applying officials 
of that order, except to the extent they have been incorporated into or made relevant by 
domestic law. This Article argues that, at least with respect to treaties, the Framers held 
the dualist view regarding the status of international law as law in the absence of 
domestic incorporation, but adopted the Supremacy Clause to incorporate treaties into 
municipal law, thus effectively transforming the dualist system into a monist system 
(with limited exceptions, such as where a treaty exceeds the treaty-making power or is 
superseded by legislation, see infra note 145). Kelsen's observations do not conflict 
with this thesis. Kelsen did not claim that the monist theory accurately described how 
domestic courts in fact view their functions. Indeed, he acknowledged that Anglo-
American judges do not regard themselves as agents of international law, but instead 
apply international law only to the extent it has been made "part of" American or 
English law. Kelsen, supra, at 435 & n.27. 
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If the classic position did not in fact accurately describe interna-
tional law, it would be necessary to consider whether the domestic en-
forceability of treaties by individuals is explained by any departures 
from the classic model. In other words, it would be necessary to deter-
mine whether treaties are enforceable by individuals in our courts only 
when, and to the extent that, they fall within an exception to the classic 
notion that individuals do not have rights-in the sanctionist sense-
under international law. Accordingly, I next consider whether, at any 
time in our history, our conception of international law has diverged 
from the classic model and, if so, whether any such departures are rele-
vant to the analysis. 
B. The Validity of the Classic Model 
Most observers of international law would agree that the past sev-
eral decades have seen developments in international law that repre-
sent a repudiation of many of the premises of the classic model. Most 
importantly, the past decades have seen the emergence and recognition 
of norms of international law protecting human rights. These norms 
impose obligations on states towards individuals as human beings, not 
just as nationals of other states, and they limit the discretion of states 
even with respect to their own nationals. The recognition of such 
norms means that a state's obligations to behave in certain ways to-
wards individuals are no longer thought to be owed to the state of the 
individual's nationality for the collective benefit of the individuals com-
prising the state. This development of course represents a significant 
departure from the premises of the classic statist conception of interna-
tionallaw. 
Perhaps surprisingly, there has not been a corresponding expan-
sion of the secondary rights of individuals in the international legal or-
der. Although there has been a modest expansion of the right of 
individuals to enforce international norms affecting them in interna-
tional fora,46 for the most part such secondary rights continue to be 
enforceable on the international plane only by states.47 
The expansion of the international law rights of individuals as a 
result of the emergence of an international law of human rights does 
not support the conclusion that the enforceability of a treaty by individ-
uals domestically turns on whether the treaty confers rights on individ-
uals as a matter ofinternationallaw. Those who argue that treaties may 
be invoked by individuals in our courts only when they confer rights on 
individuals rely on statements from judicial opinions dating from the 
46. See, e.g., Elihu Lauterpacht, Aspects of the Administration of International 
Justice 67-72 (1991). 
·47. See Henkin, supra note 38, at 438-42. 
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late nineteenth century,48 truly the heyday of the classic model.49 Yet 
throughout that period individuals could enforce treaties in our 
courts.50 Thus, at that time, it was not true that individuals could en-
force treaties in our courts only if they had rights under the treaty as a 
matter of international law. 
The emergence of an international law of human rights does not 
justify a different rule. Conceivably, the expansion of international 
remedies of individuals for violations of international human rights 
norms might justify a corresponding contraction of domestic remedies, 
on the ground that domestic remedies are no longer necessary. 5 1 But if 
domestic remedies were to be contracted on this ground, the resulting 
rule would allow individuals to enforce treaties in our domestic courts 
when they do not have a right under the treaty-in the strict sanctionist 
sense of the term-as a matter of international law. This is, of course, 
the opposite of the rule that some lower courts have begun to apply.52 
As a general matter, the international law of human rights today seeks 
to protect individuals by requiring states to protect such rights in their 
domestic legal systems. 5 3 To rely on the modest expansion of the sec-
ondary rights of individuals under international law to hold that treaties 
are enforceable by individuals domestically only if they are enforceable 
by individuals internationally would be a perversion of international 
human rights law. It would reduce the ability of individuals to enforce 
48. The decision cited most frequently for this proposition is Head Money Cases, 
112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884). See, e.g., Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 850-51 
(D.C. Cir. 1976); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 29-30 (2d Cir. 1976); Brief of 
United States in Alvarez, supra note 14, at 34. 
49. See, e.g., Akehurst, supra note 20, at 73; Mark W. Janis, An Introduction to 
International Law 169-70 (1988). 
50. See, e.g., United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886), written by Justice 
Miller, the author of Head Money Cases, in which an individual was permitted to rely on a 
limitation implicit in the extradition treaty between the United States and Great Britain 
even though Great Britain could have waived the limitation, either before or after the 
extradition, and any remedy at the international level for the United States' failure to 
comply with the treaty would have been Great Britain's only. See also cases cited infra 
notes 258, 265, 30 1. In none of those cases would the individual have had the power to 
enforce the United States' duty on the international plane. Had the United States 
violated the obligation, the individual would have had to rely on the state of his 
nationality to pursue a remedy against the United States. See Banco Nacional de Cuba 
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 422-23 (1964) ("Because of its peculiar nation-to-nation 
character the usual method for an individual to seek relief [for a violation of 
international law] is to exhaust local remedies and then repair to the executive 
authorities of his own state to persuade them to champion his claim in diplomacy or 
before an international tribunal."). 
51. Even if such a change were justified, the question would remain whether the 
change should be accomplished by judicial decision, statute, or constitutional 
amendment. To the extent that the rules concerning enforceability of treaties in our 
courts have their source in a constitutional provision, a constitutional amendment would 
appear to be required. 
52. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
53. See Henkin, supra note 38, at 427-28. 
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treaties in the very cases in which the domestic remedy is most needed: 
when an international remedy is lacking. I accordingly put aside for 
present purposes the fact that the classic model does not accurately de-
scribe the position of the individual in international law in all respects 
today. 
Some scholars who challenge the classic model focus instead on 
how international law was perceived at the time of the Constitution's 
adoption. Increasingly, commentators have written that the classic view 
that individuals are not subjects of international law, and do not have 
rights and duties thereunder, did not prevail at the time our Constitu-
tion was adopted.54 If individuals in 1789 were thought to possess 
legal rights as a matter of international law, then it is possible that the 
Framers of our Constitution contemplated that individuals would be 
able to invoke treaties in our courts only when they would have pos-
sessed such rights under the treaties as a matter of international law. It 
might then be contended that the subsequent recognition that individu-
als do not have rights and duties under international law served to con-
tract the ability of individuals to invoke treaties domestically. 
Whatever the merits of the argument that international law as it 
was understood in 1789 operated on individuals and thus conferred 
legal rights on them directly, it is not pertinent to the present analysis. 
Even those who make the argument appear to extend it only to certain 
categories of international law, and they appear to agree that treaties 
were not one of those categories. 55 In any event, the available evi-
dence of the Framers' intent shows that they understood that treaties, 
as international instruments, operated on states as bodies politic, rather 
than on individuals. Because sovereign states acknowledged no supe-
rior, treaties depended for their enforcement on either the good faith 
54. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 
1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 Am. J. Int'l L. 461, 482-85 (1989); Anthony D'Amato, 
Judge Bork's Concept of the Law of Nations Is Seriously Mistaken, 79 Am]. Int'l L. 92, 
103-04 (1985); M.W. Janis, Individuals as Subjects of International Law, 17 Cornell 
Int'l LJ. 61, 61-64 (1984); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 
100 Yale LJ. 2347, 2351-53 (1991); Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: 
Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 Va. L. Rev. 1071, 1100 
(1985); Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of jonathan Robbins, 100 Yale 
LJ. 229, 252 (1990). 
55. Thus, Professor D'Amato notes that, though certain rules of international law 
"appl[ied]" to individuals, treaties in 1789 "app[lied]" only to "political entities." 
D'Amato, supra note 54, at 104. And Professor Lobel maintains that the "necessary" 
law of nations derived from natural law was thought to confer rights directly on 
individuals, see Lobel, supra note 54, at 1080-81 & n.39, but treaties at the time were 
not thought to fall within this category. See Vattel, supra note 17, at lxvi (designating 
treaties and customary law as "arbitrary" law of nations). It is not clear that all of the 
commentators cited supra note 54 were using the term "right" in its strict sanctionist 
sense. To the extent that they were not, their differences with the classic model may be 
largely terminological. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
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of the parties or war. 56 In these respects, they considered treaties to be 
different from laws. Because treaties lacked a legal sanction, they con-
ferred on both states and individuals what a sanctionist would have 
considered moral rather than legal rights. In declaring treaties to be 
the law of the land, it was the Framers' intent to afford individuals a 
domestic legal santion for treaty violations. 
II. THE FRAMERs' INTENT REGARDING THE EFFECT OF THE SuPREMACY 
CLAUSE ON TREATIES 
The Framers' criticisms of the government established by the Arti-
cles of Confederation show that they understood that treaties, as inter-
national instruments, operated on states as bodies politic and were 
enforceable only by military force. They described the Articles as a 
"mere treaty" for these reasons. 
The new government that the Framers established, by contrast, 
was one of "law": its acts, treaties, and the Constitution were all three 
declared to be "laws." To the Framers, this meant that all three would 
be operative on individuals, not just on states, and would be enforcea-
ble in the courts. This was the mechanism by which the new govern-
ment sought to secure compliance with its acts. The Supremacy Clause 
transformed instruments that had previously been operative on states 
as political bodies and enforceable only by military force into instru-
ments operative on individuals and enforceable in the courts. 
A. The Framers' Views Concerning the Operation of Treaties on Individuals 
in the Absence of Domestic Incorporation 
The Framers' understanding of the effect of treaties as interna-
tional instruments, and their applicability to individuals in the absence 
of a domestic rule oflaw, is shown clearly by the criticisms they leveled 
at the document that they ~?-ad convened to modify or amend-the Arti-
cles of Confederation. The Articles of Confederation were criticized as 
ineffective because they operated on the states as bodies politic rather 
than on individuals and were dependent for their enforcement on mili-
tary force or the good faith of the parties. For these reasons, the Arti-
cles were described as a "mere treaty"57 between the thirteen states-
parties, and they and the acts of Congress-which similarly operated on 
states rather than individuals-were contrasted with "laws," which, in 
the Framers' view, by their nature operated on individuals and were 
enforceable in the courts.ss 
56. See infra part II.A. 
57. The Federalist No. 33, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton)(Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
58. These criticisms call to mind the familiar criticisms more recently directed at a 
similar foundational document-the Charter of the United Nations. See Akhil Reed 
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale LJ. 1425, 1448 (1987) ("[T]he 'United 
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That the Articles and the acts of Congress operated on states as 
political bodies rather than on individuals was thought by Hamilton to 
be their principal defect: 
The great and radical vice in the construction of the ex-
isting Confederation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for 
STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or 
COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished 
from the INDIVIDUALS of whom they consist .... The conse-
quence of this is that though in theory their resolutions con-
cerning those objects are laws constitutionally binding on the 
members of the Union, yet in practice they are mere recom-
mendations which the States observe or disregard at their 
option. 
There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a 
league or alliance between independent nations for certain de-
fined purposes precisely stated in a treaty ... , and depending 
for its execution on the good faith of the parties. Compacts of 
this kind exist among all civilized nations, subject to the usual 
vicissitudes of peace and war, of observance and nonobserv-
ance, as the interests or passions of the contracting powers 
dictate .... 
If the particular States in this country are disposed to 
stand in a similar relation to each other ... the scheme would 
indeed be pernicious. 59 
Though the Articles were laws in theory, they were in practice more 
analogous to treaties, which also "depend[ed] for [their] execution on 
the good faith of the parties."60 In words that call to mind Austin's 
later writings, 61 Hamilton wrote: 
It is essential to the idea of a law that it be attended with a 
sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or punishment for 
disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, 
the resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will, in 
fact, amount to nothing more than advice or 
recommendation. 62 
The Framers' understanding of the distinction between a law and a 
States' in 1787 was not much more than the 'United Nations' is in 1987: a mutual treaty 
conveniently dishonored on all sides."). 
59. The Federalist No. 15, at 108-09 (Alexander Hamilton)(Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
60. 1d. at 109. 
61. Austin defined a law as a command backed by sanctions. See Austin, supra note 
26, at 90-93. He thus concluded that an obligation not accompanied by a sanction for 
its violation was not a law properly so called. See id. at 101-02. He questioned the 
status of international law as law because its commands did not issue from and were not 
enforced by a determinate body. See id. at 187-89. He accordingly considered that 
international law belonged more properly to the realm of positive morality. See id. 
62. The Federalist No. 15, supra note 59, at 110. 
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treaty was spelled out even more clearly by Hamilton in the Federalist 
No. 33: 
A LAW, by the very meaning of the term, includes supremacy. 
It is a rule which those to whom it is prescribed are bound to 
observe. This results from every political association. If indi-
viduals enter into a state of society, the laws of that society 
must be the supreme regulator of their conduct. If a number 
of political societies enter into a larger political society, the 
laws which the latter may enact, pursuant to the powers in-
trusted to it by its constitution, must necessarily be supreme 
over those societies and the individuals of whom they are composed. 
It would otherwise be a mere treaty, dependent on the good faith of 
the parties.63 
In words echoing Hamilton's, Madison too expressed the view that 
a law, by its nature, requires a sanction, and in this respect differs from 
a treaty: 
A sanction is essential to the idea of law, as coercion is to 
that of Government. The federal system [under the Articles] 
being destitute of both, wants the great vital principles of a 
Political Constitution. Under the form of such a constitution, 
it is in fact nothing more than a treaty of amity of commerce 
and of alliance, between independent and sovereign States.64 
The positivist conception of a treaty as morally rather than legally 
binding is similarly evident in Madison's statement at the Convention 
that a "league or treaty ... in point of moral obligation might be as inviola-
ble as [a Constitution]" but "[i]n point of political operation" would not 
be applied by judges if it conflicted with a preexisting law.65 Along the 
same lines, Gouverneur Morris "explained the distinction between a 
federal and national, supreme, Govt.; the former being a mere compact 
resting on the good faith of the parties; the latter having a compleat 
and compulsive operation."66 
That the Articles and the acts of Congress operated on the states as 
63. The Federalist No. 33, supra note 57, at 204 (emphasis added). 
64. Observations of James Madison (April 1787), in 2 The Writings of James 
Madison 361, 363 (Gaillard Hunted., 1901). 
65. 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 93 (Max Farrand ed., rev. 
ed. 1966) [hereinafter Farrand]. 
66. 1 Farrand, supra note 65, at 34. 
That treaties were thought by the Framers to operate on states rather than on 
individuals is shown further by an exchange at the Convention between Luther Martin 
and Madison. Martin argued that "the General Govt. was meant merely to preserve the 
State Governts: not to govern individuals" and that therefore "its powers ought to be 
kept within narrow limits." 1d. at 437. Citing Vattel, among others, he maintained that, 
because "States like individuals were in a State of nature equally sovereign & free," they 
should be represented equally in the legislature. ld. Madison countered that "[t]he 
fallacy of [Martin's reasoning] lay in confounding mere Treaties ... with a compact by 
which an authority was created paramount to the parties, & making laws for the 
government of them." ld. at 446. Also at the Convention, Edmund Randolph argued 
that the Congress as constituted under the Articles were unfit for "Legislation over 
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bodies politic, rather than on individuals, and that the confederation 
lacked the authority to enforce its acts effectively were in theory distinct 
criticisms. One could conceive of a mechanism for effectively enforcing 
the acts of the confederation that would not have involved making them 
operative direcdy on individuals. But, as George Mason's statement at 
the start of the Convention shows, the Framers believed the two 
problems to be related: 
[T]he present confederation was not only deficient in not pro-
viding for coercion & punishment agst. delinquent States; but 
[he] argued very cogendy that punishment could not in the 
nature of things be executed on the States collectively, and 
therefore that such a Govt. was necessary as could directly operate 
on individuals, and would punish those only whose guilt re-
quired it. 67 
Not all of the Framers considered the Articles to be in all respects a 
"mere treaty." Indeed, the staunchest supporters of a new Constitu-
tion argued that the states had already surrendered a portion of their 
sovereignty and were thus not sovereign in the international sense even 
under the Articles of Confederation. 68 But all ascribed the inefficacy of 
the Articles to the characteristics they shared with treaties. At the Con-
necticut ratifying convention, William Samuel Johnson, a member of 
the Constitutional Convention, contrasted the treaty regime subsisting 
under the Articles with the regime of law contemplated by the 
Constitution: 
Under our old confederation, each State was bound by 
the most solemn obligations to pay its proportion of the na-
tional expense. If any state did not perform what it had so 
solemnly promised, it became a transgressor .... The other 
states have a right to redress; they have a right by the law of 
nature and nations to insist upon, and compel a performance. 
How shall this be done? There is no other way but by force of 
arms .... 
The Convention saw this imperfection in attempting to 
individuals," because they were "not elected by the people but by the Legislatures" of 
the States, and therefore "they are a mere diplomatic body." Id. at 256. 
67. ld. at 34 (emphasis added). Hamilton's statements quoted above, see supra 
text accompanying notes 59-63, also show the perceived relation between the two 
problems. 
68. For example, responding to the suggestion of some that the delegates to the 
Convention lacked the power to propose anything other than a federal plan, by which 
they meant a government in which "the power was exercised not on the people 
individually; but on the people collectively, on the States," Madison noted that "in some 
instances as in piracies, captures &c. the existing Confederacy . . . must operate 
immediately on individuals." Id. at 314; accord id. at 447. Hamilton made the same 
point. Id. at 283. These statements are not inconsistent with the Framers' 
understanding of the distinction between laws and treaties. The thrust of these 
statements was that the United States "never were independent States, were not such 
now, & never could be even on the principles of the Confederation." Id. at 467 
(statement of Elbridge Gerry). 
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legislate for States, in their political capacity; that the coercion 
of Law can be exercised by nothing but a military force. They 
have therefore gone upon entirely new ground. They have 
formed one new nation out of the individual States. The con-
stitution vests in the general legislature a power to make laws 
in matters of national concern; to appoint Judges to decide 
upon these Laws; and to appoint officers to carry them into 
execution. This excludes the idea of an armed force. The 
power, which is to enforce these Laws, is to be a legal power 
vested in proper magistrates. The force, which is to be employed, 
is the energy of Law; and this force is to operate only upon indi-
viduals, who fail in their duty to their country. This is the pe-
culiar glory of the constitution, that it depends on the mild 
and equal energy of the magistracy for the execution of the 
Laws.69 
The Framers, in short, understood that treaties between independent 
states operated on those states as bodies politic, not on individuals, and 
were morally binding on those states but enforceable only by force. In 
these respects, they considered treaties to be different from "laws, " 70 
which by their nature operated on individuals, had compulsive force, 
and were enforceable in the courts.71 
B. The Framers' Intent Concerning the Enforceability of Treaties by 
Individuals in Domestic Courts Under the Constitution 
The regime established by the Articles was ineffective, in the Fram-
ers' view, because the acts of Congress, their treaties, and the Articles 
themselves, lacked a legal sanction. Like "mere treaties," they were op-
erative on sovereign states, which acknowledged no superior, and they 
thus depended for their enforcement on the good faith of those states 
or on military force. The Framers addressed this problem by annexing 
a sanction to all three. They gave all three the status of municipal law 
and accordingly made all three enforceable in the domestic courts by 
and against individuals. 
The treaty-making power under the Articles was vested in Con-
69. William Samuel johnson, Speech in the Connecticut Ratifying Convention, jan. 
4, 1788, reprinted in 15 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 
248-49 Qohn P. Kaminski & Gaspare]. Saladino eds., 1984) (emphasis added). 
70. This understanding of "law" is by no means archaic. See Lon L. Fuller, The 
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 372 (1978) ("The object of the 
rule of law is to substitute for violence peaceful ways of settling disputes."). 
71. See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) ("The 
province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals .... "); id. at 177 
("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law 
is."); The Federalist No. 22, at 150 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
("Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning and 
operation."); The Federalist No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) ("The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the 
courts."). 
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gress, 72 and the individual states were prohibited from entering into 
compacts with other nations. 73 But the Articles addressed neither the 
extent to which treaties would have the force oflaw in the states nor the 
consequences of violations of treaties by the states. Jefferson and Jay 
had opined that treaties made by Congress under the Articles of Con-
federation were of necessity binding on the states and superior to state 
law, and indeed, in its waning days the Continental Congress passed a 
.resolution to that effect.74 But some states had enacted laws conflicting 
with treaty obligations, and the judges in the states were enforcing 
these laws rather than the treaties. There was no effective way under 
the Articles of Confederation to ensure that states did not, either inten-
tionally or unintentionally, violate a treaty provision, or to correct any 
such violation. 
The inability of the central government under the Articles of Con-
federation to secure compliance by the states with the nation's treaty 
obligations was among the principal animating causes of the Framers' 
decision to establish a new government under a new Constitution, 
rather than simply amend the Articles of Confederation. In introduc-
ing the Virginia plan, Edmund Randolph listed prominently among his 
reasons for proposing a new constitution the fact that the Confedera-
tion "could not cause infractions of treaties or of the law of nations, to 
be punished."75 "If a State acts against a foreign power contrary to the 
law of nations or violates a treaty, [the Confederation] cannot punish 
that State, or compel its obedience to the treaty."76 Pinckney also 
noted in the early days of the Convention that "foreign treaties [had 
not] escaped repeated violations."77 And James Madison remarked 
that "[e]xperience had evinced a constant tendency in the States to ... 
violate national Treaties .... "78 Indeed, when Madison, in question-
ing the adequacy of one of the proposed alternatives to the existing 
system, catalogued the "evils" of the system created by the Articles of 
Confederation, the first question he asked was: 
Will it prevent those violations of the law of nations & of Trea-
ties which if not prevented must involve us in the calamities of 
foreign wars? The tendency of the States to these violations 
has been manifested in sundry instances. The files of Congs. 
contain complaints already, from almost every nation with 
which treaties have been formed. Hitherto indulgence has 
been shewn to us. This cannot be the permanent disposition 
of foreigu nations. A rupture with other powers is among the 
72. See Articles of Confederation, art. 9. 
73. See Articles of Confederation, art. 6. 
74. See 32joumals of the Continental Congress 124-25, 177-84 (Mar. 21, 1787) 
(Roscoe R. Hill ed.). 
75. 1 Farrand, supra note 65, at 19. 
76. Id. at 24-25 Games McHenry). 
77. Id. at 164 Games Madison). 
78. Id. 
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greatest of national calamities. It ought therefore to be effec-
tually provided that no part of a nation shall have it in its 
power to bring them on the whole. The existing confederacy 
does not sufficiently provide against this evil. 79 
As Madison's remarks indicate, the Framers were concerned about 
treaty violations because they threatened offending other nations and 
thus provoking destructive and cosdy wars.80 But the Framers sought 
to minimize treaty violations n<>t only to avoid calamity, but also to se-
cure for the nation the benefits of agreements with foreign nations, who 
could not be expected to enter into such agreements if past agreements 
were continually violated.81 Finally, the Framers were concerned not 
just with the material benefits of complying with treaties, but also the 
nation's reputation and honor.s2 
79. Id. at 316. Madison went on to say that the New Jersey plan, discussed below, 
infra notes 86-94 and accompanying text, "does not supply the omission. It leaves the 
States as uncontrouled as ever." Id. Madison preferred the scheme contemplated in the 
Virginia plan for ensuring compliance with treaties. 
80. See also 4 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the 
Federal Constitution 119 (Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d ed. 1881) [hereinafter Elliott's 
Debates] (statement of William Davie) ("A due observance of treaties ... is the only 
means of rendering less frequent those mutual hostilities which tend to depopulate and 
ruin contending nations."); id. at 279 (statement of Charles Pinckney) ("[T]reaties shall 
be considered law of the land; and happy will it be for America if they shall be always so 
considered: we shall then avoid the disputes, the tumults, the frequent wars, we must 
inevitably be engaged in, if we violate treaties."); The Federalist No.3, at 42 (John jay) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The just causes of war, for the most part, arise either from 
violations of treaties or from direct violence."); infra note 90 (Framers' concern for 
national security). 
81. See 4 Elliott's Debates, supra note 80, at 266 (statement of Charles Pinckney) 
("[If treaties had not been considered the law of the land] and any individual state 
possessed a right to disregard a treaty made by Congress, no nation would have entered 
into a treaty with us."); Oliver Ellsworth, Speech in the Connecticut Ratifying 
Convention,Jan. 4, 1788, reprinted in 15 The Documentary History ofthe Ratification 
of the Constitution, supra note 69, at 243, 247 ("[T]reaties are not performed. The 
treaty of peace with Great-Britain was a very favorable one for us. But it did not happen 
perfectly to please some of the states: and they would not comply with it. The 
consequence is, Britain charges us with the breach, and refuses to deliver up the forts on 
our northern quarter."); see also 1 Farrand, supra note 65, at 433 (Wilson asking "What 
is the reason that Great Britain does not enter a commercial treaty with us? Because 
congress has not the power to enforce its observance."). 
82. See Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1101 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360) (Jay, 
CJ., delivering charge to the jury) ("The peace, prosperity, and reputation of the 
United States, will always greatly depend on their fidelity to their engagements; and 
every virtuous citizen ... will concur in observing and executing them with honour and 
good faith; and that, whether they be made with nations respectable and important, or 
with nations weak and inconsiderable, our obligation to keep our faith results from our 
having pledged it .... "); 2 Elliott's Debates, supra note 80, at 490 (statement of james 
Wilson) ("[The supremacy] clause, sir, will show the world that we make the faith of 
treaties a constitutional part of the character of the United States; that we secure its [sic] 
performance no longer nominally, for the judges of the United States will be enabled to 
carry it into effect .... "); 3 Farrand, supra note 65, at 548 (statement of james Madison) 
(because of treaty violations, "the Fedl. authy had ceased to be respected abroad"); The 
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The inability of the central government to enforce compliance with 
treaties was just one aspect of a broader deficiency of the Articles: the 
central government lacked the authority or means to enforce any of its 
acts, or the Articles themselves. This deficiency was attributed by the 
Framers to the fact that, like treaties, the Articles and the acts of Con-
gress did not operate on individuals and could not be enforced against 
the states.83 The Framers corrected this problem with respect to trea-
ties in exactly the same way they corrected it with respect to the statutes 
of the Union and the Constitution itself: they declared all three to be 
the "supreme Law of the Land," and accordingly operative directly on 
individuals and enforceable in the courts. 
Although there was a consensus at the Convention that measures 
had to be taken to ensure compliance by the states with treaties as well 
as the other acts of the central government, the alternative plans intro-
duced at the Convention differed in how they addressed the problem. 
Under the Virginia plan, which was introduced by Edmund Randolph at 
the start of the Convention and reflected on this issue the views of 
James Madison,84 the legislature would have had the power "to nega-
tive all laws passed by the several States, contravening in the opinion of 
the National Legislature the articles ofUnion, or any treaties subsisting 
under the authority of the union."85 The New Jersey plan, introduced 
by William Patterson as an alternative to the Virginia plan, would have 
secured compliance by the states with both treaties and statutes 
through the plan's version of what became the Supremacy Clause: 
Resd. that all Acts of the U. States in Gongs. made by virtue & 
in pursuance of the powers hereby & by the articles of confed-
eration vested in them, and all Treaties made & ratified under 
the authority of the U. States shall be the supreme law of the 
respective States so far forth as those Acts or Treaties shall 
relate to the said States or their Citizens, and that the judiciary 
of the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions, 
any thing in the respective laws of the Individual States to the 
contrary notwithstanding; and that if any State, or any body of 
men in any State shall oppose or prevent ye. carrying into exe-
cution such acts or treaties, the federal Executive shall be au-
thorized to call forth ye power of the Confederated States, or 
so much thereof as may be necessary to enforce and compel an 
Federalist No. 22, supra note 71, at 151 (treaty infractions threaten "[t]he faith, the 
reputation, [and] the peace of the whole Union," and make it less likely that foreign 
states will "respect and confide in" the United States). Professor Burley has made a 
similar point concerning the Framers' reasons for desiring compliance with the law of 
nations generally. See Burley, supra note 54, at 481-88. 
83. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text. 
84. See Charles F. Hobson, The Negative on State Laws: James Madison, the 
Constitution, and the Crisis of Republican Government, 36 Wm. & Mary Q, 215, 219 
(1979). 
85. I Farrand, supra note 65, at 21, 47, 61, 225. 
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obedience to such Acts, or an Observance of such Treaties.86 
The New Jersey plan also called for the establishment of a federal judi-
ciary, and the judiciary under this plan would have been expressly au-
thorized to exercise appellate jurisdiction in all cases requiring "the 
construction of.any treaty or treaties."87 Similarly, the Virginia plan 
called for the establishment of a federaljudiciary, but it would not spe-
cifically have conferred jurisdiction over cases involving treaties. 
Under both plans, the mechanism for securing compliance with 
treaties was the same as the mechanism for securing compliance with 
federal statutes. The proposed mechanisms, however, differed radi-
cally from each other. By declaring treaties to be "law," and specifically 
requiring federal and state courts to apply them in cases before them, 
the New Jersey plan made treaties operative on individuals and gave the 
courts the power and the duty to interpret and enforce them.88 The 
Virginia plan instead gave the legislature the power to "negative" state 
laws if it found them to be inconsistent with a treaty of the United 
States. At least as initially proposed, state laws were to be inoperative 
unless and until they were approved by Congress. 89 Thus, treaties 
would not themselves have been operative on individuals; first-line re-
sponsibility for securing compliance with treaties would have resided in 
the legislature, which would have determined whether a state law was 
consistent with the treaty. The judiciaries then would have been re-
quired to give effect to the legislative "veto" of the state law, but not to 
the treaty itself. This may explain why the Virginia plan did not explic-
itly extend the jurisdiction of the national courts to cases involving 
treaties.90 
86. Id. at 245. 
87. Under the New Jersey plan, the judiciary was expressly authorized to exercise 
jurisdiction 
in all cases touching the rights of Ambassadors, in all cases of captures from an 
enemy, in all cases of piracies & felonies on the high seas, in all cases in which 
foreigners may be interested, in the construction of any treaty or treaties, or 
which may arise on any of the Acts for regulation of trade, or the collection of 
the federal Revenue. 
Id. at 244. 
88. Under the Virginia plan, as well as the New Jersey plan, the laws of the national 
government were to operate directly on individuals rather than on the states. See id. at 
34, 141. This was a major departure from the approach under the Articles of 
Confederation. In Patterson's view, the New Jersey plan did not differ from the Virginia 
plan in this respect. See id. at 251. But the New Jersey plan, unlike the Virginia plan, 
made treaties operative directly on individuals and relied on the judiciary to give effect to 
treaty provisions. And the Supremacy Clause, as ultimately adopted, gave the 
Constitution itself the status of law, whereas the Virginia plan did not. 
89. See Hobson, supra note 84, at 227. 
90. See I Farrand, supra note 65, at 231. The Virginia plan would have given the 
national judiciary jurisdiction over cases involving "questions which involve the national 
peace and harmony" as well as cases involving aliens. Id. at 22. The Framers were 
concerned about treaty violations by the states because such violations could provoke 
war. See id. at 19, 24-25; see also supra note 80 (noting the dangers of continued treaty 
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The proposed legislative negative of state laws was rejected by the 
Convention.91 Immediately after the rejection of this proposal, aver-
sion of the Supremacy Clause identical in substance to the first sen-
tence of the clause quoted above was taken up.92 This resolution was 
agreed to without any discussion.93 The Framers thus opted for a judi-
cial negative over a legislative negative. The rejection of the Virginia 
plan thus reflects a decision not to make the legislature the primary 
interpreter and enforcer of treaties against the states, and the adoption 
of the Supremacy Clause represents a decision to vest this power and 
duty in the courts. 94 
violations to national security). Thus, the national judiciary would presumably have had 
jurisdiction under this provision to review cases in which the states enforced a state law 
that the federal }egislature had negatived as violative of a treaty. But there was nothing 
in the Virginia plan making treaties themselves operative on individuals or preemptive 
of inconsistent state laws. 
91. See 2 Farrand, supra note 65, at 28. The Convention debates disclose three 
objections to the proposal. First, it was observed that this provision would "be terrible 
[i.e., offensive] to the States," id. at 27, and "it would disgust all the states," id. at 28. 
Second, some perceived a logistical problem: "Shall all the laws of the States be sent up 
to the Genl. Legislature before they shall be permitted to operate?" Id. at 27. When the 
proposal was revived later, George Mason expanded upon this logistical issue, 
"wish[ing] to know how the power was to be exercised. Are all laws whatever to be 
brought up? Is no road nor bridge to be established without the Sanction of the General 
Legislature? Is this to sit constantly in order to receive & revise the State Laws? He did 
not mean by these remarks to condemn the expedient, but he was apprehensive that 
great objections would lie agst. it." Id. at 390. The proposal this time was withdrawn. 
See id. at 392. Finally, the power was perceived to be unnecessary. Roger Sherman 
noted that "the Courts of the States would not consider as valid any law contravening 
the Authority of the Union, and which the legislature would wish to be negatived." Id. 
at 27. Sherman also observed that "[s]uch a power involves a wrong principle, to wit, 
that a law of a State contrary to the articles of the Union, would if not negatived, be valid 
& operative." Id. at 28. And Gouverneur Morris stated that "[a] law that ought to be 
negatived will be set aside in the judiciary departmt. and if that security should fail; may 
be repealed by a Nation!. law." Id. These remarks appear to assume that the Supremacy 
Clause would be adopted. See infra note 94. 
92. The resolution read as follows: 
[T]hat the Legislative acts of the U.S. made by virtue & in pursuance of the 
articles of Union, and all treaties made & ratified under the authority of the 
U.S. shall be the supreme law of the respective States, as far as those acts or 
treaties shall relate to the said States, or their Citizens and inhabitants-& that 
the Judiciaries of the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions, 
any thing in the respective laws of the individual States notwithstanding. 
Id. at 28-29. 
93. Curiously, it was the Virginia plan's proposal for defining the jurisdiction of the 
federal judiciary-extending such jurisdiction to "cases ... involv[ing] the National 
peace and harmony"-that was agreed to at this point, also without discussion. Id. at 
39. This provision would presumably have conferred jurisdiction over cases involving 
treaties. See supra note 90. 
94. That the legislative negative was thought by some to be unnecessary, see supra 
note 91, does not mean that the Framers considered treaties to be operative on 
individuals and enforceable in the courts even in the absence of the Supremacy Clause. 
When these remarks were made, the Supremacy Clause had already been proposed 
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The foregoing resolutions were referred by the Convention to the 
Committee of Detail. The draft Constitution reported by that Commit-
tee mentioned treaties in several provisions. The version of the 
Supremacy Clause that was reported by the Committee was identical to 
the one approved by the Convention.95 The Committee's report de-
fined the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to "extend to all cases aris-
ing under laws passed by the Legislature of the United States; to all 
cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls; ... to 
all cases of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies .. . 
between a State or the Citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens or 
subjects."96 Although the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was not 
expressly extended to cases arising under treaties, most cases involving 
treaties could have been expected to fall in one of those categories. 
Finally; the Legislature was given the power "[t]o call forth the aid of 
the militia, in order to execute the laws of the Union, enforce treaties, 
suppress insurrections, and repel invasions .... "97 
This last provision was amended to delete the words "enforce trea-
ties" as redundant, as treaties were declared to be "laws" in the 
Supremacy Clause.98 The Supremacy Clause was amended to add 
"This Constitution" as among the "supreme Laws of the several 
States,"99 and to revise the reference to treaties to read as follows: "all 
treaties made, or which shall he made," under the authority of the 
United States.100 The latter change was designed to make it clear that 
treaties entered into before the adoption of the Constitution were also 
to be the "supreme law of the several States."101 The current wording 
of the clause was chosen by the Committee of Style and was not the 
subject of discussion. The clause reads as follows: 
(indeed, a version of the Supremacy Clause was proposed by Pinckney 
contemporaneously with the introduction of the Virginia plan). The statements to the 
effect that the legislative negative was unnecessary thus apparently assumed that the 
Supremacy Clause would be adopted. When the negative proposal was reintroduced, 
Sherman again called it "unnecessary," this time explicitly relying on the Supremacy 
Clause. See 2 Farrand, supra note 65, at 390. Some of the statements-such as 
Sherman's statement that the legislative negative proposal involved a "wrong 
principle," see supra note 91-might also be understood as arguments in favor of the 
Supremacy Clause as well as against a legislative negative. In any event, given the 
general understanding that treaties were not thought to operate on individuals, the need 
to declare them operative as law on individuals and enforceable in the courts was 
obviously greater than the need to declare federal legislation to be law. See 4 Elliott's 
Debates, supra note 80, at 160 (statement of William Davie) ("[T]he general 
government ought to legislate upon individuals, instead of states. Its laws will otherwise 
be ineffectual, but particularly with respect to treaties."). 
95. See 2 Farrand, supra note 65, at 183. 
96. Id. at 186. 
97. Id. at 182. 
98. Id. at 389-90. 
99. Id. at 381-82. 
100. Id. at417. 
101. Id. 
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This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.10 2 
The clause defining the jurisdiction of the federal courts was then 
amended to parallel the Supremacy Clause.103 The clause thus 
amended extended the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to "all Cases, 
in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the 
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their 
Authority."104 
Thus, in the end, the Framers adopted the very same mechanism 
for enforcing treaties, federal statutes, and the Constitution itself. It 
consisted of the Supremacy Clause and its corollary in Article III. The 
Supremacy Clause gave all three the status of law and instructed the 
judges in every state to give them effect. The Supreme Court was given 
appellate jurisdiction over cases arising under all three to monitor state 
court compliance with the clause. The Constitution thus makes judges 
the primary enforcers of all three categories of law.Io5 
Today, it is recognized that the judicial power and duty to review 
the acts of the states and the other branches of the federal government 
for conformity with the Constitution springs from the Supremacy 
Clause's designation of the Constitution as law.106 The Articles were 
considered by the Framers to be a "mere treaty" insofar as they oper-
ated on states rather than individuals and were not judicially enforcea-
ble. They were a political document allocating powers among political 
entities but not conferring judicially enforceable rights. By transform-
ing our foundational document from a "mere treaty" into a "law," the 
Framers made it enforceable by individuals in the courts. The 
Supremacy Clause accomplished the very same thing with respect to 
treaties. The clause transformed them from "mere treaties"-in the 
international sense-into laws. It altered-or made irrelevant-for do-
mestic purposes those attributes of treaties that distinguished them 
102. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
103. 2 Farrand, supra note 65, at 432. 
104. U.S. Const. art. lll, § 2, cl. I. 
105. Although the Constitution also authorized the use of the militia to enforce the 
three categories of federal laws against recalcitrant states, the courts were chosen as the 
primary agencies for the construction and enforcement of treaties. 
106. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (deriving court's 
power to review acts of the legislature for conformity with the Constitution from the fact 
that it is the "province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is"); 
Edward S. Corwin, Marbury v. Madison and the Doctrine of judicial Review, in I Selected 
Essays on Constitutional Law 128, 146-47 (Edward Barrett ed., 1938); Henry P. 
Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 Yale LJ. 1363, 1365 
(1973) [hereinafter Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication]; james Wilson, I The 
Works ofjames Wilson 329-30 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1987). 
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from laws: it made them operative on individuals and enforceable in 
the courts by individuals. 
That the Constitution made treaties operative on individuals and 
enforceable in the courts is shown further by the Framers' statements 
during the ratification debates. Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 
22 that "[t]he treaties of the United States, to have any force at all, must 
be considered as part of the law of the land. Their true import, as far as 
respects individuals, must like all other laws, be ascertained by judicial 
determinations."107 Anti-Cincinnatus, defending the Supremacy 
Clause, wrote that 
public treaties become the law of the land in that being made 
by constitutional authority, i.e., among us, by those whom the 
people themselves have authorized for that purpose, are in a 
proper sense their own agreements, and therefore as laws, 
bind the several states, as states, and their inhabitants, as individu-
als to take notice of and govern themselves according to the 
articles and rules which are defined and stipulated in them: as 
law of the land they bind to nothing but a performance of the 
engagements which they contain.xos 
And Brutus, criticizing Article III, conceded that he could "readily 
comprehend what is meant by deciding a case under a treaty. For as 
treaties will be the law of the land, every person who has rights or privi-
leges secured by treaty, will have aid of the courts oflaw, in recovering 
them." 109 William R. Davie, a member of the Federal Convention, de-
scribed the effect of the Supremacy Clause and the purpose of the grant 
of federal jurisdiction over cases "arising under" treaties to the North 
Carolina ratifying convention as follows: 
It was necessary that treaties should operate as laws upon indi-
viduals. ·They ought to be binding upon us the moment they 
are made. They involve in their nature not only our own 
rights, but those of foreigners. If the rights of foreigners were 
left to be decided ultimately by thirteen distinct judiciaries, 
\there would necessarily be unjust and contradictory decisions. 
If our courts of justice did not decide in favor of foreign citi-
107. The Federalist No. 22, supra note 71, at 150 (emphasis added). 
108. Anti-Cincinnatus, Northampton Hampshire Gazette, Dec. 19, 1787, reprinted 
in 15 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, supra note 69, at 
36, 38. This statement suggests an understanding of the Supremacy Clause as merely 
declarative of the inherent status of treaties as law in a democracy: because in a 
democracy the people are sovereign, and because treaties 3;re made on behalf of the 
sovereign, the treaties entered into by a democratic government bind the people. cr. 
infra note 120 (describing similar view of James Wilson). Under such a theory, the 
status of treaties as law derives not from the Supremacy Clause but from the nature of 
democratic government. Nevertheless, even under this theory, treaties are operative as 
law on individuals as a result of domestic law (the Constitution, which establishes a 
democratic system of government), not international law. 
109. Brutus Xlil, New York Journal, Feb. 21, 1788, reprinted in 16 The 
Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, supra note 69, at 172. 
Brutus had difficulty understanding what was meant by a case "in equity" under a treaty. 
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zens and subjects when they ought, it might involve the whole 
Union in a war .... uo 
The Convention and ratification debates, and contemporaneous 
statements, show clearly that the Framers were concerned about treaty 
violations because they could provoke wars, deter other nations from 
entering into beneficial agreements with us, and adversely affect the na-
tion's reputation. To prevent or remedy treaty violations before they 
produced these consequences, they declared treaties to be the 
"supreme Law of the Land." By so doing, the Framers intended to 
make treaties operative on individuals and enforceable in the courts in 
cases between individuals. They considered a judicial sanction to be an 
essential attribute of a law, and by giving treaties the status oflaw they 
contemplated that the judiciary would provide such a sanction and thus 
prevent or remedy any violation before it escalated to the international 
arena. 
C. Early judicial Construction 
The Supreme Court's first major treaty decision, Ware v. Hylton, 111 
further demonstrates the Framers' understanding of the Supremacy 
Clause's effect on treaties. This decision provides additional evidence 
that the Framers understood that the Supremacy Clause transformed 
what would otherwise have been merely moral obligations into legal 
ones enforceable by individuals in our courts. 
Ware v. Hylton concerned the effect of the 1783 Treaty of Peace 
with Great Britain on debts that had been owed to British citizens by 
Virginia citizens, but which had been discharged pursuant to a 1777 
state law permitting the discharge of such debts through the payment 
of Virginia currency into the Virginia Treasury. The fourth article of 
the Treaty of Peace provided that "[i]t is agreed, that creditors, on 
either side, shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the 
full value, in sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore con-
tracted."112 The British plaintiff argued that this article operated to 
revive the debt owed to him by the Virginian defendant, a debt that had 
been discharged under Virginia law before 1783 when the defendant 
paid the amount owed into the Virginia Treasury pursuant to the 1777 
law. 
ln deciding that issue, justice Iredell, sitting as Circuit justice, first 
considered the effect of the treaty on the states' domestic laws before 
the adoption of the Constitution. 113 He understood the law on this 
110. 4 Elliott's Debates, supra note 80, at 158 (emphasis added). 
Ill. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). 
112. Id. at 277. 
113. See id. at 271-73. In that connection, he drew a distinction between executed 
and executory treaty provisions. Executory provisions were those in which "a nation 
promises to do a thing." Id. at 272. Such provisions are "to be carried into execution, 
in the manner which the Constitution of that nation prescribes." Id. As discussed 
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subject under the Articles of Confederation to be the same as it was in 
Great Britain, which he described as follows: 
[I]t is an invariable practice in that country, when the king 
makes any stipulation [in a treaty] of a legislative nature, that it 
is carried into effect by an act of parliament. The parliament is 
considered as bound, upon a principle of moral obligation, to 
preserve the public faith, pledged by the treaty, by passing 
such laws as its obligation requires; but until such laws are 
passed, the system of law, entitled to actual obedience, re-
mains, de facto, as before.ll4 
Thus, a treaty provision agreeing that the tariff on wines from France 
will be X would not in Great Britain itself establish the tariff as X. An 
act of Parliament was necessary to establish the tariff at X. This was so 
even though the treaty did not say "that the Parliament shall pass laws" 
to such an effect, but instead by its terms purported to set the tariff 
itself.115 In other words, in Great Britain, a treaty purporting to set a 
tariff at a certain level in fact constitutes only an agreement to set the 
tariff at that level; the treaty will not be applied by the courts or other 
domestic institutions without implementation by the domestic law-mak-
ing authority. 116 
Justice Iredell next discussed the effect of the adoption of the Con-
stitution. He observed that the Supremacy Clause was adopted to ad-
dress the position of some of the states that the Treaty of Peace had no 
greater effect on their laws than on the laws of Great Britain. The 
treaty "was binding in moral obligation, but could not be constitution-
ally carried into effect (at least in the opinion of many,) so far as legisla-
tion then in being constituted an impediment, but by a repeal." The 
Supremacy Clause was adopted "to obviate this difficulty." The effect 
of the Supremacy Clause, in Justice Iredell's view, was to render all 
otherwise "executory" treaty provisions "executed." 
Under this constitution, therefore, so far as a treaty constitu-
tionally is binding, upon principles of moral obligation, it is 
below, in Great Britain, any stipulations of a legislative nature (that is those that 
contemplate a rule operative on individuals and enforceable in court) required an act of 
Parliament. See infra notes 114-117 and accompanying text. Injustice Iredell's view, 
the Supremacy Clause obviated this distinction in the United States. See infra note II7 
and accompanying text. Chief justice Marshall later partially resurrected it in Foster v. 
Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 3I4 (I829). 
II4. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 274. Iredell's statement that treaties in Great Britain 
established moral though not legal obligations recalls john Austin's characterization of 
international law as belonging to the realm of morality and not that of law, properly 
understood. See supra note 61. 
II5. See 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 275. 
II6. See id. at 274-75. Iredell appeared to believe that the British system was 
shared by most other countries. See infra note 117. Thus his description of the British 
system was a description of the effect of treaties in domestic legal systems generally (in 
the absence of a supremacy clause). This view was apparently shared by Chief justice 
Marshall. See Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314; infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
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also, by the vigor of its own authority, to be executed in fact. 
lt would not otherwise be the supreme law, in the new sense 
provided for, and it was so before, in a moral sense. When 
this constitution was ratified, the case as to the treaty in ques-
tion stood upon the same footing, as if every act constituting 
an impediment to a creditor's recovery had been expressly re-
pealed, and any further act passed, which the public obligation 
had before required, if a repeal alone would not have been 
sufficient. 117 
Justice Iredell went on to interpret the treaty, and he held that, 
though it operated of its own force to remove impediments to the col-
lection of debts pending at the time of its ratification, the treaty did not 
obligate the United States to treat as "revived" debts that by that time 
had already been discharged. Thus, though the treaty had the force of 
law in the United States, the law it established was (on its merits) not 
one that revived the plaintiff's debt. 
The Supreme Court, on writ of error, reversed Justice Iredell, but 
only because he had not interpreted the treaty broadly enough. On the 
treaty's domestic effect, the Court was in accord with Justice Iredell. 
Each Justice set forth his reasons separately. Justice Chase, who ex-
pressed his views most fully, interpreted the Supremacy Clause as es-
tablishing that "every treaty made by the authority of the United States, 
shall be superior to the constitution and laws of any individual State," 
and that, consequently, the "laws of any of the states, contrary to a 
treaty, shall be disregarded."118 He went on to interpret the treaty, 
applying general principles of treaty interpretation, and concluded that 
the 1783 Treaty of Peace obligated the parties not only to disregard 
preexisting laws that permitted certain debts to be discharged with pa-
per money, but also to treat as "revived" any debts that had been dis-
charged pursuant to such laws before the treaty entered into force. 119 
The other Justices (save Iredell) concurred in this result.120 
117. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 277. Justice Iredell also noted that the United States 
Constitution "affords the first instance of any government ... saying, treaties should be 
the supreme law of the land," thus suggesting that he believed that most other countries in 
the world followed the British model described above, supra notes 113-116 and 
accompanying text. Id. at 272. 
118. Id. at 237. 
119. See id. at 241-42. 
120. See id. at 245, 256. Justice Wilson expressed the view in his opinion that the 
treaty would supersede the state law even in the absence of the Supremacy Clause. See 
id. at 281. He did not explain his reasoning, but his lectures of 1790 shed some light on 
his thinking. See Wilson, supra note 106, at 153, 166-67, 177. Wilson apparently 
believed that in a democracy, because the people are sovereign, government officials 
enter into treaties on their behalf as their agents. Consequently, treaties are binding not 
just on the state as a political body, but on the people themselves (the principals). In 
monarchies, however, treaties would be binding only on the sovereign. See id.; see also 
supra note 108 (describing similar view of Anti-Cincinnatus). Wilson apparently 
concluded that the Treaty of Peace accordingly directly affected the rights of the 
individual defendant in Ware (who was a U.S. citizen). His theory could have led him to 
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Ware v. Hylton establishes that, when a treaty creates an obligation 
of a state vis-a-vis individuals, individuals may enforce the obligation in 
court even though the treaty does not, as an international instrument, 
confer rights directly on individuals of its own force. As Justice Iredell 
recognized, in Great Britain individuals would not have had rights 
under the treaty enforceable in court, yet the Court held that, by virtue 
of the Supremacy Clause, the treaty was enforceable by individuals in 
our courts. Justice Iredell held that the treaty did not revive debts that 
had been discharged before the treaty entered into force because the 
treaty parties did not intend to require the revival of such debts.121 
The Court held that the treaty did operate to revive such debts because 
the parties intended to require each other to revive any such debts. 
The intent of the parties largely determined the scope of the interna-
tional obligation established by the treaty; the Supremacy Clause gave 
the obligation the force of domestic law in the United States, nullified 
inconsistent state law, and required the courts to give effect to the obli-
gation at the behest of an individual.122 
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Foster v. Neilson, 123 which is con-
sidered to be the origin of the doctrine of self-executing treaties, par-
tially resurrected the distinction between executory and executed treaty 
provisions that Justice Iredell thought had been interred by the 
Supremacy Clause. The tension between the doctrine of self-executing 
treaties and the status of treaties as "Law of the Land" is discussed 
below.124 But even Foster supports the conclusion that the Framers did 
not believe treaties operated directly on individuals as a matter of inter-
national law, but that the Supremacy Clause established a different rule 
in the United States. Chief Justice Marshall wrote: 
A treaty is, in its nature, a contract between two nations, not a 
legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object 
to be accomplished, especially, so far as its operation is infra-
territorial; but is carried into execution by the sovereign 
power of the respective parties to the instrument. In the United 
States, a different principle is established. Our constitution declares 
a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be 
regarded in courts ofjustice as equivalent to an act of the leg-
islature .... 125 
conclude that, since the individual plaintiff (a British citizen) was the subject of a 
monarchy, he had no rights directly under the treaty. Wilson instead permitted the 
plaintiff to maintain his suit. It was apparently sufficient that the treaty directly imposed 
duties on the defendant; the existence of a correlative right followed. 
121. See 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 276. 
122. See id. at 236-37, 244-45. 
123. 27 u.s. 253 (1829). 
124. See infra part Ili.B.3. 
125. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (emphasis added). Marshall 
extended this last proposition only to treaties that "operate of themselves, without the 
aid of any legislative provision." Id. This qualification is the source of the doctrine of 
self-executing treaties, discussed in the next part. 
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None of the Supreme Court's subsequent decisions supports the prop-
osition that the ability of individuals to enforce treaties domestically 
turns on whether the treaty confers rights on them-in the sanctionist 
sense-as a matter of international law. By making treaties the law of 
the land, the Framers made treaties enforceable by individuals in our 
courts when they would not otherwise have been. 
III. TREATY-BASED RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF INDIVIDUALS: A 
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
That the Supremacy Clause makes treaties operative directly on in-
dividuals and enforceable in the courts at their behest does not mean 
that any treaty may be enforced by any individual at any time. The 
rules specifying whether and when constitutional and statutory adjudi-
cation is appropriate, and at whose behest, are no less applicable to 
treaty adjudication. 
In this Part, I outline a framework for determining the circum-
stances in which treaty provisions may be enforced by individuals in our 
courts. I propose a framework that is faithful to the text of the Consti-
tution and the intent of the Framers. I place particular significance on 
the clause's designation of"all" treaties as "supreme Law of the Land" 
and on the Framers' adoption of the same mechanism for securing 
compliance with treaties as for securing compliance with federal stat-
utes and the Constitution itself. The framework I propose explains the 
results in the principal Supreme Court decisions involving treaties, and 
is consistent with the rationales put forward by the Court for those re-
sults, without doing violence to the constitutional text. It is also rea-
sonably consistent with the results of the lower court decisions, and 
sensitive to the intuitions that appear to have produced those 
results. 126 
The Supremacy Clause's designation of treaties as law was 
126. The framework 1 propose is faithful to the text of the Constitution and the 
Framers' intent and describes reasonably accurately the legal landscape (particularly the 
Supreme Court decisions). Like Professor Fallon, 1 believe that, in the event of a 
conflict between constitutional text and the intent of the Framers, on the one hand, and 
legal doctrine developed by the courts, on the other, the former should prevail unless 
the latter has become firmly entrenched. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist 
Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189, 1237-52 
(1987). Thus, I accept the "last-in-time" rule, see infra note 197, even though there is 
strong (though not conclusive) evidence that the Framers intended that treaties be 
lexically superior to statutes. See Lobel, supra note 54 (arguing that last-in-time rule is 
inconsistent with Framers' intent). Compare Peter Westen, The Place of Foreign 
Treaties in the Courts of the United States: A Reply to Louis Henkin, 10 I Harv. L. Rev. 
511, 512, 516 (1987) (arguing that treaties are lexically superior to statutes but for 
political question reasons are not enforceable in courts in the face of subsequent 
conflicting statutes) with Louis Henkin, Lexical Priority or "Political Question": A 
Response, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 524, 524 (1987) (arguing that the courts regard treaties as 
equal in stature to statutes). 
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designed to avert violations by the United States of its treaty obliga-
tions. I shall accordingly focus on the power of individuals to enforce 
the treaty obligations of the United States, rather than those of other 
states. Treaties, as international instruments, impose obligations on 
states, not directly on private individuals. The acts of private individu-
als may give rise to violations of treaties by the United States if left 
unredressed and in certain other contexts, and the Framers' remarks 
show that the Supremacy Clause makes the treaty-based duties of the 
United States in certain circumstances the duties of private individuals. 
Elaboration of a theory of treaty-based duties of individuals, however, 
is beyond the scope of this Article. I shall focus instead on the ability of 
individuals to enforce treaty obligations of the United States against 
those entities whose actions are directly controlled by such treaties as a 
matter of international law: state and federal governments and their 
officials. Accordingly, the paradigmatic case considered in this section 
involves a foreign national seeking to enforce in the courts of this coun-
try against a state or federal official a treaty provision that he claims 
requires the United States to act-or refrain from acting-in a way that 
affects him, or seeking a remedy for a claimed violation of the treaty by 
the official.127 
I propose that, in determining whether a treaty is enforceable by 
an individual, the courts distinguish issues relating to the nature of the 
obligation imposed by the treaty from issues relating to whether the 
particular individual before it may enforce the obligation and what rem-
edies he may obtain. I address the former issues in Part III.B. As in the 
statutory context, a treaty should not be enforceable in court if the 
treaty does not in fact impose obligations, but is instead precatory or 
hortatory. Nor should a treaty be enforceable in the courts, even if it 
contemplates the establishment of obligations towards individuals, if 
instead of establishing those obligations itself it delegates that respon-
sibility to Congress. Finally, treaty obligations may be unenforceable in 
the courts because they raise political rather than judicial questions. 
These are not airtight categories. In fact, they may in the end involve 
the same issue: precatory or hortatory language in a treaty provision 
may indicate that the treaty does not itself establish an obligation to-
wards individuals, but delegates that responsibility to Congress, and 
the latter responsibility may be unenforceable in court because it re-
quires the exercise of political rather than judicial judgment. Whether 
they are the same or not, the issues differ from the next set of questions 
in that they focus on the nature of the obligation rather than on its 
127. Human rights treaties now obligate the United States to behave in given ways 
towards its own citizens. The framework proposed in this Article should apply equally 
when a United States citizen seeks to enforce, or obtain a remedy for the violation of, an 
obligation of the United States under a human rights treaty. For the sake of simplicity, 
however, 1 will focus in the text on treaty obligations of the United States towards 
foreign nationals. 
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relationship to the individual before the court. They are, however, 
analogous to issues that the courts address routinely in determining 
whether to enforce statutes or the Constitution. I argue that they 
should be resolved with respect to treaties as they are resolved in those 
other contexts. 
The set of questions I address in Part III.C arises only if the treaty 
imposes judicially enforceable obligations on the United States. The 
first issue is whether the individual seeking to enforce the obligation 
has standing to enforce it. To determine whether a litigant has stand-
ing to enforce a statute or a constitutional provision imposing an obli-
gation on the state, the courts ask whether the litigant is an intended 
beneficiary of the law. I argue that this test should be applied to deter-
mine whether a litigant may enforce a treaty domestically. The test that 
is currently applied for the latter purpose-whether the treaty confers a 
right on the litigant-results in confusion because of the ambiguity of 
the term "right." I concluded above that the term "right" in this con-
text must be understood as primary right. The standing rules applied 
in the statutory and constitutional contexts address whether an individ-
ual has a primary right under those laws. These same rules should be 
applied to determine whether an individual has a primary right under a 
treaty. The standing question and the primary right question may, and 
should, be collapsed. 
If the treaty imposes an obligation on the state and confers a cor-
relative primary right on an individual, whether that individual may en-
force the obligation in court may tum on whether he has a right of 
action. A right of action is not required when the litigant is relying on 
the treaty as a defense. If the litigant is seeking affirmative relief, a 
right of action is necessary but need not be established by the treaty 
itself. In the category of cases of most concern here, a right of action 
for certain forms of relief is conferred by federal statutes. In Part 
III.C.2, I examine the possible bases of rights of action to redress, pre-
vent, or stop treaty violations. 
Finally, whether the treaty is being relied on as a defense or as a 
basis for affirmative relief, the court will have to determine the appro-
priate remedy. For this purpose, I argue that all treaties incorporate 
the default rules of customary international law that specify the appro-
priate remedy for treaty violations and that under the Supremacy 
Clause, individuals are entitled to those remedies if failure to afford 
them those remedies would produce or exacerbate a treaty violation by 
the United States against the state of their nationality.128 
128. There are of course other issues that courts must address in suits against 
government officials. If suit is brought in federal court, there must be a statutory basis 
of federal jurisdiction. Additionally, official immunity may be an obstacle in a suit 
seeking retrospective relief from the government official. See Paul M. Bator et al., Hart 
and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1277-1307 (1988) 
[hereinafter Hart & Wechsler]. It should not be an obstacle to a suit seeking prospective 
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When a treaty is invoked in court, the court usually addresses what 
is considered to be a threshold issue distinct from (though perhaps re-
lated to) each of the foregoing issues: whether the treaty is self-execut-
ing. Before turning to my proposed framework, I examine in section A 
the so-called doctrine of self-executing treaties to determine how it re-
lates to the issues I will be discussing. I conclude that the doctrine in 
fact masks a variety of distinct issues that bear on a treaty's enforceabil-
ity in a given case. These are the same issues that I discuss in the re-
mainder of this Part. The framework I propose is accordingly a 
substitute for the current doctrine of self-executing treaties. Rather 
than address these issues through a single doctrine, I propose that the 
issues be addressed by the courts separately, directly, and self-
consciously. 
A. Is There a Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties? 
A treaty that is not self-executing is, according to the usual defini-
tion, a treaty that must be implemented by legislation before it may be 
applied in the court. But a treaty, like a statute or a constitutional pro-
vision, may have to be supplemented by a statute before it may be ap-
plied in the courts for any of a number of reasons. At the very least, 
there has to be a statute creating the court. If suit is brought in a fed-
eral court, there has to be a statute giving the court jurisdiction over 
the subject matter. Legislation may be needed if the law the litigant 
relies on contemplates the creation of the duty he seeks to enforce but 
does not itself purport to create the duty. If the law does create the 
duty, legislation may be required to establish a right of action for dam-
ages or for some other form of relief. Rarely will a law invoked by a 
litigant in court itself address every aspect of the litigant's case. 
The term "self-executing," when used outside the treaty context, is 
sufficiently versatile to describe any of the foregoing deficiencies of the 
law the litigant relies on. In common usage, the term means accom-
plishing a certain end ex proprio vigore, or of its own force. The meaning 
of the statement that a certain law is not self-executing depends on 
what the end is that the speaker has in mind. The statement is ambigu-
ous if that end is not specified. The same law may be self-executing in 
one sense and not in another. The Commerce Clause, for example, has 
been described as self-executing because it, of its own force, places lim-
injunctive relief against the official. Eleventh Amendment immunity may be an obstacle 
if the suit in federal court seeks retrospective relieffrom the state itself, as distinguished 
from the officer, unless Congress has abrogated the immunity or the state has waived it. 
It will not be an obstacle, however, if the suit seeks prospective injunctive relieffrom the 
officer. See id. at 1179-1221. Sovereigu immunity will bar suits against the United 
States unless Congress has waived the immunity, as it has done for suits under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. See id. at 1213-21; see 
infra notes 275, 295. On the applicability of sovereign immunity in suits against federal 
officers, see infra note 295. These issues will be discussed in this Article only in passing. 
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its on the states' legislative power. 129 But the same clause can be de-
scribed as not self-executing because it does not itself establish 
remedies for its violation.130 The Takings Clause has been described 
as self-executing because it itself establishes a remedy for its violation 
('just compensation"), 131 but it might be described as not self-execut-
ing because it does not itself confer jurisdiction on the courts, 132 or 
authorize or effectuate a levy of property without judicial interven-
tion,133 or abrogate an immunity enjoyed by a particular defendant. 134 
129. See, e.g., Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. I, 7 
(1986); South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1984); Vicki C. 
Jackson, One Hundred Years of Folly: The Eleventh Amendment and the 1988 Term, 
64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 51, 66 (1990). 
Similarly, Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment has been described as "self-
executing" in the sense that it limits of its own force the power of the states (as well as 
the federal government). See NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 350 (1973); South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966). 
130. See Alfred Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 1109, 1112 
(1969) (asking "[t]o what extent is the Constitution self-executing in regard to 
affirmative remedies?"). 
In Dennis v. Higgins, IllS. Ct. 865, 868-73 (1991), the Supreme Court held that 
section 1983 gives individuals a federal remedy against state officials for violation of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, thus suggesting that the clause does not itself afford a 
remedy. Cf. McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 110 S. 
Ct. 2238, 2247-50 (1990) (Due Process Clause requires states in certain circumstances 
to afford a damages remedy for violation of the Commerce Clause). 
131. See, e.g., First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 
482 U.S. 304, 305 (1987); United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980); United 
States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 401 (1976). 
132. Article Ill has been described as not self-executing in the sense that it does 
not itself confer jurisdiction on the lower federal courts. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas 
Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19 (1989) (plurality opinion); Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807 (1986). 
133. The decisions of the Internal Revenue Service have been described as "self-
executing" because the IRS "need never go into court to assess and collect the amount 
owed; it is empowered to collect the tax by nonjudicial means (such as levy on property 
or salary), without having to prove to a court the validity of the underlying tax liability." 
United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476,481 (1983). Of course, even IRS decisions can be 
described as not self-executing in the sense that an additional executive act may be 
required to collect the money or take possession of the property in the event of non-
payment after the levy. 
134. See Jagnandan v. Giles, 538 F.2d 1166, 1189 (5th Cir. 1976) (Goldberg, J., 
concurring) (discussing whether Fourteenth Amendment "acts as a self-executing pro 
tanto repeal of the eleventh amendment's proscription on retroactive money recoveries 
from the states"), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977); Chavous v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 745 F. Supp. 1168, 1171 (D.S.C. 1990) ("[T]he eleventh amendment ... 
'countermanded any judicial inclination to interpret article 111 [of the Constitution] as a 
self-executing abrogation of state immunity from suit.' " (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, 
American Constitutional Law§ 3-25 (2d ed. 1988)), vacated sub nom. Esposito v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, 939 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed, 60 
U.S.L.W. 3505 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1991) (No. 91-941). 
In Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 245-46 (1985), the Court said 
that a statute that authorizes a remedy against a state does not for that reason abrogate 
the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court (thus holding that 
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It is recognized that a statutory or constitutional provision may or may 
not be self-executing in any of the foregoing senses. 
The term is just as versatile, and thus just as ambignous, with re-
spect to treaties. An examination of the cases discussing the self-execu-
tion question reveals that the self-execution analysis has been used to 
address a variety of distinct reasons to apply, or not to apply, a treaty in 
a case. Thus, treaties have been dismissed as not self-executing be-
cause they do not impose the obligation on the defendant that the 
plaintiff claims they impose.135 Treaties have been dismissed as not 
self-executing because the obligations they impose do not give rise to 
correlative rights in the individuals relying on them.136 Courts have 
dismissed treaties as not self-executing because they do not confer a 
private right of action, 137 or because they do not authorize the remedy 
that the litigants relying on them seek.138 Finally, courts have dis-
missed treaties as not self-executing because the disputes to which they 
have given rise are not justiciable.139 In short, the term "self-execut-
ing" has been used in the treaty context to address the same variety of 
concepts that the term addresses with respect to statutes and constitu-
tional provisions. 
These are, of course, distinct issues, and should be addressed by 
distinct rules, as they usually are with respect to statutory and constitu-
tional claims. But, in treaty cases, the issues have been conflated. The 
the creation of a cause of action against a state and the withdrawal of the state's Eleventh 
Amendment immunity are not the same thing). See also Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. 
Ry. Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 560, 565-66 (1991) (distinguishing between creation of right of 
action against state agency and abrogation of agency's Eleventh Amendment immunity). 
But cf. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440-42 
(1989), in which the Court blurred the sovereign immunity and right of action issues by 
holding that certain treaties do not abrogate a foreign state's sovereign immunity 
because they do not "create private rights of action for foreign corporations to recover 
compensation from foreign states in United States courts." Id. at 442. The Court in 
Amerada Hess did not use the term "self-executing," but it cited cases commonly 
regarded as self-execution cases. See id. (citing Head Money Cases~ 112 U.S. 580, 
598-99 (1884) and Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)). 
135. See, e.g., In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 545, 590 (S.D. Tex. 
1980), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
136. See, e.g., Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
137. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808-10 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (Bork,J., concurring) (dictum); Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
736 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1990); Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1425 (C.D. 
Cal. 1985); cf. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. 428 (suggesting that Head Money Cases and Foster v. 
Neilson, which are commonly regarded as self-execution cases, had something to do with 
whether the treaty conferred a right of action). 
138. See, e.g., Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1222 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 
u.s. 869 (1972). 
139. See, e.g., Z & F Assets Realization Corp. v. Hull, 114 F.2d 464, 470 (D.C. Cir. 
1940), aff'd on other grounds, 311 U.S. 470 (1941). The court in this decision did not 
use the term "self-executing," but the decision has been interpreted as an application of 
the self-execution doctrine. See, e.g., Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 810 (Bork, ]., concurring); 
Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976). 
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courts have perceived the term "self-executing" as a term of art relat-
ing to a distinct (though amorphous and ill-defined) doctrine of treaty 
law. They have resolved the various issues by applying a single (though 
changing) set of criteria. The criteria address to varying degrees many 
of the issues listed above, but, to the extent they have had a clear con-
ception of the doctrine, the courts have perceived the self-execution 
issue as distinct from, though perhaps related to, each of those 
issues. 140 
What Professor Henkin said about the political-question doctrine 
is an even more apt description of the doctrine of self-executing trea-
ties: the doctrine "is an unnecessary, deceptive packaging of several 
established doctrines that has misled lawyers and courts to find in it 
things that were never put there and make it far more than the sum of 
its parts."141 Recognizing that the term "self-executing" is no more a 
term of art with respect to treaties than with respect to statutory and 
constitutional provisions, and that the "doctrine" in fact masks a variety 
of issues, each of which has its analogue in the jurisprudence of consti-
tutional and statutory adjudication, is the first step in restoring some 
integrity to this area of the law. The second step, I submit, is to address 
each of these distinct issues when it arises in a treaty case as it is ad-
dressed in a statutory or constitutional case. This includes employing 
the criteria that are used to address the issue in those other contexts, 
with appropriate modifications if necessary, but abandoning the "self-
execution" terminology and the criteria that do not bear on the rele-
vant issue. 142 
140. The courts' approach to the self-execution issue in Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 
F.2d 370, 373-76 (7th Cir. 1985), is typical. The court said that the issue turned on 
whether the treaty was "intended to be self-executing." Id. at 373. For this purpose, 
the court said that the following factors should be considered: 
(I) the language and purposes of the agreement as a whole; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding its execution; (3) the nature of the obligations 
imposed by the agreement; (4) the availability and feasibility of alternative 
enforcement mechanisms; (5) the implications of permitting a private right of 
action; and (6) the capability of the judiciary to resolve the dispute. 
Id. at 373. Without a clear conception of what the term "self-executing" refers to, 
however, it is unclear what exactly a court should look for in the language of the 
agreement or the circumstances surrounding its execution (factors I and 2). The last 
four factors relate to several of the issues discussed below: whether the treaty creates an 
obligation (factor 3), see infra part III.B.l; whether the obligation raises judicial as 
opposed to political questions (factor 6), see infra part III.B.3; whether the treaty 
confers a private right of action (factor 5), see infra part III.C.2; or whether judicial 
review is precluded by the treaty or a statute (factor 4), see infra note 299 and 
accompanying text. For a different set of criteria, see People of Saipan v. United States 
Dep't oflnterior, 502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975). 
141. Louis Henkin, Is There A "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 Yale LJ. 597, 
622 (1976). 
142. Others have attempted to bring a degree of analytic clarity to this area by 
arguing that one or more of the foregoing concepts are not properly treated as "self-
execution" issues. Thus, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law notes that 
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With respect to treaties, however, the term has come to be under-
stood in an additional sense. Among the few aspects of the self-execu-
tion doctrine about which there appears to be a consensus is that a 
treaty that is not self-executing is unavailing to the litigant relying on it 
in court. Perhaps for this reason, the notion has begun to take hold in 
the lower courts that a treaty that is not self-executing is not the law of 
the land. 143 This innovation, in combination with the inherent ambigu-
ity of the term "self-executing" and the indiscriminate use of the term 
to describe a variety of distinct concepts, has produced what has been 
correctly described as "the most confounding [doctrine] in treaty 
law."I44 
To the extent that a treaty is not the law of the land, the framework 
proposed below for examining treaty-based claims is entirely inapplica-
the question whether a treaty creates a cause of action is distinct from the question 
whether a treaty is self-executing. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States§ Ill cmt. h (1987). But these efforts have failed. The courts 
continue to address the existence of a cause of action as a "self-execution" issue. See 
supra note 137. Moreover, as discussed above, the term "self-executing" is used in 
other contexts to describe laws that do not themselves confer a remedy, so using the 
term to describe a treaty that does not itself confer a right of action cannot be said to be 
a misuse of the term. Finally, even if the "cause of action" issue were excluded from the 
"self-execution" doctrine, the doctrine would still address several other distinct 
concepts. 
I propose instead that we simply recognize that the terms "self-executing" and 
"non-self-executing" are no more terms of art with respect to treaties than with respect 
to statutory and constitutional provisions. The statement that a treaty is self-executing 
is no less ambiguous than the statement that the Takings Clause or the Commerce 
Clause is self-executing. If used at all, the term should be modified, as it is when used to 
describe statutory and constitutional provisions. Better yet, the terms should be avoided 
entirely. Instead, courts and commentators should resolve the various issues involved 
by addressing them separately and self-consciously. Each of these issues is typically 
addressed with respect to statutes and constitutional provisions without asking whether 
they are "self-executing." The issues should henceforth also be addressed with respect 
to treaties without resort to the term "self-executing" or the doctrine that bears its 
name. See Koh, supra note 54, at 2383; Myres McDougal, Remarks, 45 Proc. Am. Soc'y 
Int'l L. 102 (1951) ("This word 'self-executing' is essentially meaningless, and ... the 
quicker we drop it from our vocabulary the better for clarity and understanding."); 
Myres McDougal, The Impact of International Law upon National Law: A Policy-
Oriented Perspective, 4 S.D. L. Rev. 25, 77 (1959) ("The words self-executing and non-
self-executing embrace neither intrinsic nor historic meaning nor magic to resolve the 
issue."); Jordan Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 Am. J. Int'l L. 760, 783 & n.l32 
(1988). 
143. See, e.g .• United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 878 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 832 (1979); In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 590 (S.D. Tex. 
1980), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
Distinguished commentators have also advanced this interpretation of what it means for 
a treaty not to be self-executing. See Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 
157 (1972) [hereinafter Henkin, Foreigu Affairs and the Constitution]; Alona E. Evans, 
Some Aspects of the Problem of Self-Executing Treaties, 45 Pro c. Am. Soc'y lnt'l L. 66, 
68 (1951); Henkin, supra note 126, at 532. 
144. Postal, 589 F.2d at 876. 
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ble, as my proposals are based on the Supremacy Clause's designation 
of treaties as "law." I do not here examine the circumstances in which 
the conclusion that a treaty is not the law of the land is warranted or 
permissible. But I do propose that this issue, like the others now ad-
dressed under the self-execution rubric, be addressed separately and 
self-consciously by the courts rather than through the amorphous self-
execution doctrine. The courts should assess the particular ground be-
ing advanced to overcome the Supremacy Clause's designation of "all" 
treaties of the United States as "Law of the Land." Given the clarity of 
that text, a conclusion that a particular treaty, valid and in force inter-
nationally, is not the "Law of the Land" must be based on exceedingly 
weighty textual, structural, or historical arguments.I45 
As shown below, the Supreme Court's grounds for declining to ap-
ply treaties in particular cases do not distinguish those treaties from 
statutory or constitutional provisions. To be sure, some of the Court's 
reasons for not applying the treaties in cases before them are in tension 
with the treaties' status as "law." But that same tension exists when the 
courts decline to apply statutory and constitutional provisions for 
analogous reasons. In the latter contexts, the courts confront the ten-
sion and resolve it without concluding that the statutory or constitu-
tional provision at issue is not the "Law of the Land." In the treaty 
context, the courts have thus far been able to avoid confronting the 
tension through the facile conclusion that, because the treaty is not self-
executing, it is not the law of the land. The cavalier treatment this 
question has received in the treaty context is unacceptable. A treaty 
may well be unenforceable in the courts in certain circumstances, just 
as statutes and constitutional provisions sometimes are. That conclu-
sion may well lead a strict Austinian to question the status as "law" of 
all three.146 But, if so, their non-law status would be explained by their 
145. There are some categories of treaties whose nonlegal status can be squared 
with the text of the Supremacy Clause or justified by weighty structural or historical 
arguments: treaties that purport to accomplish what is beyond the treaty-making power, 
treaties that infringe individual rights protected by other provisions of the Constitution, 
or treaties that have been terminated or superseded by a later treaty or by legislation. It 
is fairly well-accepted that treaties in these categories do not themselves have domestic 
legal force. See Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution, supra note 143, at 
156-61. But see Lobel, supra note 54, at 1096-1114 (questioning the last-in-time rule). 
But the notion that a treaty that is not self-executing is not the law of the land, 
combined with the oft-repeated statement that a treaty's self-executing character is 
largely a matter of intent, has led some courts to reach a far more controversial 
conclusion: that a treaty is the law of the land only if the U.S. treaty-makers affirmatively 
intended that it be the law of the land. See, e.g., Postal, 589 F.2d at 878. The Supremacy 
Clause has been effectively transformed by these courts from a declaration that all 
treaties are the law of the land into a provision giving the U.S. treaty-makers the power to 
make treaties the law of the land. Whether there are categories of treaties other than 
those recognized above that, though valid and in force internationally, are not the law of 
the land is an issue that I leave for another day. 
146. cr. infra note 167. 
HeinOnline  -- 92 Colum. L. Rev.  1123 1992
1992] TREATY-BASED RIGHTS 1123 
unenforceability in the courts, which would in tum be explained by 
other factors. To use their supposed non-law status to explain their 
unenforceability in the courts, as some courts applying the self-execu-
tion doctrine appear to be doing, is a very different matter. At any rate, 
the conclusion that a treaty is unenforceable in the courts should be 
defended forthrighdy and in full cognizance of the intended conse-
quences of the Supremacy Clause's designation of treaties as "supreme 
Law of the Land," not through some ill-defined and litde understood 
doctrine. 
B. judicially Enforceable Obligations 
A treaty, like a statute or a constitutional provision, is enforceable 
in the courts only ifit establishes judicially enforceable obligations. If it 
is instead hortatory, a litigant claiming that the defendant has violated 
the treaty will lose on the merits because the treaty does not in fact 
require the defendant to behave othenvise than he has been behaving. 
Even if the treaty contemplates the establishment of obligations affect-
ing the individual, the individual's suit may be dismissed as premature 
because the treaty does not purport to establish those obligations itself, 
but instead delegates to the legislature the responsibility of establishing 
them. Finally, the treaty may establish an obligation, but the obligation 
may be unenforceable in the courts because it raises political rather 
than judicial questions. 
1. Obligations. - As shown above, the Supremacy Clause was 
designed to maximize compliance by the United States with its treaty 
obligations.147 By declaring treaties to be the law of the land, the 
Framers allocated first-line responsibility for treaty enforcement to the 
courts. The first question that must be addressed in determining 
whether a treaty may be enforced in the courts should therefore be 
whether the treaty imposes an obligation on the United States. 
Certain treaty provisions might be said to set forth aspirations 
rather than to impose obligations. Such provisions have sometimes 
been described as "precatory" or "hortatory." Often the treaty provi-
sions are described as "non-self-executing" for this reason.148 Treaty 
provisions have been held not to be self-executing when they require 
states to "use their best efforts" to achieve certain goals, 149 or when 
they urge the parties to "promot[e] and encourag[e]" certain ends. 150 
14 7. See supra part II.B. 
148. INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 429 n.22 (1984). 
149. Id. 
150. Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 619 n.2 (Cal. 1952) (quoting U.N. Charter art. 
1). In Sei Fujii, the California Supreme Court held that the provision of the U.N. Charter 
requiring states to "promot[e] and encourag[e] respect for human rights ... without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion" was not self-executing in the sense that 
it did not, of its own force, nullify state laws making distinctions on such grounds. Id. 
The decision is best understood as a decision that the Charter was setting forth 
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Such provisions might be said to impose "obligations" in a loose sense 
of the term: the obligation of every party in good faith to make appro-
priate efforts to achieve the aspirations. But obligations of this nature 
do not give rise to correlative legal "rights." 
The same issue is often addressed by the courts in the statutory 
and constitutional contexts. For example, to determine whether a fed-
eral statute or constitutional provision confers a "right" on a person 
that can be enforced under section 1983,151 the Supreme Court held 
recently that the first question to be addressed is " 'whether the provi-
sion in question creates obligations binding on the governmental unit 
or rather does no more than express a congressional preference for 
certain kinds of treatment.' " 152 This is of course very similar to the 
distinction between treaty provisions that impose obligations and those 
that are hortatory.153 Thus, outside the treaty context, the courts rou-
tinely distinguish obligatory legal provisions from hortatory provisions . 
. This aspect of the analysis therefore should not be unfamiliar to the 
courts. 154 
There is one complication with respect to treaties, however. It 
might be contended that a treaty is hortatory because there is no effec-
tive mechanism to enforce it internationally. This argument, if ac-
cepted, would render many treaty provlSlons unenforceable 
domestically; indeed, the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms has 
aspirations rather than obligations. Alternatively, the decision might be understood as 
resting on justiciability grounds: because the provision leaves the parties with 
significant discretion in determining how and when best to promote respect for human 
rights, it is up to the political branches, rather than the courts, to exercise that 
discretion. See infra notes 180-202 and accompanying text. The question whether the 
treaty imposes an obligation and the question whether the obligation it imposes is 
justiciable are obviously closely related. 
151. Section 1983 provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes 
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1981). 
152. Dennis v. Higgins, IllS. Ct. 865, 871 (1991) (quoting Golden State Transit 
Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989), which quotes Pennhurst State 
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19 (1981)). 
153. See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 24 (Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of 
Rights Act "intended to be hortatory, not mandatory"). 
154. The issue in the treaty context is different in one respect: whether the treaty 
imposes an obligation is not governed by the intent of Congress or even the President 
and two-thirds of the Senate (the treaty-makers); it is, rather, a matter of treaty 
interpretation, determined by rules of international law relating to treaty interpretation. 
See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236-37 (1796); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 
Pet.) 253, 313-14 (1829); see generally Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, May 
23, 1969, arts. 31-33, 1155 U.N.T.S. 330-331 (rules of treaty interpretation). 
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led some to question the status of international law as law155 and others 
to describe international law as a primitive legal system.156 But the 
Framers recognized the limited efficacy of international mechanisms for 
enforcing treaties, and they nevertheless made treaties enforceable by 
individuals in our courts. The Supremacy Clause made legally binding 
treaties that would otherwise have been only morally binding. In deter-
mining whether the treaty imposes an obligation on the United States 
to behave in a given way, therefore, the likelihood that the other party 
would take steps to secure a sanction for the violation, or that any such 
steps would prove effective, should play no part in the analysis. 
2. Delegation. -What many consider to be the prototype of a 
non-self-executing treaty may also be understood as a treaty that does 
not itself establish the obligation that the litigant is seeking to enforce, 
but its compatibility with the Supremacy Clause is best perceived by 
comparing it with a statute that delegates law-making power to an ad-
ministrative agency. This category is typified by the treaty involved in 
the case that gave birth to the self-execution doctrine, Foster v. Neil-
son .157 Foster involved a treaty providing that certain Spanish grants 
"shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of the 
lands."158 The plaintiff claimed title to land in Florida pursuant to 
Spanish grants. The Court rejected his treaty argument on the ground 
that the treaty did not itself "ratify or confirm" the Spanish grants, but 
instead obligated the United States to "ratify and confirm" the grants in 
the future. The Court compared treaties to contracts and held that this 
contract was executory-it was a promise to perform a particular act. 
Such provisions, the Court held, must be executed by the legislature 
before they may be applied by the courts. 159 Whether a treaty provi-
sion is executory or not was clearly, in the Court's view, a matter of 
treaty interpretation, and the Court decided the issue by relying on the 
treaty's language. The provision would not have been executory, in the 
Court's view, if it had said that the grants were "hereby" confirmed.160 
Indeed, in a later case Chief justice Marshall concluded that the treaty 
provision at issue in Foster was not in fact executory.161 His about-face 
on this point resulted from his consultation of the Spanish text, which 
provided that the grants were to "remain ratified and confirmed." 162 
155. See Austin, supra note 26, at 187-88. 
156. See Kelsen, supra note 45, at 16 (asserting that the prevalence of"selfhelp" 
in the absence of a "centralized coercive order" is the mark of a "primitive legal order"). 
157. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829); see People of Saipan v. United States Dep't of 
Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 101 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975); 
Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 962 n.59 (D.D.C.), rev'd on other grounds, 617 
F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
158. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 310. 
159. See id. at 314. 
160. Id. 
161. See United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88 (1833). 
162. Id. 
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This language showed that the treaty did not, as he had previously con-
cluded, "stipulat[e] for some future legislative act." 163 
The Court in Foster thus decided that the treaty did not itself estab-
lish the obligation that the litigant relying on it was seeking to en-
force-the obligation to recognize Spanish grants as ratified and 
confirmed-but instead imposed a different obligation on the United 
States-the obligation to enact legislation to ratify and confirm the 
grants. That the former obligation may not be enforced in court before 
Congress fulfills the latter obligation does not distinguish this category 
of non-self-executing treaty from statutes that might similarly be de-
scribed as non-self-executing. If Congress were to enact a statute in-
structing an administrative agency to adopt regulations for the benefit 
of a particular class of individuals, and an individual in that class were 
to bring suit before the adoption of the regulation claiming the benefit 
contemplated hy the law, the litigant's suit would be dismissed as pre-
mature.I64 The Foster category of non-self-executing treaty can be con-
ceived as a delegation of law-making responsibility by treaty to 
Congress. The distinction is between a treaty obligation to behave in 
given ways towards the individual and a treaty obligation to enact a law 
requiring that individuals be treated in a given way. The latter obliga-
tion would not be violated if executive officials treated the individuals 
in the disapproved way; it would only be violated if the legislature failed 
to enact the required law. 165 Thus, an individual claiming that his 
treaty rights have been infringed by the treatment he received would 
lose because the rights were not infringed, not because the treaty lacks 
the force of domestic law.166 It is a law that by its terms is addressed to 
Congress. 167 
163. 1d. at 89. 
164. If the litigant were to bring suit against the agency seeking to require it to 
initiate proceedings for adopting the regulation, the suit would be permitted under 
certain circumstances. See Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and 
Private Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1193, 1205-06, 1267-89 (1982) (discussing "right of 
initiation"). An analogous claim against Congress seeking to force it to implement a 
treaty would face insuperable justiciability problems, however. 
165. See D'Amato, supra note 54, at 98-99. 
166. That an agency's exercise of law-making authority validly delegated to it by 
Congress is not reviewable by the courts is compatible with the courts' duty to say what 
the law is. To the extent the agency has been delegated law-making authority, the law is 
whatever the agency says it is. See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative 
State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 25-26 (1983) [hereinafter Monaghan, Marbury and the 
Administrative State]. The courts can of course review the agency's regulation to 
determine whether it is within the scope of the delegation. Because treaties and statutes 
are considered to be of equivalent stature, the courts may not similarly review a statute 
to determine whether it is consistent with the treaty. That is because, as a result of the 
last-in-time rule, the statute supersedes the treaty (at least if Congress's power to 
legislate on the subject is not based on the treaty). 
167. Because there is no sanction for Congress' violation of the obligation, see 
supra notes 164, 166, a strict Austinian would deny that the treaty is law. Whatever the 
merits of such a position, it is a conclusion based on the fact that the treaty is 
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Recognizing a category of treaty that is unenforceable in the courts 
because the obligation it imposes is an obligation to enact legislation is 
relatively unproblematic.168 Identifying such treaties, however, is an-
other matter. The easiest case is when the treaty expressly states that 
the United States' obligation is contingent on the enactment of legisla-
tion.169 At the other end of the spectrum, it is clear that a treaty prohib-
iting conduct by the United States towards individuals does not require 
legislative implementation to be enforceable by individuals in the 
courts. 170 In between, determining whether the treaty obligation is an 
obligation to enact legislation is tricky in light of the facts that (a) in 
some states (most states, according to Justice Iredell171) treaties always 
require implementing legislation, and (b) the Supremacy Clause was 
designed to establish a different rule in the United States. The Foster 
Court focused on whether the treaty obligated the United States to 
"perform a particular act" or, on the other hand, purported to "act 
directly on the subject."172 But, as we saw above, in Great Britain, even 
a treaty providing that tariffs are "hereby" set at a given level requires 
unenforceable in the courts, which is in turn based on historical and structural 
considerations (such as the last-in-time rule) of the type that I argued above, see supra 
text accompanying note 145, were required to justify such a conclusion. The 
unenforceability of the treaty is not explained by its non-law status; rather, its non-law 
status results from its unenforceability, which is in turn explained by other factors. 
Thus, while the statement that a non-self-executing treaty is not the law of the land, as 
applied to this category of treaty, may be true as a descriptive matter, the statement lacks 
prescriptive value. It is epiphenomenal. 
168. This category of non-self-executing treaty is relatively unproblematic because 
it does not create a discrepancy between our international treaty obligation and our 
domestic law. Rather, it recognizes that the international obligation is an obligation to 
enact legislation, an obligation that is not judicially enforceable for separation-of-powers 
reasons. See supra notes 164, 166-167. 1t would be far more problematic to recoguize 
(as the Postal court appears to have held, see supra note 145) that a treaty itself imposes 
an international obligation on the United States to behave in a given way towards 
individuals, but that it is not enforceable in the courts by individuals because it does not 
have the force of domestic law. 
169. See United States v. American Sugar Refining Co., 202 U.S. 563, 576 (1906), 
involving a treaty providing specifically that the United States' obligations did not arise 
until the enactment of legislation by Congress. 
170. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 697, 702-03 (1878): 
When it is provided by treaty that certain acts shall not be done, or that certain 
limitations or restrictions shall not be disregarded or exceeded by the 
contracting parties, the compact does not need to be supplemented by 
legislative or executive action, to authorize the courts of justice to decline to 
override those limitations or to exceed the prescribed restrictions, for the 
palpable and all-sufficient reason, that to do so would be not only to violate the 
public faith, but to transgress the "supreme law of the land." 
This opinion has been characterized as "very able" by the Supreme Court. See United 
States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 427-28 (1886); see also Restatement (Third) of the 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 111 reporter's note 5 (1987). 
171. See supra notes 116-117. 
172. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). 
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an act of legislation to give it the force of domestic law. 173 The Court 
held in Ware,174 and Chief justice Marshall agreed in Foster, 175 that the 
Supremacy Clause established a different rule in the United States. 
That different rule might have been that no legislation is required in 
the United States even if the treaty purports to require legislation. 
Marshall declined to go that far. He held that legislation was required 
if the parties to the treaty affirmatively "stipulat[e] for some future leg-
islative act."176 That holding is unexceptionable, but there is a degree 
of circularity in inferring such a stipulation from language in a treaty 
that appears to contemplate the performance of a particular act. 177 
Marshall apparently regarded the treaty involved in Foster as one 
that, by affirmative agreement of the parties, required an act of legisla-
tion. The pitfalls of inferring such an agreement from ambiguous evi-
dence are vividly illustrated by Marshall's about-face, in United States v. 
Percheman, with respect to the very same treaty provision.178 A discus-
sion of the types of evidence that might appropriately support a conclu-
sion that a treaty "stipulates for some future legislative act" is beyond 
the scope of this Article. 179 For present purposes, it is sufficient to note 
that this category of treaties represents a determination that the treaty 
does not itself purport to establish the obligation that the litigant rely-
ing on it seeks to enforce, but instead obligates the United States to 
enact legislation that would in tum affect the individual in some way. 
3. justiciability.- The self-execution problem is of course at bot-
tom a separation-of-powers problem. The desiguation of a rule as 
"law" in a given state serves to assign responsibilities among officials of 
173. See supra text accompanying notes 114-116. 
174. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
175. See supra text accompanying note 125. 
176. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 89. 
177. Marshall's focus on whether the language of the proVIsion appeared to 
contemplate a particular act overlooked the possibility that the parties chose the 
language not because they affirmatively intended to require a legislative act, but because 
the domesticlaw of one or more of the parties required the performance of a particular 
act regardless of the parties' intent. As justice Iredell recoguized in Ware, at that time 
most nations followed the British rule. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 262, 
270 (1796). 
I78. 32 U.S. at 51. 
I79. Some courts have recently held that the existence in a multilateral treaty of a 
provision requiring all parties to inform the other parties, or a central depository, of any 
legislation they may enact to give effect to the treaty's provisions means that the treaty as 
a whole is not self-executing. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 
774, 809 (D.C. Cir. I984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. 
Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396, 1406 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 809 F.2d 794 
(D.C. Cir. 1987). Such a provision, however, may simply reflect the fact that, in certain 
states, treaties never have domestic effect without implementing legislation. 
Additionally, the provision may reflect the fact that some provisions of the treaty require 
legislation, while others do not. It is well settled that some provisions of a treaty may be 
self-executing while others are not. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States § Ill cmt. h (1986). 
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the state for enforcing the rule. In Great Britain and the United States, 
the courts are ,responsible for enforcing laws in adjudicatory contexts. 
In Great Britain, treaties are not considered law domestically because 
they are made by the Executive, and the Parliament has exclusive law-
making authority.180 In the United States, the designation of treaties as 
"law" was intended to make them enforceable directly by courts with-
out the need for legislation. The Supremacy Clause, therefore, ad-
dresses the separation-of-powers issue that the self-execution doctrine 
raises. The doctrine under which treaties require legislative implemen-
tation before they may be applied by the courts is in tension with the 
power-allocating function of the Supremacy Clause. We do not resolve 
this tension by denominating it a separation-of-powers problem. 
But it is helpful to recognize that the same tension arises when 
courts decline to adjudicate a constitutional claim on political-question 
grounds. Commentators have pointed out the fundamental inconsis-
tency between the political-question doctrine and the notion that "it is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is." 181 With respect to the Constitution, as with respect to 
treaties, there is thought to be a basic tension between their status as 
law and the inability or incapacity of the courts to give them effect in 
certain circumstances. The conceptual problem is the same. It should 
be addressed in a similar manner.1s2 
Though the Framers understood that "laws" would generally be 
enforceable by the courts, they also intended to confine the power of 
the judiciary to cases of a judicial nature. At the Convention, Madison 
doubted whether it was not going too far to extend the juris-
diction of the Court generally to cases arising Under the Con-
stitution, & whether it ought not to be limited to cases of a 
Judiciary Nature .... The right of expounding the Constitu-
tion in cases not of this nature ought not to be given to that 
Department.183 
The jurisdiction of the federal courts was nevertheless extended to 
cases arising under the Constitution without expressly limiting it to 
cases of a 'judiciary" nature because it was "generally supposed that 
the jurisdiction given was constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary 
180. See 1 Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law 226 (1970). 
181. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); accord Michael J. 
Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy 316 (1990); Henkin, supra note 141, at 600-01; 
Fritz W. Scharpf, judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 
Yale LJ. 517, 517-19 (1966); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 7-8 (1959). 
182. Commentators have argued that the "self-execution" doctrine is essentially a 
version of the political-question doctrine. See, e.g., Charles W. Stotter, Comment, Self-
Executing Treaties and the Human Rights Provisions of the United Nations Charter: A 
Separation of Powers Problem, 25 Buff. L. Rev. 773, 774 (1976); Quincy Wright, 
National Courts and Human Rights-The Fujii Case, 45 Am.J. Int'l L. 62, 64 (1951). 
183. 2 Farrand, supra note 65, at 430. 
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nature." 184 The justiciability doctrines of standing, mootness, and 
ripeness, which tell us "who" may invoke the judicial power and 
"when," 185 are all thought to flow from this limitation, which is thought 
to be implied in the "case or controversy" requirement.I86 
The political-question doctrine asks "whether" a particular dispute 
may be resolved judicially, regardless of the concreteness of the dispute 
or the adversarial relationship of the parties. The answer may be nega-
tive either because (a) the nature of the issue renders it inappropriate 
for judicial resolution or (b) resolution of the dispute has been assigned 
by the Constitution to a different branch of government.I87 
The first category consists of issues that are thought to require 
judgments of a political rather than legal nature. Although few today 
would maintain that there is a bright line between legislation and adju-
dication, 188 this version of the political-question doctrine may reflect 
deeply held intuitions that certain types of issues are inherently not for 
judicial resolution. Many of the "self-execution" decisions might be 
understood as applications of this category of the political-question 
doctrine. In the latter context, the courts ask whether there are ''judi-
cially discoverable and manageable standards,"189 while in the former 
the courts ask whether the treaty provision is "too vagne for judicial 
enforcement"190 or "provide[s] specific standards."l9l This category is 
characterized, however, by legal provisions that leave the political 
branches with discretion that is sufficiently unguided that the courts 
consider it inappropriate to intervene. Professor Henkin argnes that 
184. Id. 
185. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication, supra note 106. 
186. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984). 
187. Other considerations have at times been considered relevant, see Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (listing "elements which identify" political questions), 
but the two noted in the text appear to be the operative ones. See Japan Whaling Ass'n 
v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 229-30 (1986) (dismissing "embarrassment 
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments" as a concern, saying that 
"we cannot shirk [our] responsibility merely because our decision may have significant 
political overtones") (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217). 
188. Cf. Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and 
Administrative Courts Under Article lii, 65 Ind. LJ. 233, 264 (1990) (there are no 
"rigid and impermeable walls" between the executive and judicial functions). But cf. 
I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) ("The Constitution sought to divide the 
delegated powers of the new Federal Government into three defined categories, 
Legislative, Executive, and judicial, to assure ... that each branch of government would 
confine itself to its assigned responsibility."). 
189. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217. The courts similarly ask, in determining 
whether an individual has a "right" for the purposes of section 1983, whether the 
plaintiff's interest is " 'too vague and amorphous' to be 'beyond the competence of the 
judiciary to enforce.'" Dennis v. Higgins, 111 S. Ct. 865, 871 (1991) (quoting Golden 
State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989)). 
190. People of Saipan v. United States Dep't oflnterior, 502 F.2d 90, 99 (9th Cir. 
1974). 
191. Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
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these are not justiciability decisions at all, but rather determinations on 
the merits that the conduct being challenged is within the defendant's 
discretion to perform.192 In any event, this category does not include 
cases in which the obligation imposed by the legal provision is clear-
cut, such as the obligation not to abduct persons from the territory of 
another state. The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that the polit-
ical-question doctrine "is one of 'political questions,' not one of 'polit-
ical cases.' " 193 
The second category consists of issues the decision of which has 
been allocated by the Constitution to another branch of govem-
ment.194 It differs from the first category in that it is not necessarily 
limited to situations in which the commitment of the issue to another 
branch is inferred from the need to make judgments of a political na-
ture. But there are few constitutional commitments of issues to other 
branches, and they have been interpreted narrowly by the Court.195 It 
cannot be said that the Constitution allocates decision of treaty issues 
generally to branches other than the judiciary.196 The Supremacy 
Clause's text and history show that the Framers intended that the 
courts be the principal enforcers of treaties. 
It might perhaps be argued the Constitution allocates to the courts 
the power to enforce treaties against the states and private individuals, 
but not against the other branches of the federal government or in the 
face of inconsistent acts of those branches. We have already seen that 
the courts may not enforce treaties in the face of subsequent acts of the 
other branches that take the form oflegislation or treaty.197 Recoguiz-
ing that the courts lack the power to enforce a treaty in the face of an 
inconsistent unilateral act of the President, however, would be highly 
problematic in light of the status of treaties as law and the President's 
constitutional duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed.198 
Nevertheless, the President is acknowledged to have limited independ-
192. See Henkin, supra note 141, at 606. 
193. Bakerv. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217. 
194. Professor Wechsler considers this the only defensible category of political 
questions. See Wechsler, supra note 181, at 7-8. 
195. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-48 (1969), in which the 
apparent textual commitment in Article 1, Section 5 of the Constitution-which provides 
that "[e]ach House shall be the Judge of the ... Qualifications of its own Members"-
was interpreted to bar judicial review only of those qualifications expressly set forth in 
the Constitution. That interpretation bars judicial review of issues that require no policy 
choices and are among those best suited for judicial resolution, such as whether the 
Member is at least 25 years old and has been a citizen for at least seven years. 
196. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 
(1986) ("[T]he courts have the authority to construe treaties .... "). 
197. It is noteworthy that the decisions first articulating the last-in-time rule relied 
on a political-question rationale. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 195 (1888); 
The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620-21 (1870); Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. 
Cas. 784, 786-87 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799). 
198. But cf. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1983) (relying on the Take Care 
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ent legislative authority in the area of foreign affairs that enables him to 
terminate treaties unilaterally in certain circumstances. 199 To the ex-
tent the President possesses such a power it might be argued that he 
possesses a corresponding power to determine that compliance with a 
treaty is no longer in the national interest in particular circumstances 
without terminating the treaty. I do not examine this issue further 
here. But I note that, whatever the President's freedom from judicial 
control in this regard, it is not necessarily shared by lower level execu-
tive officials.200 
The two categories of "non-self-executing" treaties discussed 
above correspond roughly to the two categories of political questions. 
"Hortatory" treaty provisions may be conceived not as provisions that 
do not impose obligations, but as provisions that impose obligations 
that leave much to the discretion of the parties; the unenforceability of 
such obligations in the courts may thus be ultimately grounded on the 
absence of judicially manageable standards. And "executory" treaty 
provisions may be analogized to treaties that themselves delegate first-
line enforcement responsibility to the legislature. Moreover, the two 
categories may significantly overlap. For example, the reason for re-
quiring legislation to implement "executory" treaty provisions might in 
many cases be a conviction that, when a treaty consists of mutual 
promises, determining the time and manner of the United States' per-
formance in relation to that of other parties requires the exercise of 
discretion and gamesmanship that is beyond the competence or proper 
role of the judiciary because it turns on judicially unmanageable 
standards. 
In the constitutional context, too, the courts have tended to blur 
the two categories of political questions, often treating them as one.201 
Clause to support its conclusion that the President's determination how to execute a 
particular law was not subject to judicial review). 
199. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1006-07 (1974) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
200. The Court has on numerous occasions enforced treaties against executive 
officials. See, e.g., United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886) (limiting federal 
criminal prosecution to charge by which respondent was extradited); Chew Heong v. 
United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884) (enforcing treaty against executive officials); United 
States v. Brooks, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 442, 460 (1850) (affirming right to disputed land 
"against the claim of the United States"); see also Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939) 
(rejecting executive's construction of treaty). ' 
201. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 
(1986): 
The political question doctrine excludes from judicial review those 
controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations 
constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the 
confines of the Executive Branch. The Judiciary is particularly ill suited to 
make such decisions, as "courts are fundamentally underequipped to formulate 
national policies or develop standards for matters not legal in nature." 
(quoting United States ex rei. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1379 (1981)). 
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Thus, with respect to both treaties and the Constitution, whether the 
responsibility for enforcing a particular provision has been entrusted to 
a branch other than the judiciary may in the end tum on whether en-
forcement of the provision involves the application ofjudicially unman-
ageable standards. And an affirmative answer to that question may, as 
Professor Henkin argues, mean simply that the relevant branch has the 
discretion to behave as it has been behaving-i.e., that, on the merits, 
the law does not impose an obligation to behave differendy.202 1 do not 
here advocate any particular version of the political-question doctrine, 
nor do 1 contend that it provides an independent ground for refusing 
to enforce treaties that do not fit into the first two categories of unen-
forceable treaty provisions discussed above. But 1 do propose that the 
parallels between the political-question doctrine and the doctrine of 
self-executing treaties be recoguized and that the tension between the 
latter doctrine and the status of treaties as "law" be resolved, as it gen-
erally is with respect to constitutional provisions, not by denying the 
provision's status as law, but by determining whether there are overrid-
ing reasons to hold that what is prima facie a "law" is nevertheless unen-
forceable in the courts. 
C. Correlative Rights 
lt is often said that an individual may enforce a treaty in our courts 
only if the treaty confers rights on the individual. For that statement to 
have any prescriptive value, the term "rights" cannot be understood in 
the sense of secondary rights, under either international or domestic 
law. As we have seen, the Framers recognized that individuals do not 
have secondary rights under treaties as a matter of international law, 
but they intended nevertheless that treaties be enforceable by individu-
als domestically.203 Moreover, the statement purports to tell us when 
an individual has domestic secondary rights under a treaty. lf the term 
"rights" were understood in the sense of domestic secondary rights, 
the statement would be a tautology. 
The statement would be consistent with both the Framers' intent 
and the Supreme Court's decisions if we understood the term in its 
sense ofprimary right. lfwe so understood the term, the existence of a 
202. Professor Henkin argues that the Supreme Court's "political question" 
decisions represent determinations either that the defendant was acting within the scope 
of its constitutional authority or that the requested equitable relief was properly denied 
as a matter of equitable discretion. Henkin, supra note 141, at 606; cf. United States 
Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 60 U.S.L.W. 4279, 4284 (Mar. 31, 1992) ("In invoking 
the political question doctrine, a court acknowledges the possibility that a constitutional 
provision may not be judicially enforceable. Such a decision is of course very different 
from determining that specific congressional action does not violate the Constitution. 
That determination is a decision on the merits that reflects the exercise of judicial review, 
rather than the abstention fromjudicial review that would be appropriate in the case of a 
true political question." (citations omitted)). 
203. See supra part 11. 
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right would be governed by the legal rules that are employed to deter-
mine when individuals have standing to enforce statutory and constitu-
tional provisions that impose obligations on government officials. 
Employing these legal rules with respect to treaties is, moreover, con-
sistent with the Supremacy Clause's equivalent treatment of constitu-
tional, statutory, and treaty law. Finally, the relevant standing rules are 
well suited to application in the treaty context. 
The supremacy clause invalidates governmental action that violates 
a treaty. 204 Because government deprivations of liberty or property 
must ordinarily be preceded or followed by a hearing, an individual 
who has a primary right under a treaty-that is, standing to enforce it-
will ordinarily have an opportunity to enforce the treaty defensively in 
an adjudicatory setting. The sanction of nullity should satisfy a strict 
sanctionist that the treaty is genuinely law. But, as to treaty violations 
already committed, the defensive sanction leaves a substantial gap be-
tween the primary right and the secondary right. This gap is signifi-
cantly narrowed by rights of action afforded by the common law, state 
and federal, and by federal statutes authorizing remedies for violations 
of federal law. 
Only where a treaty confers primary rights but neither a statute nor 
the common law supplies a right of action should it be necessary to 
locate a right of action in the treaty itself. If the treaty does not confer a 
right of action expressly, it will be necessary to determine whether a 
right of action is implicit in the treaty. This Article proposes that a 
right of action be deemed to be implicit in a treaty if failure to afford it 
would give rise to, or exacerbate, the responsibility of the United States 
to the state of the litigant's nationality under international law. The 
same analysis should be employed to determine what the appropriate 
remedy is when a treaty is relied upon defensively or when a right of 
action is afforded by a statute that does not specify the remedy. 
1. Standing and Primary Rights. - When an individual seeks to en-
force a constitutional or statutory provision that imposes a duty on the 
state, the courts usually consider as a threshold question whether the 
individual has standing.205 A showing of standing is of course required 
204. Unless, of course, the actors have the constitutional power to violate or 
supersede treaties or have been instructed to violate the treaty by someone having such 
power. See supra text accompanying notes 197-220. 
205. Although the courts often address standing as a threshold issue, there is no 
reason that the non-constitutional aspects of standing have to be considered before 
other legal issues, such as whether the litigant is entitled to a remedy. The conclusion 
that an individual is entitled to a remedy is necessarily a conclusion that the individual 
has standing to obtain the remedy. See infra text accompanying note 247. Thus, the 
court could bypass the standing issue by turning directly to the remedy issue. Under the 
analysis proposed helow, a litigant should be entitled to a remedy if affording the 
individual a remedy would prevent or cure a violation of international law by the United 
States to the state of the individual's nationality. See infra text accompanying notes 
316-325. If rules of customary international law toncerning exhaustion of local 
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when the individual seeks to enforce a duty of the state based on a 
treaty. But, though the courts often address standing in treaty cases, 
they appear to consider the issue to be distinct from the question 
whether the individual has a "right" under the treaty such that the 
treaty may be said to be self-executing.206 The two inquiries in fact 
address the same issue and should be collapsed. 
The doctrine of standing is a relatively recent creation. Its emer-
gence as a separate doctrine is attributable to the growth of the admin-
istrative state.207 Because the Supreme Court decisions suggesting that 
a treaty may be enforced by individuals only if it confers a right on the 
individual predate this development, it is not surprising that these deci-
sions do not connect the issues of primary rights and standing. Today, 
the connection should be plain: like statutes imposing duties on ad-
ministrative agencies, treaties by their nature impose duties on the 
state. Standing doctrine, which identifies who may enforce statutes that 
impose duties on government agencies, addresses precisely the same 
question as this branch of the "self-execution" question: does the liti-
gant have a correlative primary right? 
Because treaties are laws that impose duties on the state, the stand-
ing decisions relating to two federal statutes are particularly pertinent. 
Section 1983 authorizes actions against state officials by individuals 
who have been deprived of "any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States.208 The 
Supreme Court's decisions regarding when an individual has a "right" 
under the Constitution or federal laws for purposes of section 1983 
thus not only address the precise question posed by the "primary 
right" inquiry, but also employ the same terminology. Indeed, Profes-
sor Monaghan has recently described the requirement of a "right" 
under section 1983 to be a requirement of a "primary right" as Hart 
and Sacks define the term.209 The Supreme Court has recently held 
that three considerations determine whether an individual has a "right" 
under section 1983: 
In deciding whether a federal right has been violated, we have 
considered [I] whether the provision in question creates obli-
gations binding on the governmental unit or rather "does no 
remedies were adopted for the purpose of determining the individual's entitlement to a 
remedy in our domestic courts, as suggested infra notes 319-325 and accompanying 
text, such rules would also provide a floor for standing. If the standing issue is 
addressed first, the international-law rules discussed below should be consulted on this 
issue; standing should not be denied to an individual who is entitled to a remedy under 
those rules. 
206. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1355-58 (9th 
Cir. 1991). 
207. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 Yale LJ. 221, 225 
(1988). 
208. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1988). 
209. See Hart & Sacks, supra note 26; Monaghan, supra note 26. 
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more than express a congressional preference for certain 
kinds of treatment." [2] The interest of the plaintiff must not 
be "too vague and amorphous" to be "beyond the compe-
tence of the judiciary to enforce." [3] We have also asked 
whether the provision in question was "inten[ded] to benefit" 
the putative plaintiff.2IO 
The standing part of that test is the third consideration-whether the 
provision was "intended to benefit" the plaintiff.211 
This requirement is similar to the standing requirements under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, which provides that a "person suffering 
legal wrong ... or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action 
within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review 
thereof."212 A person is "adversely affected or aggrieved" by agency 
action, according to the Supreme Court, if "the injury he complains of 
(his aggrievement, or the adverse effect upon him) falls within the 'zone 
of interests' sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose 
violation forms the legal basis for his complaint."213 Professor 
Monaghan has written that the standing requirements under these two 
statutes appear to be converging, and that both tum on a distinction 
between "direct" and "incidental" beneficiaries.2I4 
This distinction is peculiarly suited to application in the treaty con-
text. The distinction between direct and incidental beneficiaries is rem-
iniscent of the distinction applied in contract law to determine the 
circumstances in which someone who is not a party to a contract may 
enforce a contractual obligation as a third-party beneficiary. Treaties 
are contracts between nations,215 and the position of individuals with 
respect to treaties has been compared to that of a third-party benefici-
ary under a private contract.216 Indeed, in defining the concept of a 
"primary right," Hart and Sacks give the third-party beneficiary situa-
tion as an example.217 
210. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989) 
(citations omitted) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. I, 19 
(1981) and Wright v. Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 430, 431-33 
(1987)). The Court quoted this same language in Dennis v. Higgins, Ill S. Ct. 865, 871 
(1991). 
211. The first consideration listed by the Court addresses whether the treaty 
imposes an obligation or is instead precatory, and the second relates to the justiciability 
of the obligation. See supra notes 152, 189 and accompanying text. 
212. 5 u.s.c. § 702 (1988). 
213. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3186 (1990). 
214. Monaghan, supra note 26, at 257-60. 
215. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); supra note I. 
216. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest 
Proposal, 100 Yale LJ. 2277, 2304 (1991). 
217. 
If A promises B that he will pay B's debt to C and the promise is valid and 
binding, it is obvious that C has a primary "right" at least in the sense of a claim 
to the benefit of the performance of A's promise. But as every first-year law 
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Adopting the rules applied by the courts to determine whether in-
dividuals have standing to enforce statutes or constitutional provisions 
that are in terms addressed to the government will hardly eliminate all 
of the problems that courts have encountered in determining when an 
individual may enforce a treaty. Indeed, standing doctrine is regularly 
the subject of ridicule and pleas for abandonment.218 The point here, 
though, is that once it has been determined that a treaty provision im-
poses an obligation on the state, the standing inquiry and the "primary 
right" inquiry are the same: is this individual within the class of per-
sons who should be permitted to enforce the obligation in court? De-
spite the disarray in which we find standing law, collapsing the standing 
and primary right inquiries would simplify the treaty-application pro-
cess by replacing two sets of rules with one. If nothing else, standing 
doctrine is far more familiar to the courts than treaty application 
doctrine. · 
In fact, standing doctrine would add considerable predictability 
and coherence to the treaty application process. The problematic 
standing cases in the statutory and constitutional contexts involve chal-
lenges to agency action having broad and diffuse impacts affecting a 
wide array of persons in varying ways (thus giving rise to multipolar 
disputes), or iJ1iuries that are either abstract or indirectly or remotely 
traceable to the agency's action.219 If a suit is brought to challenge 
agency action of this type as a violation of the treaty,220 the standing 
student knows it has not been obvious to many courts that C has a right of 
action against A if A fails to pay the debt . 
. Hart & Sacks, supra note 26, at 152. The Supreme Court's decisions concerning 
implication of rights of action from statutes also support the proposition that an 
intended beneficiary of a law has a primary right under it. ln Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 
(1975), the Court listed as the first of four fuctors relevant to the issue whether the 
plaintiff was " 'one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,'-that 
is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?" Id. at 78 (citation 
omitted) (quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)). Since the 
court listed this as a factor in determining whether the litigant had a right of action, it 
must have meant to refer to a primary right. An "especial" beneficiary-like an 
intended beneficiary-would thus be the holder of a primary right. Similarly, Professor 
Fletcher has compared the standing inquiry to the question of whether a third-party 
beneficiary may enforce a contract. See Fletcher, supra note 207, at 238. 
218. See, e.g., Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An 
Inadequate Surrogate for Claims for Relief, 83 Yale LJ. 425, 442-50 (1974); David P. 
Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 41; Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing 
Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 635,651-59 (1985); Mark 
V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 
663, 663 (1977) (criticizing standing doctrine as irrational and concealing "decisions on 
the merits of the underlying constitutional claim"). 
219. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752-53 (1984) (standards for 
conferring tax exempt status on racially discriminatory schools); Duke Power Co. v. 
Carolina Envtl. Study Group Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72-73 (1978) (threat that injuries from 
nuclear power accident would be inadequately compensated due to limited liability of 
Price-Anderson Act). 
220. See, e.g., japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 
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issue may well be difficult to resolve, as it sometimes is with respect to 
statutes and constitutional provisions.221 But, in treaty cases, standing 
issues have seemed problematic even in the bipolar, "private right" 
cases that have never generated controversial standing problems in the 
statutory and constitutional contexts.222 The standing problems in 
these cases can be traced to the understanding that treaties, as instru-
ments of international law, do not confer rights on private individuals. 
But the Framers changed that (or made it irrelevant), for domestic pur-
poses, when they gave treaties the same legal status as the Constitution 
and federal statutes. Applying standing doctrine as it is applied in the 
statutory and constitutional contexts should obviate these problems. In 
those contexts, it has long been clear that anyone whose liberty or 
property is protected from governmental interference by law has stand-
ing to challenge government conduct depriving him of such liberty or 
property. 223 
The Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez 224 
illustrates the problems that would be obviated by applying ordinary 
standing doctrine in treaty cases. Having concluded that the extradi-
tion treaty between the United States and Mexico prohibited the United 
States from unilaterally abducting individuals from Mexican territory, 
the court struggled to determine whether an individual abducted by the 
United States from Mexico had standing to invoke the rule in our 
courts.225 If the prohibition had had its source in a statute, there would 
have been no standing problem. Someone abducted by the govern-
ment in violation of a law prohibiting his abduction has standing to 
invoke the prohibition in court.226 The action directly affects his lib-
n.4 (1986). The plaintiff in japan Whaling was seeking to enforce a statute that was 
alleged to incorporate a standard set forth in a treaty. 
221. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
222. On the traditional "private rights" view of standing, see Albert, supra note 
218, at 430-42; Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication, supra note 106, at 1365-68; 
Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 164, at 1202-04; Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the 
Privatization of Public Law, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1432, 1434-40 (1988). Some 
commentators have argued that tbis grudging view of standing was created judicially to 
restrict the ability of courts in the Lochner era from interfering with social welfare 
legislation, see Sunstein, supra, at 1435-38; Steven Winter, The Metaphor of Standing 
and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1371, 1454-57 (1988), and have 
denied that the Framers contemplated any such restriction on the judicial power, see 
Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 
78 Yale LJ. 816, 817-19 (1969). 
223. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 222, at 1434-35. 
224. 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991). 
225. The court examined this question as a "standing" question rather than a "self-
execution" question. Other courts, however, have tackled similar issues as "self-
execution" issues. See supra notes 4, 136. The Ninth Circuit in Verdugo discussed the 
self-execution issue separately, apparently believing that tbe issue involved something 
distinct from standing or the defendant's "rights" under the treaty. See id. at 1349-51. 
226. The question of remedy is distinct (if not totally unrelated), and the Ninth 
Circuit addressed it separately. In the domestic context, the Supreme Court has held, in 
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erty, and the statute flatly prohibits the government from depriving him 
of that liberty.227 
The individual's standing is not called into question by the fact that 
the category of persons the treaty seeks to protect is broad. The class 
of intended beneficiaries will typically be large when the obligation im-
posed by a law is a negative one, such as the obligation not to conduct 
searches and seizures without a warrant.228 Nor is standing defeated by 
the fact that the treaty is also designed to protect Mexico and the 
United States as states and more broadly to ensure international order. 
Treaties, like all laws, may seek to advance the interests of the commu-
nity as a whole by conferring primary rights on particular individuals. 
That a treaty is designed to protect societies and promote order by allo-
cating governmental powers does not mean that it does not also confer 
primary rights. The Supreme Court recently so held in Dennis v. Hig-
gins 229 in the context of defining a "right" for purposes of section 
1983. It was argued in Dennis that the Commerce Clause of the federal 
Constitution does not confer "rights" on individuals but rather is 
merely a "power-allocating" provision. 230 The Court agreed that the 
clause was a power-allocating provision, but held that the clause also 
confers "rights" on individuals to engage in interstate commerce with-
out being subjected to state regulation running afoul of the clause.231 
Similarly, the extradition treaty's prohibition of unilateral abductions of 
Mexican citizens from Mexico not only allocates power territorially be-
tween the United States and Mexico, it also confers a primary right on 
citizens ofboth countries not to be subjected to deprivations ofliberty 
by the other state while in their home state's territory.232 
a much criticized decision, that the fact that a criminal defendant was brought to the 
jurisdiction in violation of the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1988 & Supp. 
1991), did not deprive the criminal court of jurisdiction. See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 
519, 522-23 (1951). It did not, however, question the defendant's standing. It merely 
declined to add to the sanctions specifically provided in the Act "a sanction barring a 
state from prosecuting persons wrongfully brought to it by its officers." Id. at 523. 
227. See supra text accompanying notes 233. 
228. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. That is not to say that anyone harmed by such a 
search has standing to challenge it. See cases cited infra note 245. 
229. 111 S. Ct. 865 (I991). 
230. Id. at 870. 
231. Id. at 871-72. The Court said that it had already rejected the contrary 
argument in a prior case in which it held that individuals were within the "zone of 
interests" protected by the Commerce Clause. Id. at 872 (citing Boston Stock Exch. v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 321 n.3 (1977)); accord Monaghan, supra note 26, at 
246 (the purported dichotomy between distribution of power and establishment of 
personal rights is illusory). 
232. In Verdugo, the Ninth Circuit held that, when the state from which the 
defendant was abducted protests the abduction, the defendant has derivative standing to 
assert the rule against unilateral abductions. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 
939 F.2d 1341, 1355-57 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the analysis proposed here, however, 
there would be no need to resort to a notion of derivative standing. Derivative standing 
is necessary if the right being asserted is not one's own. It is true that only Mexico has 
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Nor does the fact that only the state may enforce treaty obligations 
at the international plane, or that the state may waive obligation, mean 
that individuals lack primary rights under the treaty for domestic pur-
poses.233 Until recently, this could be said of all treaties.234 These are 
the qualities of treaties under international law that have led commen-
tators to conclude that they do not confer "rights" on individuals. But 
it was precisely these qualities of treaties that the Framers sought to 
alter (or make irrelevant) for domestic purposes when they adopted the 
Supremacy Clause.235 
lt may be that many treaties will lie entirely beyond judicial cogni-
zance because they are intended to benefit only states as states, rather 
than individuals. For example, it is difficult to imagine a circumstance 
in which an individual would have standing to enforce a disarmament 
treaty. Even the person with the contract to remove the weapons can-
not be said to be a direct or intended beneficiary of such a treaty.236 
But that is because such a treaty was only intended to benefit society as a 
whole, rather than individuals within it.237 Treaties that do address the 
parties' treatment of individuals, however, should not be considered 
secondary rights under the extradition treaty as a matter of international law, but that 
does not mean that an individual cannot enforce the treaty in our courts. See supra note 
50. In the statutory context, standing rules determine whether an individual has a 
primary right under a law. If the court had applied such rules, it would have had little 
difficulty concluding that Verdugo had standing. After conducting such a standing 
analysis, the court's conclusion would have been that the individual had a "right" under 
the treaty as a matter of domestic law. fhe court's mistake was to begin by assuming 
that Verdugo did not have a right under domestic law because he did not have a right 
under international law. 
233. The "right" is a type of right of asylum. See United States v. Rauscher, I 19 
U.S. 407, 420 (1886). It is thus, by definition, a right not to be subjected to the 
enforcement jurisdiction of states other than, in this instance, Mexico. It is a right vis-a-
vis states other than Mexico. The fact that the right may be "defeasible" by Mexico does 
not negate its status as a right vis-a-vis the United States . 
. 234. See supra note 50. 
235. If the state of the individual's nationality did in fact waive the obligation 
before it was allegedly violated, then the individual would be without a claim. Perhaps 
the result should be the same if the state waives the obligation after the violation. 
However, the Ninth Circuit's holding in Verdugo that an individual has standing to 
enforce the obligation only if the state of his nationality affirmatively protests, see 939 
F.2d at 1352, is effectively a conclusive presumption that unless the state affirmatively 
protests it will be deemed to have waived the obligation. In no other context does an 
individual's ability to enforce a treaty in a domestic court turn on an affirmative 
demonstration that the state has not waived the obligation. See supra note 50. 
236. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3186 (1990) (dicta). 
237. Although a citizen of one of the states may have an interest in compliance with 
the treaty, it has long been established that a "minute and indeterminable" interest, 
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,487 (1923), or an interest that is indistinguishable 
from that of the general public, or an interest that is purely ideological, is insufficient to 
entitle an individual to enforce a law. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753-56 (1984); 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735-41, (1972); Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 468-88. 
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unenforceable by individuals merely because their purpose is also to 
benefit society as a whole. 
1n summary, standing doctrine addresses the same issue that the 
courts sometimes address as a "self-execution" issue: whether the duty 
imposed by the treaty gives rise to a correlative primary right of the 
litigant such that the litigant may enforce the rule in court. In the do-
mestic standing context, the conclusion by a court that the litigant has 
standing is effectively a determination that the litigant has a primary 
right under the applicable law. The same is true when the obligation 
being enforced has its source in a treaty. Once standing has been 
found, there should be no need to inquire further whether the litigant 
has a "right" under the treaty. Where a treaty requires a state to be-
have in a given way towards an individual, that individual will have a 
correlative primary right and thus standing. Where the connection be-
tween the state's obligation and the individual is less direct, the individ-
ual's standing will tum on whether he was an intended beneficiary of 
the obligation. 
2. Rights of Action and Remedial Rights. - The relationship among 
the concepts "right of action,"238 "remedy," and "standing" has been 
the subject of considerable uncertainty. Hart and Sacks define a right 
of action as the "capacity to invoke the judgment of a tribunal of au-
thoritative application upon a disputed question about the application 
of preexisting arrangements and to secure, if the claim proves to be 
well-founded, an appropriate official remedy."239 So conceived, a right 
of action is the right to obtain some remedy from a tribunal. One may 
have a right of action and yet not be entitled to the particular remedy 
one seeks. But if one is entitled to a remedy, one necessarily has a right 
of action, unless the remedy is purely defensive. In the cases that dis-
cuss when a private right of action exists under a statute, the Court uses 
the term as if it were synonymous with private remedy.240 
The Supreme Court has said that the standing question is "closely 
related" to the right of action question, and that, apart from Article 111 
considerations, the former asks "[e]ssentially" whether the legal provi-
sion can be understood as granting the plaintiff "a right to judicial re-
lief."241 But on other occasions it has distinguished standing, rights of 
action, and remedies.242 Hart and Sacks distinguish a primary right 
238. The courts appear to use the terms "right of action" and "cause of action" 
interchangeably. I use them interchangeably here. 
239. Hart & Sacks, supra note 26, at 154. 
240. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 
91 (1981); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979). 
241. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). 
242. In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), the Court distinguished the 
' concepts as follows: 
[S]tanding is a question of whether a plaintiff is sufficiently adversary to a 
defendant to create an Art. III case or controversy, or at least to overcome 
prudential limitations on federal-court jurisdiction; cause of action is a question 
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from a right of action, and they argue that the former does not neces-
sarily carry with it the latter.243 They regard a primary right as a neces-
sary but not sufficient condition of a right of action. This appears to be 
consistent with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court taking a self-
consciously more restrictive approach to inferring rights of action from 
statutes. It is, however, in tension with the common law maxim that 
"where there is a legal right, there is a legal remedy,"244 as well as with 
the sanctionist view that a right without a remedy is not a legal right. 
As discussed below, the tension is relieved significantly, with respect to 
primary rights against the government, by statutes, the common law, 
and the Due Process Clause. 
Although the particulars of the relationship are unsettled, the 
Court's decisions do permit some observations about the relationship 
among the concepts of standing, right of action, and remedy. A litigant 
has to establish a right of action only if he is seeking to maintain an 
action; a right of action is unnecessary if one is invoking a legal provi-
sion as a defense. When it has been determined that a right of action 
exists to enforce a particular law or when a law is being invoked as a 
defense, it may nevertheless be necessary to establish that a particular 
class of litigants has standing245 and that the remedy being sought is 
the appropriate one. 246 But a determination that a litigant is entitled to 
of whether a particular plaintiff is a member of the class oflitigants that may, as 
a matter of law, appropriately invoke the power of the court; and relief is a 
question of the various remedies a federal court may make available. A plaintiff 
may have a cause of action even though he be entitled to no relief at all, as, for 
example, when a plaintiff sues for declaratory or injunctive relief although his 
case does not fulfill the 'preconditions' for such equitable remedies. 
Id. at 239-40 n.l8 (1979) (citations omitted). In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 
112 S. Ct. 1028, 1033-35 (1992), the Court recently insisted on this distinction between 
rights of action and relief, holding that while the courts' implication of rights of action 
from statutes may raise separation of powers issues, no such problems are raised by 
their determination that a particular form of relief is available under a statute that 
confers a right of action but does not specify the remedy. 
243. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42. 
244. See 112 S. Ct. at 1033. 
245. Standing issues may arise when laws are invoked by defendants as well as 
plaintiffs. See, e.g., United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 86-89 (1980); United States 
v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731-33 (1980); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 
171-76 (1969). 
246. Thus, since Verdugo was a defendant and had shown that he had standing to 
invoke the treaty, he did not have to show further that he had a right of action. The 
court, however, properly required him to show that the appropriate remedy for the 
government's violation of its duty was his repatriation. See supra note 10. Similarly, 
defenders of the exclusionary rule argue that exclusion of evidence is the appropriate 
remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment, yet it has not been thought that the 
defendant needed a right of action to invoke the Fourth Amendment for the purpose of 
excluding evidence. With respect to both the extradition treaty in Verdugo and the 
Fourth Amendment, however, a litigant would need a right of action if he were to bring 
a lawsuit seeking damages for violations of the state's duty. In both cases the litigaiH 
would have to demonstrate his standing to enforce the legal provision. 
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a particular remedy is necessarily a determination that the litigant has a 
right of action for that remedy, unless the remedy is purely defen-
sive.247 And a determination that a particular class of litigants has a 
right of action or is entitled to a remedy is necessarily a determination 
that such litigants have standing. 
a. Rights of Action. - Numerous lower courts have held that a 
treaty is "self-executing" only if it creates a private right of action, and 
they determine whether a treaty confers such a right of action by look-
ing for evidence of an intent of the parties or of the U.S. treaty makers 
to create such a right of action.248 If they do not find such evidence, 
they conclude that the treaty is not "self-executing" and accordingly 
need not be considered by the court. But, although a treaty that does 
not itself confer a right of action may for that reason be described as 
not self-executing with respect to remedies,249 such a treaty is not for 
that reason unenforceable in the courts. A right of action is not neces-
sary if the treaty is being invoked as a defense. Moreover, treaties have 
long been enforced pursuant to common law forms of action. Further-
more, there are a number of possible federal statutory bases for rights 
of action to enforce treaties, the most important being section 1983 
and the AP A. Only if there is no other basis for the right of action 
should it be necessary to locate a right of action in the treaty itself. If 
the treaty expressly entitles the individual to a remedy, he is entitled to 
that remedy by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. If the treaty does not 
expressly entitle the individual to a remedy, a remedy should neverthe-
less be considered to be implicit in the treaty whenever failure to afford 
the individual the remedy would give rise to international responsibility 
of the United States to the state of the individual's nationality. 
A right of action is not necessary to invoke a treaty as a defense. 
For example, it is clear that the Framers intended that a treaty would 
nullify any inconsistent state law, and that a treaty supersedes an earlier 
federal statute.25° Thus, a defendant being prosecuted or sued under a 
state or prior federal law that is inconsistent with a treaty is entitled to 
invoke the treaty in court to nullify the state or federal law without hav-
ing to show that the treaty confers a private right of action. 251 More-
over, the Due Process Clause ordinarily requires that a government 
deprivation of property or liberty be preceded by a hearing. Thus, 
even if the beneficiary of a treaty-based primary right were deemed not 
to possess a right of action, he would nevertheless be free to resist a 
247. See Edwin M. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 16 (1934) ("[T]hat the grant 
of any [remedy] would necessarily presuppose a cause of action can hardly be 
doubted."). 
248. See cases cited supra note 137. 
249. See supra text accompanying notes 130-131. 
250. The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1870). 
251. See, e.g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 197 (1961); Patsone v. 
Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 145 (1914). 
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deprivation of liberty or property that violates the treaty and to invoke 
the treaty as a defense to a government coercive proceeding. 252 The 
Supremacy Clause, by nullifying inconsistent official action, and the 
Due Process Clause, by requiring a hearing at which the action can be 
challenged (either offensively or defensively), furnish the legal sanction 
that a strict sanctionist would consider an essential attribute of a law 
and a legal right. 
Even a litigant invoking a treaty in an action to obtain affirmative 
relief may not have to show that the treaty confers a right of action. 
Federal law, including treaty-based law, "is interstitial in its nature."253 
All federal law is enacted "against the background of the total corpus 
juris of the states."254 As with federal statutes, it is not unusual for 
"substantive rights [to] be defined by [treaty] but the remedies for their 
enforcement left undefined or relegated wholly to the states. "255 Trea-
ties imposing primary duties without specifying remedies, like similar 
federal statutory and constitutional provisions, have long been given 
effect through common law forms of action. In most of the nineteenth 
century treaty cases, the "right of action" of the party relying on the 
treaty was supplied by the common law; the treaty simply supplied the 
rule of decision. Thus, in Ware v. Hylton,256 the plaintiff was suing to 
recover a debt. The treaty merely nullified the defendant's defense of 
payment. In Foster v. Neilson,257 the plaintiff brought a suit in the nature 
of ejectment, and the treaty was relevant in determining who had title 
to the property.258 
In suits against the government, too, the right of action might 
have its source in the common law. If government action that assert-
edly violates federal law also constitutes a tort under state law or 
would otherwise entitle an individual to relief under the common law 
if performed by a private person, the individual may sue the official 
(state or federal) in his personal capacity, for either legal259 or equita-
252. On the constitutional right to a hearing and a judicial forum, see infra text 
accompanying notes 288-294. 
253. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 128, at 533. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. 
256. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). 
257. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829). 
258. See id. at 314-15; see also Florida v. Furman, 180 U.S. 402,428 (1901) (action 
to remove cloud on legal title); Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238, 243 (1889) 
(ejectment); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 485 (1879) (action "pursuant to a law 
ofthe State"); Orrv. Hodgson, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 453,462-63 (1819) (bill in equity); 
Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 277 (1817) (ejectment); Harden v. Fisher, 14 
U.S. (I Wheat.) 300, 303 (1816) (same). 
259. The Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, 
28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1988), preempted state-law tort suits against federal officers 
for money damages, substituting in its place a suit against the United States under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act. See United States v. Smith, IllS. Ct. 1180, 1189 (1991). On. 
the FTCA, see infra note 275. 
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ble260 relief, on a common law theory.261 The officer in such a case 
would be treated as a private person, and the violation of federal law 
would serve to nullify any defense of justification. 262 Until relatively 
recently, most damage actions against federal or state officials predi-
cated on acts that were alleged to violate federal statutory or constitu-
tional provisions took this form.263 In this manner, state law 264 may 
provide the right of action for enforcing treaty-based primary rights 
against state265 and, to the extent not preempted by federal law, federal 
260. Until 1988, state courts could entertain an action against a federal officer for 
damages or for "legal" remedies that resembled injunctions, such as replevin and 
ejectment, but not for mandamus or habeas corpus. See Richard Arnold, The Power of 
State Courts to Enjoin Federal Officers, 73 Yale LJ. 1385, 1394-95 (1964). The 
decisions regarding the power of state courts to enter an injunction against a federal 
officer were, however, "in confusion." See id. (arguing that state courts do have the 
power); see also Herbert Wechsler, Federaljurisdiction and the Revision of the judicial 
Code, 13 Law & Contemp. Probs. 216, 220 (1948) ("[It is] doubtful whether state courts 
are empowered to restrain the action of a federal official taken under color of federal 
law."). But see infra note 293 (structuralist arguments for the ability of state courts to 
enjoin federal officers). In 1988, Congress preempted state-law suits against federal 
officials for money damages, making the Federal Tort Claims Act the exclusive remedy 
for obtaining money damages for injuries caused by federal officials. See supra note 
259. Suits under the FTCA may be maintained only in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1346(b) (1988). State courts presumably retain the power to entertain suits in the 
nature of replevin and ejectment. Moreover, they retain whatever power they possessed 
to enter injunctions against federal officials. In any event, to say that a state court may 
not enjoin a federal official is not to say that state law may not afford a "right of action" 
to enjoin a federal official, an action maintainable only in federal court. Federal courts 
before Erie awarded damages against federal officials pursuant to what we today 
consider state-law rights of action, see infra note 261, and they enjoined threatened 
federal official action that would infringe rights protected by the common law and for 
which the officer would be held liable in damages if the act were completed, see infra 
note 282. 
261. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 132 (1851); Elliott v. 
Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137 (1836) (assumpsit). 
262. The officer who violates federal law is "stripped of his official or 
representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his 
individual conduct." Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908) (explanation for 
inapplicability of Eleventh Amendment). Nevertheless, the officer is entitled to a 
qualified immunity from suit for damages. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 128, at 
1277-1307. 
263. See Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a 
Sword, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1532, 1541-45 (1972); Hill, supra note 130, at 1124-28; Katz, 
supra note 27, at 48-51. 
264. Because the decisions cited supra notes 258 and 261 and infra note 266 were 
pre-Erie, they do not specify whether the rights of action were based on federal or state 
common law. Today, we would consider these actions, when brought against private 
defendants, to be based on state law. To the extent not preempted by federal statute, 
the actions against federal officials might alternatively be thought to be. based on federal 
common law. See infra note 284. 
265. See, e.g., Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 125 (1928) (state mandamus action 
against California secretary of state); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332,340 (1924) 
(state action for an injunction against city). 
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officials.266 If the litigant bases his action on state law, however, the 
right to recovery could depend on the vicissitudes of the relevant state 
law. For this and other reasons,267 the litigant may prefer to base his 
action on federal law. 
Treaties are enacted against a background not only of state law, 
but also of federal statutes authorizing the courts to award remedies for 
the violation of federal laws generally. There are a variety of possible 
federal bases for actions against state or federal officials predicated on 
an alleged violation of a treaty provision. The most important ones are 
section 1983 and the AP A. 
Section 1983 confers a right of action for damages and injunctive 
or declaratory relief on persons who have been deprived under color of 
state law "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
266. A number of federal decisions recognize that the common law may provide a 
right of action against federal officers whose conduct allegedly violates a treaty. In 
Curtis v. Fiedler, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 461 (1862), the Supreme Court dismissed an action 
in assumpsit against a federal collector of customs for the recovery of duties that were 
allegedly collected in violation of a treaty with Russia. The suit was dismissed on the 
ground that Congress had withdrawn that remedy by statute, but the Court said that 
"[p]rior to the passage of that act, it had frequently been held that an action of 
assumpsit would lie against a collector to recover back duties illegally exacted by him of 
the importer." Id. at 478. The Court did not distinguish between duties that were 
illegally exacted because they violated a treaty and those illegally exacted for some other 
reason. Similarly, Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888), Head Money Cases, 18 F. 
135, aff'd, 112 U.S. 580 (1884), and Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784 (C.C.D. Mass. 
1855) (No. 13,799) were all actions in assumpsit against federal customs collectors for 
the recovery of duties allegedly collected in violation of treaties. The actions were all 
dismissed on the ground that the treaties involved had been superseded by statute, but 
in none of the cases was the availability of a right of action against the official at common 
law questioned. Cf. DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 220 (1900), in which the Court held 
that a suit in assumpsit would lie against a customs collector for the recovery of duties 
that were claimed to have been unlawfully exacted; because the goods had been shipped 
from Puerto Rico, which, by virtue of a treaty, had become part of the United States, 
they had not been imported from a "foreign country" and accordingly there was no 
authority for their collection. Id. at 180-81. 
Recent amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act, however, purport to preempt 
state-law damage actions against federal officials. See supra note 259; infra note 275. 
On the role of state law in affording a right of action against federal officials for 
nonmonetary relief, see infra notes 282-283 and accompanying text. 
267. For example, the litigant may prefer to be in federal court. Recent Supreme 
Court decisions on the general federal question statute establish that federal jurisdiction 
may not exist under that statute if the federal law establishing the primary right is not 
enforceable through a federal right of action. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. 
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986). However, federaljurisdiction over a tort suit against a 
federal or state official would be available under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1350 (1981), if the official's act violates a treaty. That statute provides that "[t]he 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort 
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Id. 
Moreover, a federal official sued in state courts would be able to remove to federal court 
if his defense is based on federal law. See Mesa v. California, 109 S. Ct. 959 (1989). 
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stitution and laws" of the United States.268 Because treaties are "Law 
of the Land" under the Supremacy Clause, they fall within the terms of 
that statute. In Maine v. Thiboutot,269 the Court rejected the argument 
that the term "laws" in section 1983 "should be limited to some subset 
of laws."270 In the majority and dissenting opinions in Baldwin v. 
Franks,271 it was common ground among the Justices that the term 
"law" in a closely related provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1870 in-
cluded "a treaty between this Government and a foreign nation. " 272 
The lower courts that have considered the issue have concluded that 
section 1983 confers a right of action for violation of treaty-based 
rights.273 
Section 702 of the APA provides that "[a] person suffering legal 
wrong because of [federal] agency action, or adversely affected or ag-
grieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is 
entitled to judicial review thereof."274 This provision affords a right of 
action for equitable or declaratory relief275 challenging the actions of 
268. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1988). 
269. 448 u.s. 1 (1980). 
270. Id. at 4. 
271. 120 u.s. 678 (1887). 
272. ld. at 695 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that this was "conceded" by the 
majority). Baldwin involved section 5508 (now 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1988)), which provided 
that "[i]f two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any 
citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States, ... they shall be fined not more than five 
thousand dollars, and imprisoned not more than ten years .... " Id. at 684; accord 
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 661 n.36 (1979) (White, J., 
concurring) (noting that the Court in Baldwin concluded that discrimination against an 
alien in contravention of a treaty "would be within the proscription of § 241 but for t4e 
language in that statute limiting its application to denials of the rights of 'citizens'"). 
On the relationship between § 241 and § 1983, see id. at 661, 654-63 (because § 241 
and § 1983 are "analogous" and "describe[] the rights protected in language [that is] 
nearly identical," they should be read to be coextensive). But cf. id. at 623-44 (Powell, 
]., concurring) (although the term "laws" in § 241 includes all federal laws, the term in 
§ 1983 extends only to laws relating to equal rights). Justice Powell's position was later 
rejected in Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 1. 
273. See Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 626 (9th Cir. 1991); Hoopa 
Valley Tribe v. Nevins, 881 F.2d 657, 661-63 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 
1523 (1990); Note, judicial Enforcement oflntemational Law Against the Federal and 
State Governments, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1269, 1272 & n.28 (1991). 
274. 5 u.s.c. § 702 (1988). 
275. Suits against the United States seeking damages for injuries caused by federal 
officials are permitted in certain circumstances by the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402(b), 1504, 2110, 2401-2402, 2411-2412, 2671-2680 (1988). In 
1988, Congress broadened the grounds on which damages could be recovered against 
the United States under the Act, but at the same time it provided that the Act would 
thenceforth be the exclusive basis of obtaining money damages as the result of injuries 
caused by the actions of federal officers that do not violate the Constitution. See supra 
note 259. Accordingly, suits against federal officers for money damages for injuries 
caused by violation of treaties can no longer be pursued on a state law or federal-
common-law tort theory. Suits against such officers for equitable relief or "legal" relief 
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federal agencies or officials as contrary to law.276 Treaties are of course 
federal law and their violation thus produces a "legal wrong." Accord-
ingly, the APA has been read by the courts to authorize judicial review 
of federal agency action that allegedly violates a treaty.277 
These decisions are undoubtedly correct. Although the APA is to-
day considered the statutory basis of a federal right of action,278 the 
action for judicial review of federal agency action did not originate with 
the AP A. 279 Before the enactment of the APA, judicial review was 
available in an action against the officer personally.280 Independently 
of the AP A, it was a "familiar principle that executive officers [could] be 
restrained from threatened wrongs in the ordinary courts in the ab-
sence of some exclusive alternate remedy."281 This "right of action" 
for judicial review has been thought to have its basis in some combina-
other than money damages, however, are not preempted by the FTCA. See supra note 
260. 
276. See japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 n.4 
(1986). 
277. See Sohappy v. Hodel, 911 F.2d 1312, 1316-17 (9th Cir. 1990); Makah Indian 
Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1990); Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in 
Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 942-43 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (dictum); Flynn v. Shultz, 748 
F.2d 1186, 1191-94 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 830 (1985); Rainbow 
Navigation, Inc. v. Department of the Navy, 686 F. Supp. 354, 356 n.IO (D.D.C. 1988), 
aff'd, 783 F.2d 1072 (1986); cf.japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 230-31 n.4 (APA provides the 
"right of action" in suit seeking to enforce statute requiring the Secretary of Commerce 
to certify that japan's conduct "diminishes the effectiveness" of treaty). 
278. Seejapan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 230 n.4. 
279. See Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 95-96 
(1947), reprinted in Tom C. Clark, I.C.C. Practitioner's]., Feb. 1948, § 11, at 5. 
1 refer in the discussion that follows to what is known as nonstatutory review, that is, 
review of agency action not based on the terms of a statute relating specifically to that 
agency. See Clark Byse &Joseph V. Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue 
Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 
Harv. L. Rev. 308 (1967) (discussing nonstatutory review of federal agency action). 
Review of treaty-based claims might be authorized independently by an agency's organic 
statute. Review might additionally be available under statutes authorizing particular 
forms of relief other than injunctive or declaratory relief. There are numerous such 
statutes that would authorize particular remedies in particular contexts for treaty 
violations. For example, a writ of habeas corpus may be granted to persons "in custody 
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241 (1988); see generally Stephen G. Breyer & Richard B. Stewart, Administrative 
Law and Regulatory Policy 969-74 (1992) (discussing certiorari, mandamus, and other 
writs). The Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1981), might also be read to authorize 
tort remedies for actions of federal or state officials that violate treaties. 
280. See, e.g., American Sch. of Maguetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 
(1902). 
281. Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 290 (1944); accord Harmon v. Brucker, 355 
U.S. 579, 581-82 (1958) ("Generally, judicial relief is available to one who has been 
injured by an act of a government official which is in excess of his express or implied , 
powers."). 
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tion of the common law,282 either state283 or federal;284 ajurisdictional 
statute, such as the general federal question statute;285 and the All 
Writs Act.286 The right of action to enjoin state or federal action that 
282. See Attorney General's Comm. on Admin. Procedure, Administrative 
Procedure in Government Agencies, S. Doc. No.8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1941). The 
Report does not specify whether it was referring to state or federal common law. The 
issue was less important in the days before Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); 
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); and Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 
478 u.s. 804 (1986). 
283. Federal jurisdiction was sometimes based on diversity of citizenship. See 
Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851). Where diversity did not exist, "the 
federal courts [gave] the 'arising under' requirement a liberal interpretation in 
nonstatutory review actions." Byse & Fiocca, supra note 279, at 323. The recognition 
that the APA establishes a federal right of action, see Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American 
Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 n.4 (1986), obviates the jurisdictional problem. 
284. See Breyer & Stewart, supra note 279, at 976: 
If no specific statutory review is provided in the relevant organic statute, 
plaintiffs may seek review under more general principles of administrative 
law-principles that allow them to prevent unlawful governmental action or to 
obtain redress when they have been injured. As a result of Erie R.R. v. 
Tompkins, federal courts no longer exercise any general common law 
jurisdiction to redress torts by government officials. But ... federal courts have 
continued the private law model of administrative law by developing special 
federal law remedies for official activities that would also constitute common 
law torts. Nevertheless, a plaintiff must still find a statute that provides a 
federal court with jurisdiction to hear his or her claim. The most obvious 
choice is ... 28 U.S.C. § 1331 .... 
285. See Stark, 321 U.S. at 310 ("The responsibility of determining the limits of 
statutory grants of authority [to protect justiciable individual rights] ... is a judicial 
function entrusted to the courts by Congress by the statutes establishing courts and 
marking their jurisdiction."); Louis L. Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review, 71 Harv. L. 
Rev. 401, 432 (1958) (':Judicial review ... rests on the congressional grant of general 
jurisdiction to the article Ill courts."); see also Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 705 
(1979) ("Absent the clearest command to the contrary from Congress, federal courts 
retain their equitable power to issue injunctions in suits over which they have 
jurisdiction."); Huie v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 698, 704 (11th Cir. 1987) ("Once jurisdiction is 
established, courts maintain the authority to provide equitable relief commensurate to 
the harm."); Breyer & Stewart, supra note 279 (common law and jurisdictional statute); 
Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative 
Action: Some Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 867, 870 n.l2 
(1970) (general federal question statute and All Writs Act). With respect to actions 
alleging treaty violations, the Alien Tort Statute may provide authority for judicial 
review. See supra note 267. 
286. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1981). See Scalia, supra note 285, at 870 n.l2. In his 
dissenting opinion in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), then-Justice Rehnquist 
distinguished the courts' ability to imply rights of action for damages, which he thought 
was limited in the absence of congressional authorization, from their power to entertain 
actions seeking equitable relief, which "federal courts have historically had broad power 
to fashion." ld. at 42. The litigant need only show "a right and a violation" (and 
presumably also jurisdiction) to trigger this equitable power. ld. (quoting Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)). Because he was discussing 
the availability of a right of action for equitable relief, his reference to "right" here is 
obviously a reference to a primary right. He attributes the right of action recognized in 
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)-to enjoin violations of the Constitution by state 
HeinOnline  -- 92 Colum. L. Rev.  1150 1992
1150 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1082 
violates federal law might also be thought to be a concomitant of the 
Supremacy Clause's invalidation of such action, as the "customary legal 
incidents of voidness" include "the availability of a suit for rescission or 
for an injunction."287 
The right of action for judicial review of federal agency action for 
conformity with federal law also has constitutional underpinnings. The 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that deprivations 
of property or liberty by the federal government be either preceded or 
followed by a hearing.288 Although the hearing need not initially be in 
officers-to this broad equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts. See 446 U.S. at 43. 
In contrasting the courts' power to award damages, he noted the inapplicability to 
damage actions of the All Writs Act, thus suggesting obliquely that the broad equitable 
powers of the federal courts have their source in that statute. See id. 
The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988), would supply the 
equivalent statutory basis for actions for declaratory relief. See United States v. Fausto, 
484 U.S. 439, 444 (I988) (suits for declaratory judgment among the "forms of action 
traditionally used for so-called nonstatutory review of agency action"). Professor 
Monaghan has recently written that the Declaratory Judgment Act, being remedial only, 
was not meant "to dispense with the need to establish a right of action." Monaghan, 
supra note 26, at 238. As he distinguishes a right of action from a primary right, his 
statement suggests that the combination of a primary right under a treaty and a remedy 
under the Declaratory Judgment Act is an insufficient basis for maintaining an action for 
a declaration of a violation of federal law. The authorities he cites, however, discuss 
only the Act's effect on federal jurisdiction. I d. They establish that, if the primary right 
that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate through his action, disregarding anticipated defenses, 
does not rest on federal law, federal jurisdiction is lacking even though the declaratory 
remedy is authorized by federal law. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 
U.S. 667 (1950). It does not follow that federal jurisdiction would be lacking if the 
plaintiff were to seek a declaration to vindicate a primary right afforded by federal law. 
In any event, leaving aside the question of federal jurisdiction, the cases are consistent 
with the conclusion that a plaintiff seeking a declaration that agency action violates 
federal law need not show more than a primary right under federal law and the 
availability of a remedy under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Cf. Shaw v. Delta Air 
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.l4 (1983) (entertaining action for a declaration that state 
statute preempted by federal statute). Today, a similarly situated plaintiff would be able 
to rely on section 1983 for his right of action, see Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of 
Los Angeles, llO S. Ct. 444, 448 (1989), but at that time the issue was unsettled. The 
Court did not discuss the right of action issue, but it held that the case arose under 
federal law. 
The co-drafter of the Declaratory Judgment Act has written that to maintain an 
action for a declaration, one must possess a "cause of action," but he uses the latter 
term in the sense of "legal interest," a concept that combines notions of ripeness and 
standing: "[A declaratory judgment plaintiff] must show that his rights are in direct 
issue or jeopardy; and incidental thereto, must show that the facts are sufficiently 
complete, mature, proximate, and ripe to place him in gear with his adversary, and thus 
to warrant the grant of judicial relief." Borchard, supra note 247, at 36. 
287. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. ll, 19 (1979) 
(implying a right of action for rescission and injunction from a federal law declaring 
certain private contracts void). ' 
288. This is clearly the case when the liberty or property interest is not itself, 
defined by federal statute or treaty, such as when the state physically restrains an 
individual or takes away his tangible property. See Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. 
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a court, if Congress provides for an initial hearing by administrative 
agencies or non-Article III courts, some measure of review by an Arti-
cle III court-or perhaps a state court-is thought to be required either 
by Article III289 or by the Due Process Clause itsel£.290 Judicial review 
of executive deprivations ofliberty or property for which an administra-
tive hearing has not been provided would appear to be required a forti-
ori. The Due Process Clause thus ordinarily contemplates that 
government deprivations of primary rights will be either preceded or 
followed291 by an opportunity to test the legality of the deprivation in 
Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 243-44 n.6 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(deprivations of "personal liberty" require either "prior opportunity to be heard" or 
"prompt subsequent hearing"). But a liberty or property interest may also be created by 
federal law, including treaty. In such circumstances, the power of Congress to limit the 
procedures available for the vindication of the treaty right might be thought to be 
broader, on the theory that, if Congress has the power to repeal the right entirely, it 
must have the lesser power oflimiting the manner in which it may be enforced. On this 
theory, a total denial of a hearing might be construed as an implicit repeal of the 
substantive right. This ground for curtailing hearing rights within the agency has not 
yet commanded a majority in the Court, cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) 
(plurality opinion), but, as discussed infra note 294, it may be the unarticulated rationale 
for upholding preclusions of judicial review in certain circumstances. Cf. Davis v. 
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979) (noting that because "[s]tatutory rights and 
obligations are established by Congress ... it is entirely appropriate for Congress ... to 
determine ... who may enforce them and in what manner"). 
289. See Bator, supra note 188, at 267-68; see also Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. 
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70 n.23 (1982) (plurality opinion) ("[W]hen 
Congress assigns [public rights] matters to administrative agencies, or to legislative 
courts, it has generally provided, and we have suggested that it may be required to 
provide, for Art. III judicial review."). 
290. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87 (1932) (Brandeis,]., dissenting); Hart 
& Wechsler, supra note 128, at 400. The Supremacy Clause, in conjunction with Article 
III, generally requires that judicial review of agency action depriving persons of liberty 
or property encompass de novo review of the agency's interpretation of the law. See St. 
joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) ("The supremacy of law demands that there shall be opportunity to have 
some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied; and whether the 
proceeding in which facts were adjudicated was conducted regularly."). Hart writes that 
"[i]t's perfectly obvious that final authority to determine even questions of law can be 
given to executive or administrative officials in many situations not having the direct 
impact on private persons of a governmentally-created and judicially-enforceable duty, 
or of an immediate deprivation of liberty or property by extra-judicial action." Hart & 
Wechsler, supra note 128, at 410. These categories, however, would appear to cover 
only situations in which no "rights" are at stake either because there is no correlative 
duty or because no one was an intended beneficiary. See, e.g., Panama Canal Co. v. 
Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309, 318 (1958). 
The deference that courts give to administrative interpretations of law is not 
inconsistent with the requirement of de novo review of issues of law: the agency's 
construction of the law is deferred to only to the extent the agency was delegated law-
making power on the matter. To that extent, the law is what the agency says it is. See 
Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, supra note 166, at 27-28. But the 
court's duty includes a duty to determine de novo whether the agency exceeded the 
scope of the delegation. 
'291. If a predeprivation hearing is not afforded, the Due Process Clause in certain 
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court, either state292 or federal,293 at least if no administrative hearing 
has been afforded. Because of the constitutional problems that would 
arise if a right of action were not recognized, the Court requires that a 
congressional intent to preclude judicial review of federal agency action 
be expressed clearly.294 
circumstances requires that a retrospective remedy be afforded the individual. See 
McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, I 10 S. Ct. 2238 (1990). 
292. Presumably, both the Due Process Clause and Article III would be satisfied if 
federal agency action were reviewable by state courts, as state court decisions on federal 
issues would be reviewable by the Supreme Court. But cf. supra note 260 (doubtful 
whether state courts may enjoin federal officer). Suits against federal officers 
commenced in state courts, however, will wind up in federal court if the officer is basing 
his defense on federal law and prefers to be in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1442a 
(1988); Mesa v. California, 109 S. Ct. 959 (1989). 
293. In Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988),Justice Scalia rejected the m;rlority's 
contention that denying the litigant a federal forum for vindication of his constitutional 
rights would present constitutional problems: "The first response to the Court's grave 
doubt ... is that the denial of all judicial review is not at issue here, but merely the 
denial of review in United States district courts." Id. at 611 (Scalia,]., dissenting). The 
Constitution's requirement ofajudicial forum in certain circumstances, combined with 
the fact that the Constitution gives Congress the discretion not to establish lower federal 
courts, is a strong ground for concluding that the state courts do indeed bave the power 
to enjoin federal officials, at least if similar relief is not available in federal court. Cf. 
supra note 260 (state injunctions against federal officials). 
294. See Webster, 486 U.S. at 603; see also Bowen v. Michigan Acad. of Family 
Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986). The Court in these cases referred to the 
serious constitutional questions that would arise if a judicial forum were denied for 
constitutional claims. As noted supra note 288, the constitutional problems with 
preclusion of review might be thought to be less severe with respect to action that 
allegedly deprives persons of property or liberty interests themselves created by federal 
statutes or treaties, on the ground that, if Congress has the power to withdraw the right 
entirely, it has the power to take the lesser step of limiting its enforceability. This 
analysis has not yet gained favor with the Court as a ground for limiting the right to a 
hearing within the agency, but it may be the unarticulated rationale for upholding the 
preclusion of all judicial review where Congress has placed statutory limits on the 
government's withdrawal of statutory benefits and provided for an administrative 
hearing. See, e.g., United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439 (1988); United States v. Erika, 
Inc., 456 U.S. 201 (1982). Even with respect to statutory rights, however, preclusion of 
review presents constitutional problems if no administrative hearing is allowed. See 
Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1968) 
(Harlan, J., concurring). In any event, the Court applies the presumption in favor of 
judicial review to nonconstitutional claims as well as constitutional ones (although 
perhaps not always to avoid constitutional questions). See Lindahl v. Office of 
Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768, 778 (1985). 
In certain contexts, preclusion of review bas been expressly upheld on the ground 
that Congress possesses extraordinary substantive powers in the field, and that therefore 
the Due Process Clause does not even apply. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 128, at 
413-19 (describing the decisions regarding admission of aliens as drawing "distinctions 
between when the Constitution applies and when it does not apply at all"). On the 
applicability of the Constitution to unadmitted aliens, see Jean v. Nelson, 4 72 U.S. 846, 
858 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
The extent of Congress' power to deny access to the courts for enforcement of 
treaty-based rights is beyond the scope of this Article. It is clear, however, that ih this 
HeinOnline  -- 92 Colum. L. Rev.  1153 1992
1992] TREATY-BASED RIGHTS 1153 
The pre-APA regime for obtaining judicial review offederal agency 
action gave rise to what many considered a "mass of confusion."295 By 
enacting the APA and its 1976 amendments waiving the sovereign im-
munity of the United States and thus dispensing with the need to sue 
the officer, Congress sought to rationalize this area of the law.296 Be-
cause the regime the APA seeks to rationalize made no distinction be-
tween official action violative of treaties and official action violative of 
statutes or the Constitution,297 no such distinction should be read into 
the APA. To hold the APA inapplicable to agency action that is unlaw-
ful because it violates a treaty would not be to make such treaties unen-
forceable; rather, it would be to resurrect the prior regime, with all of 
its complications and inadequacies, with respect to treaty cases. There 
is no justification for doing so. 
Moreover, a distinction between federal agency action that violates 
a statute and federal agency action that violates a treaty would be both 
unworkable and illusory. Virtually all federal agency action that vio-
lates a treaty will also violate a statute. It is well established that, unless 
Congress clearly says otherwise, federal statutes are to be construed 
consistently with our treaty obligations.298 Thus, unless Congress has 
clearly said otherwise, federal statutes delegating authority to federal 
officers do not delegate authority to violate treaties. Accordingly, fed-
eral agency action that allegedly violates a treaty obligation of the 
United States also exceeds the scope of the statute delegating authority 
to the agency. Judicial review of the agency action that allegedly ex-
ceeds the scope of the agency's delegated authority is of course pre-
cisely what the APA has always been thought to address. 
In short, in suits against state and federal officials, a right of action 
is afforded by section 1983 and the APA, respectively, to any person 
holding a primary right under a treaty unless either a treaty or a statute 
makes other procedures exclusive or affirmatively precludes review.299 
context as in others, "[i]f there be an admitted wrong, the courts will look far to supply 
an adequate remedy." DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 176-77 (1901). 
295. Then Assistant Attorney General Scalia used this phrase to describe the law 
concerning the applicability of sovereign immunity to the officer cases described above. 
See supra note 280-81 and accompanying text. To rationalize this area, Congress 
amended the APA in 1976 to waive the United States' sovereign immunity in APA suits, 
thus dispensing with the need to sue the officer. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1656, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6121, 6126. 
296. See id. at 6140. 
297. See supra note 266. 
298. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
§ 114 (1986). 
299. Review is unavailable under section 1983, the APA, or any of the other sources 
of nonstatutory review if a law (or treaty) sets forth exclusive alternative enforcement 
mechanisms or (in the absence of constitutional problems) otherwise precludes review. 
lt will thus be necessary in such suits to consult the enforcement mechanisms, if any, of 
. the treaty. But, contrary to what some courts appear to believe, the absence of such 
~echanisms does not mean that there is no right of action. The issue is whether the 
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Both statutes, in their respective spheres, "close the gap between pri-
mary right and remedial right, making the existence of the former de-
terminative of the existence of the latter."300 It should thus be 
unnecessary in the categories of cases of most concern here to locate a 
right of action in the treaty itself. 
In light of these two statutes, whether the treaty itself confers a 
right of action will generally be an issue only with respect to treaties 
treaty's mechanisms are exclusive. Indeed, the absence of enforcement mechanisms in 
the treaty militates in favor of the individual seeking to enforce the treaty's obligations 
through the rights of action discussed in the text. There is a strong presumption, 
moreover, that these rights of action have not been foreclosed. See Wright v. City of 
Roanoke Redev. Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1987) (cause of action available 
unless "state actor demonstrates by express provision or other specific evidence from 
the statute itself that Congress intended to foreclose such private enforcement. 'We do 
not lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy' 
for the deprivation of a federally secured right," quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 
992, 1012 (1984)); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) ("[O]nly 
upon a showing of'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should 
the courts restrict access to judicial review [of federal agency action]," quoting Rusk v. 
Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962)). 
A right of action may also be foreclosed by a statute, as opposed to the treaty itself. 
See Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 546-50 (1895) (statute declaring 
decision of immigration and customs officer "final" unless reversed by Secretary of the 
Treasury precludes review by habeas corpus), limited by Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3, 9 
(1915) ("[C]ondusiveness of the decisions of immigration officers ... is conclusiveness 
upon matters of fact."). 
300. Monaghan, supra note 26, at 251. Professor Monaghan was here referring to 
section 1983, but later observes that the AP A standing decisions and those under 
section 1983 are converging. See id. at 255. Of course, with respect to federal officers, 
the APA leaves open a substantial gap by not providing for retrospective relief, a gap 
that the ITCA only partially closes. 
The recent decision in Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992) may signal a 
retrenchment from the Dennis v. Higgins analytical framework, see id. at 1371 (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting), in that, in the section 1983 context, the Court required evidence that 
Congress "unambiguously confer[red] upon the ... beneficiaries of the [federal statute] 
a right to enforce [the statute]," id. at 1367. Read broadly, the decision would render 
section 1983 superfluous, since it would afford a right of action only if one may be 
implied under the statute under Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The decision need not 
be read so broadly, however. The Court's approach was influenced by the fact that the 
statute involved was enacted under the Spending Clause, which requires a particularly 
clear intent to subject the state to liabilities. See 112 S. Ct. at 1366. Additionally, the 
Court appeared to hold that an enforceable right was lacking because the federal law 
was "not specific" and did not provide "statutory gnidance" and thus left the states with 
"a great deal of discretion," id. at 1368-69; the decision is thus not a "right of action" 
holding under the framework proposed herein, but rather a holding that the law did not 
impose on the state the obligation the litigant was seeking to enforce. See supra text 
accompanying notes 148-154; cf. 112 S. Ct. at 1370 (statute imposes "only a rather 
generalized duty on the State"). 
To the extent that the Court reopens the gap between primary rights and secondary 
rights Dennis v. Higgins had closed, or if section 1983 or the APA were for some reason 
read not to apply to treaty-based rights, the analysis proposed here for determining 
whether a right of action is implicit in the treaty itself should be employed to determine 
whether a treaty itself confers a right of action against state and federal officials. 
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that confer primary rights on individuals vis-a-vis other individuals. In 
such cases, when the treaty expressly obligates the United States to af-
ford particular remedies to individuals, those remedies are available to 
those individuals without legislation by virtue of the Supremacy 
Clause.so1 If the treaty is silent as to remedies, and no common-law 
action is available, it is necessary to consider whether a right of action is 
nevertheless implicit in the treaty. Until relatively recently, if a statute 
conferred a primary right, as defined above, the courts generally im-
plied a right of action for damages or other appropriate relief,302 in the 
absence of a clear legislative intent to make other enforcement mecha-
nisms exclusive.303 This approach was applied to constitutional claims 
beginning with Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents .so4 In Cort v. Ash,sos 
however, the Court began to take a self-consciously more restrictive 
approach to implying rights of action for damages under statutes.306 
The individual's status as an intended beneficiary of a statute became 
just one of four factors, and the "focus" of the analysis became whether 
Congress affirmatively intended to create a right of action.307 In sev-
eral cases, the Court has declined to infer a right of action under a 
statute even though it found the plaintiff to be an intended benefici-
ary.308 With respect to constitutional claims, however, the Court has 
adhered to its comparatively hospitable, pre-Cort approach to implying 
rights of action. 
Although the Court has not, since Cort, addressed the proper test 
for implying rights of action from treaties, several factors militate in 
favor of employing a third approach, more closely resembling the ap-
301. See, e.g., Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 489,496-97 (1824); Harden 
v. Fisher, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 300, 301 (1816); Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 
U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 627 (1812). 
302. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 
374 (1982) ("If a statute was enacted for the benefit of a special class, the judiciary 
normally recognized a remedy for members of that class."); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 
241 U.S. 33,39 (1916) ("[W]here [disregard of statute] results in damage to one of the 
class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover ... is 
implied."). 
303. See Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 420-21 
(1975); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 
453, 464-65 (1974). 
304. 403 u.s. 388, 392, 396 (1971). 
305. 422 u.s. 66 (1975). 
306. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 811 
(1986) ("The development of our framework for determining whether a private cause of 
action exists has proceeded only in the last 11 years, and its inception represented a 
significant change in our approach to congressional silence on the provision of federal 
remedies."); Curran, 456 U.S. at 377 ("In 1975 the Court unanimously decided to 
modify its approach .... "). 
307. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988). 
308. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 145 (1985); 
Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 541 (1984); Transamerica Mortgage 
Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979). 
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proach the Court applies today with respect to constitutional claims. 309 
First, the Court has justified its retrenchment in the statutory context 
on the ground that 
statutory rights and obligations are often embedded in com-
plex regulatory schemes, so that if they are not enforced 
through private causes of action, they may nevertheless be en-
forced through alternative mechanisms .... The Constitution, 
on the other hand, does not "partake of the prolixity of a legal 
code."3IO 
In this regard, treaties resemble the Constitution far more closely than 
statutes.311 Second, the Court's continuing hospitable approach to im-
plying rights of action under the Constitution is based in part on the 
intent of the Framers to make the courts the primary enforcers of con-
stitutional rights.312 We saw above that the Framers had a similar in-
tent with respect to treaties.3I3 Third, the clear statement rule that Cort 
and its progeny impose on Congress comes at relatively little cost, as 
Congress can easily correct a decision denying a right of action under a 
statute.314 It is, however, far less appropriate to impose a clear state-
ment obligation on our treaty partners even with respect to future trea-
ties; it is entirely illegitimate to subject pre-Cort treaties to such a 
standard. Finally, and most importantly, the consequences of denying 
beneficiaries of treaty obligations the power to enforce them in court 
309. The Ninth Circuit expressly held that the Cort analysis was not applicable in 
determining whether a right of action is implicit in Article I 7 of the Warsaw Convention. 
See In re Mexico City Aircrash of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 409 (9th Cir. 1983); 
see also Benjamins v. British Eur. Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978) (neither the 
majority opinion implying a right of action, nor dissenting opinion, employs the Corl 
test). 
310. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819)). 
311. See Shabtai Rosenne, Developments in the Law ofTreaties, 1945-1986, at 59 
(1989) (treaties "are rarely if ever drafted with that degree of precision and carefully 
chosen language that one would expect to find in a well-drafted private-law contract or 
in good parliamentary drafting"). If treaties do include their own complex enforcement 
scheme, it might be appropriate to deny a private right of action, but this is more 
appropriately accomplished through rules applied in the constitutional context and in 
the context of section 1983. See supra note 299. In reality, the cases in which the Court 
has denied a private right of action to intended beneficiaries have been cases in which 
there was strong evidence of an intent to make alternative enforcement mechanisms 
exclusive. See Russell, 473 U.S. at 147; Fox, 464 U.S. at 539; Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 20. 
In this respect, the difference between the test proposed here and the Cort test as 
applied to statutes may thus not be significant. 
312. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 241-42. 
313. See supra part 1l.B. 
314. See Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 536 (1989) 
("Congress undoubtedly was aware from our prior cases such as [Cort] that the Court 
had departed from its prior standard for resolving a claim urging that an implied 
statutory cause of action should be recognized .... "); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 
442 U.S. 560, 579 (1979) ("[1]fCongress intends those customers to have such a federal 
right of action, it is well aware of how it may effectuate that intent."). 
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through a private action are, or should be, of greater concern to the 
nation, as the failure of the courts to remedy a violation of a foreign 
national's primary rights under a treaty would render the United States 
responsible on the international plane to the state of the individual's 
nationality. As explained in greater detail below, every treaty obligat-
ing a state to treat individuals in given ways includes, as a matter of 
international law, an implicit obligation to provide redress if the indi-
vidual is injured by a state's failure to afford him the required treat-
ment. In treaty cases, therefore, an important factor in determining 
whether a private right of action should be "implied" under a treaty 
that does not expressly confer one is whether failure of the courts to 
afford the remedy would produce (or exacerbate) the international re-
sponsibility of the United States to the state of the individual's national-
ity. If it would, a private right of action to obtain that remedy under 
domestic law should be considered to be implicit in the treaty.315 
b. Remedies.- If the individual's right of action is conferred by a 
general statute, such as section 1983 or the APA, or if the individual is 
invoking the treaty as a defense, it will be necessary to determine the 
appropriate remedy in a given case. If the treaty itself specifies that the 
individual should be afforded a particular remedy, the individual is en ti-
ded to the remedy by virtue of the Supremacy Clause.316 If the treaty is 
silent as to remedies, however, it is important to consider a second re-
spect in which treaties are interstitial. Unlike federal statutes, treaties 
are interstitial in two legal orders at the same time. In the international 
legal order, treaties are concluded by states against a background of 
customary international law. Norms of customary international law 
specify the circumstances in which the failure of one party to fulfill its 
treaty obligations will permit the other to rescind the treaty, retaliate, 
or take other steps. At a more general level, norms of customary inter-
national law address the secondary rights of states that arise upon a 
violation by other states of primary rules of international law, including 
those having their source in a treaty. Like individuals who enter into 
contracts governed by municipal law, the parties to a treaty may ad-
dress some remedial issues in the treaty itself. They may, however, 
leave remedial matters to the default rules of customary international 
law that-like municipal contract law-govern those matters that the 
parties have left unaddressed. 
If a treaty obligates the parties to treat individuals in a given way 
but does not specify a remedy for failure to comply with the obligation, 
the default rules of customary international law dictate the secondary 
315. The rule proposed herein might be subject to one exception: it should 
arguably be unavailable when the United States agrees on a different reparation directly 
with the state of the individual's nationality. In such situations, the agreement might be 
deemed a waiver by the state of the individual's nationality of the United States' 
obligations under the treaty. See supra note 235. 
316. See supra note 301. 
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rights of the state of the individual's nationality and the corresponding 
secondary duties of the offending state. In many instances, the secon-
dary duty will be a duty to treat the individual in a given way. For ex-
ample, Professor Schachter, addressing the secondary rights (and 
correlative secondary duties) of states for violations of primary rules of 
international law, has written as follows: 
When a State is internationally responsible for a wrongful 
act, it is under an obligation to discontinue the act and to pre-
vent the continuing effects of the act. It is also normally under 
a duty to restore the situation as it existed before the 
breach .... 
The question of whether compensation is a permissible 
substitute for restoration (or restitution) has given rise to 
much controversy. Clearly, [however,] an offending State is under a 
duty to return an object held unlawfully or to return territory illicitly 
held as long as that is materially possible. 317 
Thus, if one state unlawfully takes an individual (an "object" under in-
ternational law) from the territory of his state of nationality, and is 
holding him unlawfully, the offended state is entitled under customary 
international law to have its national returned. Because the treaty was 
entered into against a background of customary interuationallaw, the 
rule of customary international law requiring that objects unlawfully 
held be returned should be read into the treaty prohibiting the taking 
as if it had been incorporated therein expressly.318 
As a matter of international law, the remedy is considered to be 
317. Oscar Schachter, General Course in Public International Law, 178 Recueil des 
Cours 190-91 (1984) (emphasis added); accord Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States§ 901 cmt. d (1987). 
318. This would certainly be the case under international law rules of treaty 
interpretation. The Vienna Convention, which is considered declaratory of customary 
international law of treaty interpretation, provides that in the interpretation of a treaty 
provision, "there shall be taken into account, together with the context, ... any relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties." Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, supra note 154, at 340. 
Of course, for purposes of international law, there is no need to determine whether 
the remedy has its basis in the treaty or customary international law. Both are equally 
binding on the parties. For purposes of domestic law, however, there may be a 
distinction between the two for determining whether the courts may require compliance 
by the executive. The Supremacy Clause, in conjunction with the Take Care Clause, 
provide a stronger textual basis for concluding that the courts may order the executive 
to comply with treaty-based obligations. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 
700 (1900) (in the absence of a treaty or other "controlling executive or legislative act or 
judicial decision," courts must resort to the customs or usages of civilized nations). 1 do 
not propose to consider here whether the courts must afford individuals remedies 
required by customary international law because customary international law is "part of 
our law." Rather, I advocate the more limited conclusion that (a) customary 
international law of remedies for violation of primary rnles of international law should, 
for purposes of our domestic law, be considered to be incorporated into treaties that 
impose primary obligations on states, and (b) individuals should be deemed to be 
entitled to the remedy by virtue of the Supremacy Clause to the extent that affording the 
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that of the state of the individual's nationality, not of the individual 
himself. But the statement that only the state has a remedy under inter-
national law means that only the state may set in motion the machinery 
of international law for sanctioning the violation. That conclusion 
should have little bearing on whether the individual should be entitled 
to obtain a sanction for the violation in domestic courts. The reasons 
that led me to conclude that the Supremacy Clause transforms the pri-
mary rights of states into the primary rights of individuals who are in-
tended beneficiaries of the correlative obligation equally support the 
conclusion that the clause similarly transforms the secondary rights of 
states into the secondary rights of those same individuals. 
When a state's primary obligation under a treaty is an obligation to 
behave in a given way towards individuals, an additional default rule of 
customary international law imposes an obligation on the parties to the 
treaty to afford the individual a remedy domestically. I refer here to the 
international law doctrine of exhaustion of local remedies, which makes 
the international law responsibility of the offending state to the state of 
the individual's nationality contingent on the individual's having sought 
and been denied redress in the offending state's local courts.319 This 
doctrine of international law may be said to entitle the individual to a 
remedy in the offending state's local courts in the very same way that 
the treaty gives the individual a primary right: in both cases the sanc-
tion is the international responsibility of the offending state to the state 
of the individual's nationality. 
As we saw above, to an extreme sanctionist this sort of entitlement 
does not give the individual a legal right under international law be-
cause the individual in fact has such a remedy only if the domestic law of 
the offending state gives him the remedy.320 Such a sanctionist would 
remedy would prevent, cure, or reduce the United States' responsibility to the state of 
the individual's nationality under international law. 
3I9. See generally Amerasinghe, supra note 22, at 45-5I (exhaustion of local 
remedies required); Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 494-505 (4th 
ed. I990) (rights and remedies of aliens under local and international law); Castor H.P. 
Law, The Local Remedies Rule in International Law I5-I6 (I96I)(defining exhaustion 
and justifying its use); Max Sorenson, Manual of Public International Law 582-9I (I968) 
(defining rnle and applications); Algot Bagge, Intervention on the Ground of Damage 
Caused to Nationals, with Particular Reference to Exhaustion of Local Remedies and the 
Rights of Shareholders, I958 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. I62, I65-69 (exhaustion requires 
balancing private burdens and state sovereignty); David R. Mummery, The Content of 
the Duty to Exhaust Localjudicial Remedies, 58 Am.J. Int'l L. 389 (I964) (exhaustion 
rooted in states' jurisdiction over persons within their borders). The remedy afforded 
must "rectify the situation," Mummery, supra, at 40I, and be "acceptable on the 
international plane," Sorenson, supra, at 584. Although international law does not 
require that the local remedy be afforded by a court, the usual method of exhausting 
local remedies is to bring suit in the local courts. In any event, for the reasons cited 
infra note 322, in the United States the courts are the appropriate agencies for affording 
the remedy required by international law. 
320. See supra note 45. 
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consider any "right" of the individual in such a situation to be a right 
under domestic law.321 At bottom, therefore, the conclusion that the 
individual does not have a right under international law is based on the 
understanding that the availability of the remedy depends on domestic 
incorporation of the international law rule requiring remedy by the of-
fending state. 
The United States, however, has incorporated treaties into domes-
tic law through the Supremacy Clause. The purpose and effect of this 
incorporation was precisely to alter, for purposes of our domestic law, 
the international law rule pursuant to which only states were thought to 
have rights and remedies under treaties. The Framers' reasons for 
making treaties the law of the land and requiring the courts to give 
them effect require the conclusion that, in those circumstances in which 
affording a remedy to the individual would avoid or cure (entirely or 
partially) a treaty violation against the state of the individual's national-
ity, the individual is en tided to the remedy by virtue of the Supremacy 
Clause. 
As discussed in Part 11, the Framers were concerned about treaty 
violations in part because such violations could offend other states and 
perhaps lead to calamity and war. The Framers empowered foreign na-
tionals to utilize our courts to enforce the nation's treaty commitments 
in part to cure any such violations before they gave rise to international 
friction. As Hamilton wrote in defending Article III's conferral of juris-
diction over cases involving aliens: 
The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers 
for the conduct of its members. And the responsibility for an 
injury ought ever to be accompanied with the faculty of 
preventing it. As the denial or perversion of justice by the 
sentences of courts, as well as in any other manner, is with 
reason classed among the just causes of war, it will follow that 
the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in 
which the citizens of other countries are concerned.322 
It was thus contemplated that the federal courts would guard against 
offenses to foreign states by ensuring that foreign nationals were not 
denied justice in our courts. Hamilton's arguments of course extend 
beyond the application of treaties: the international law duty not to 
deny justice to an alien applies whether or not the alien's underlying 
claim is based on international law. But, although the concepts are dis-
321. See Austin, supra note 26, at 594 ("Each state may . . . enforc[e] 
[international] law by its own tribunals .... This, however, is not International, but 
National or Civil Law; i.e. in regard to the sanction."). 
322. The Federalist No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961); accord 2 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 520 
(Merrill jensen ed., 1976) (statement of james Wilson at the Pennsylvania Convention) 
("It was thought proper to give the citizens of foreign states full opportunity of 
obtaining justice in the general courts, and this they have by its appellate 
jurisdiction .... [I]t is necessary to preserve peace with foreign nations."). 
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tinct, the rules concerning denial of justice and those concerning ex-
haustion oflocal remedies are related in that they both require the local 
courts to adhere to an international standard in affording remedies to 
aliens.323 Moreover, as Hamilton acknowledged, the reasons for ex-
tending federal jurisdiction to all cases involving aliens apply even 
more strongly to "cases arising upon treaties and the law of na-
tions."324 The Supremacy Clause and its jurisdictional corollary in Ar-
ticle III (in their application to treaties), were designed to avert 
violations of international law by the United States by empowering in-
tended beneficiaries of treaty obligations of the United States either to 
enforce those obligations or to obtain such remedies as would cure the 
violation as a matter of international law. This is exactly the purpose of 
the international-law doctrine of exhaustion oflocal remedies.325 The 
Supremacy Clause's declaration that treaties are the "Law of the Land" 
should accordingly be interpreted by reference to the international law 
rules obligating the United States to afford individuals adequate do-
mestic remedies for violations of treaties. The clause should be read to 
require the courts to afford individuals, at a minimum, such remedies as 
would avoid or cure a violation of international law by the United States 
against the state of the individuals' nationality. 
CoNCLUSioN 
The oft-repeated proposition that individuals do not have rights 
under treaties under international law means only that individuals do 
not have standing to enforce treaties in the international arena. That 
disability has no bearing on the ability of individuals to enforce treaties 
in our domestic courts. The Framers recognized that treaties, as inter-
national instruments, did not operate on individuals. By declaring trea-
ties to be the "supreme Law of the Land," they intended to alter this 
quality of treaties for purposes of our domestic law. The Supremacy 
Clause made treaties operative on individuals and enforceable in the 
ordinary courts at the behest of individuals. 
I have proposed in this Article a framework for determining which 
treaties may be enforced in the courts and by whom. The courts must 
first consider whether the treaty imposes judicially enforceable obliga-
tions. A treaty may not impose obligations at all, or the obligations it 
323. See Alwyn V. Freeman, International Responsibility of States for Denial of 
Justice 403-55 (1938); Mummery, supra note 319, at 411-14. 
324. The Federalist No. 80, supra note 322, at 476; see also Mummery, supra note 
319, at 414 (although denial of justice and exhaustion of local remedies are distinct, 
denial of justice "will at times provide a fortiori examples of ineffective local judicial 
remedies"). 
325. See Freeman, supra note 323, at 408 ("By appropriately redressing violations 
of international law with respect to the person or property of foreigners, the State 
asserts a check upon its answerability to other States, discharges the responsibility that 
has already been engaged, and thus parries, as it were, by anticipation, a reaction from 
abroad."). 
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imposes may be addressed to the legislature, or they may not be en-
forceable judicially for residual separation-of-powers reasons. 
If the treaty does impose judicially enforceable obligations, the 
court must determine whether the individual seeking to enforce it has 
standing to invoke it. I propose employing for this purpose the stand-
ing rules that are used to determine whether an individual has standing 
to enforce statutory or constitutional duties of the state. lf the treaty is 
being invoked by a plaintiff, the court must also determine that the 
plaintiff has a right of action. The right of action, however, need not 
have its source in the treaty. Ordinarily, a right of action for enforce-
ment of a treaty against state and federal officials will be provided by 
section 1983 and the APA, respectively. Finally, the court must deter-
mine what the appropriate remedy for the treaty violation is. For this 
purpose, I propose that the court consult the rules of international law 
specifying the appropriate remedy for international law violations and 
"entitling" the individual to obtain the remedy domestically. Because 
the Supremacy Clause was adopted in part to prevent or cure violations 
of international law by the United States before they gave rise to inter-
national friction, the clause should be read to require the courts to 
award to individuals at least such remedies as would prevent or cure 
(partially or wholly) international responsibility of the United States to 
the state of the individual's nationality. 
ADDENDUM 
As this issue went to press, the Supreme Court handed down its 
decision in United States v. Alvarez Machain:326 Disagreeing with the 
Ninth Circuit's holding in Verdugo, on which the Court of Appeals in 
Alvarez had relied,327 the Supreme Court held that the United States-
Mexico Extradition Treaty did not prohibit unilateral abductions by 
U.S. officials of persons in Mexican territory. The Court accordingly 
did not reach the issue that is the focus of this Article: under what 
circumstances may individuals enforce in our courts obligations im-
posed by treaty on the United States.328 Justice Stevens, joined by Jus-
tices Blackmun and O'Connor, dissented. They concluded that the 
treaty did prohibit unilateral abductions and that the defendant had 
326. 60 U.S.L.W. 4523 (U.S. June 16, 1992). 
327. See supra notes 11 and 13 and accompanying text. 
328. The majority noted, nonetheless, that "[t]he Extradition Treaty has the force 
of law, and if, as respondent asserts, it is self-executing, it would appear that a court 
must enforce it on behalf of an individual regardless of the offensiveness of the practice 
of one nation to the other nation." 60 U.S.L.W. at 4527. The majority thus recognized 
that the question of a treaty's "self-executing" nature is distinct from the question of its 
status as domestic law, apparently disagreeing with the lower courts that have suggested 
that only treaties that are self-executing are the law of the land. See supra notes 
143-145 and accompanying text. 1t also apparently concluded, in agreement with this 
Article, that a protest by the offended state should not he a prerequisite of an 
individual's standing to enforce a treaty. See supra note 235. 
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standing to assert the rights of Mexico in our courts if Mexico pro-
tested.329 The court summarily vacated the Ninth Circuit's judgement 
in Verdugo, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent 
with Alvarez.330 
329. 60 U.S.L.W. at 4531 n.26. 
330. 60 U.S.L.W. 3857 (U.S. June 23, 1992). 
